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In Partisan Gerrymandering and the Construction of American Democracy, 
Erik J. Engstrom offers an important, historically grounded perspective 
on the stakes of congressional redistricting by evaluating the impact of 
gerrymandering on elections and on party control of the U.S. national 
government from 1789 through the reapportionment revolution of the 
1960s. In this era before the courts supervised redistricting, state parties 
enjoyed wide discretion with regard to the timing and structure of their 
districting choices. Although Congress occasionally added language to 
federal- apportionment acts requiring equally populous districts, there 
is little evidence this legislation was enforced. Essentially, states could 
redistrict largely whenever and however they wanted, and so, not surpris-
ingly, political considerations dominated the process.
Engstrom employs the abundant cross- sectional and temporal varia-
tion in redistricting plans and their electoral results from all the states— 
throughout U.S. history— in order to investigate the causes and con-
sequences of partisan redistricting. His analysis reveals that districting 
practices across states and over time systematically affected the com-
petitiveness of congressional elections, shaped the partisan composition 
of congressional delegations, and, on occasion, decided party control of 
the House of Representatives. In conclusion, Engstrom places recent 
developments in redistricting politics and scholarship within the larger 
historical context uncovered in this book.
Erik J. Engstrom is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Uni-
versity of California, Davis.
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Gerrymandering and the 
Evolution of American Politics
This book evaluates the impact of congressional redistricting on elections 
and control of U.S. national government from 1789 to the reapportion-
ment revolution of the 1960s. The motivating question is one that scholars 
seldom ask: what was redistricting like in the past? It turns out that the 
answer to this question is essential for understanding both the past and 
present of American politics.
Almost all previous research on congressional redistricting concentrates 
on the period after the 1960s. In the mid- 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court 
outlawed malapportioned electoral districts for both state legislatures and 
the U.S. House of Representatives. This transformative legal revolution 
produced a massive wave of redistricting across the nation that shifted 
the partisan landscape in state legislatures across the country and funda-
mentally redistributed power in American politics. In addition, this reap-
portionment revolution led to the creation of a large scholarly literature 
devoted to studying the causes and consequences of the modern decennial- 
redistricting process. In this now- vast literature, redistricting prior to the 
1960s receives brief treatment, although the years before 1964 constitute 
nearly 75 percent of the United States’ nearly 225- year history.
Such narrowly focused accounts suffer from two principal disadvan-
tages. First, it has led political scientists and historians to radically under-
estimate the power of gerrymandering in shaping the development of 
American politics. Throughout the 19th century, partisan gerrymandering 
systematically structured the competitiveness of congressional elections, 
2 Partisan Gerrymandering and the Construction of american democracy 
the partisan composition of congressional delegations, and, on occasion, 
decided party control of the House of Representatives. Gerrymandering 
roiled state legislatures across the country, and profoundly shaped the 
tumult of 19th- century politics and policy. The outcomes of these colli-
sions continue to cast long shadows over modern American politics.
Second, the failure to examine the history of redistricting has led stu-
dents of contemporary American politics to misunderstand the context in 
which modern redistricting takes place. Modern research has argued that 
redistricting produces, at best, only a minimal impact on the partisan bal-
ance of power in Congress. However, no consensus has emerged about why 
gerrymandering has had such little impact. Some scholars have argued that 
constraints on gerrymandering in the modern period— including court 
oversight, “one- person, one- vote” mandates, and demands by congres-
sional incumbents for secure seats— have made it virtually impossible to 
engage in a full- blown partisan gerrymander. Others contend that the par-
tisan gains to be had from gerrymandering are limited, regardless of the 
institutional configuration under which redistricting takes place. Moving 
beyond the relatively fixed institutional and political context of modern 
redistricting provides a powerful opportunity to assess these competing 
explanations.
Some of the most interesting questions in the study of American poli-
tics, therefore, concern the differences between the past and the present. 
Understanding the causes and consequences of these differences prove 
essential for understanding both the historical development and contem-
porary practice of American democracy.
The Electoral Development of Congress
Although the basic constitutional architecture of the federal government 
has remained largely constant since 1789, the day- to- day conduct of Amer-
ican politics has changed dramatically over time. Nowhere are these differ-
ences more visible, and more consequential, than in the House of Represen-
tatives. Nowadays, elections to the House are characterized by extremely 
low levels of competition. Incumbents dominate election outcomes. Most 
incumbents who run for reelection win, and win big. One consequence of 
low competition is that membership in Congress is relatively stable from 
one year to the next. Another consequence is that the partisan seat distri-
bution in the House tends to respond slowly to changes in public prefer-
ences. Indeed, a large and influential literature on congressional elections 
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is motivated by trying to understand the causes and consequences of low 
competition and candidate- centered congressional elections.
Congressional elections of the mid- to- late 19th century, by contrast, 
were characterized by rabid partisanship, intense voter interest, massive 
turnout, and fever- pitched competition. For example, between 1870 and 
1890, nearly 45 percent of House elections were decided by a vote margin 
of 10 percent or less (Dubin 1998). Compare that to House elections in 
the 2000s, in which only 22 percent were decided by such a narrow margin 
(Jacobson 2009, 32). The deep competitiveness of district- level congres-
sional elections also reflected, and reinforced, intense battles over control 
of the national government.
Throughout most of the 19th century, the national vote in House elec-
tions was very close. As a result of the fever- pitched local and national com-
petition, party ratios in the House could, and often did, change dramati-
cally. For example, in 1854, Democrats lost a monumental 74 seats. The 
House only had 234 members total, so the seat swing accounted for nearly 
30 percent of the membership. In 1874, Republicans were on the losing 
end of another massive wipeout— surrendering 94 seats. In 1894, Demo-
crats lost 114 seats (in a chamber of 357). These impressive seat swings 
reflected, and reinforced, intense competition between the parties for con-
trol of national government. Notably, from 1870 to 1900, each party con-
trolled the House exactly half of the time.
The fierce competition for elected office radiated down to the indi-
vidual career decisions of representatives. Today, Congress is filled with 
career politicians. In a typical year, nearly 95 percent of incumbents run 
for reelection and win. By contrast, in the 19th century, many fewer incum-
bents ran and fewer won. In 1852, for example, only 52 percent of incum-
bents sought election. Consequently, tenures in Congress tended to be 
brief. Representatives tended to serve one or two terms before perhaps 
returning to their home state to pursue local office, receiving a federal 
appointment, or returning to the private sector. The result was immense 
turnover in the membership of the House. At the beginning of the 28th 
Congress in 1843, for example, 73 percent of the members were freshmen. 
This rapid turnover shaped both the internal structure of the House and 
the legislative process. For example, committee memberships and com-
mittee chairs were incredibly fluid, making the reciprocal tit- for- tat rela-
tionships necessary to forge durable policy coalitions incredibly difficult 
to foster.
While these facets of 19th- century electoral and legislative poli-
tics constitute agreed- upon facts, the reasons for them remain uncertain 
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and controversial. Unfortunately, past scholarly research fails to provide 
a fully satisfying explanation for the tumult of 19th- century politics and 
its replacement by the professionalized politics of the 20th century. The 
dominant scholarly narrative emphasizes realignment and critical elec-
tions. According to this narrative, American political history can be divided 
into long periods of electoral normalcy and brief periods in which tradi-
tional voting patterns and ideological cleavages are abruptly overturned. 
Though considerable debate exists within the realignment literature about 
what exactly constitutes a critical election, some common patterns in the 
literature can be identified.
According to its foremost proponents— V. O. Key (1955), Walter Dean 
Burnham (1970), and James L. Sundquist (1983)— critical elections feature 
abrupt, permanent changes in traditional voting patterns. These changes 
in mass- voting behavior are accompanied by intense battles at the elite 
level over party nominations, party platforms, and ideological alignments. 
Finally, the realignment of ideological coalitions creates “a unified major-
ity party capable of enacting major policy shifts” (Brady 1988, 29). Critical 
elections thus are defined by sudden shifts in voting patterns, reshaped 
party platforms, and sweeping changes in public policy.
Although considerable ink has been spilled debating whether or not 
certain elections meet the criteria of a critical realigning election, the gen-
eral consensus is that, at a minimum, the elections of 1828, 1860, 1896, 
and 1932 deserve a spot on the electoral equivalent of Mount Rushmore. 
These elections, according to the chief advocate of the realignment narra-
tive, constitute the “mainsprings” American politics (Burnham 1970); they 
reshaped electoral and policy coalitions for succeeding generations. The 
realignment narrative also serves as a normative baseline against which 
many political observers judge modern American politics. Moreover, the 
supposed absence of transformative elections in the post– World War II era 
provides the evidence that many commentators, in and out of academia, 
have used to impugn modern U.S. politics.
The realignment narrative also provides a potentially satisfying expla-
nation for the modernization of American politics— and the House in 
particular— in the 20th century. Again, the dominant scholarly storyline 
follows in the footsteps of Burnham. In particular, the election of 1896, 
so the argument goes, swept aside the fever- pitched party competition of 
the 19th century and replaced it with low turnout, less partisan elections, 
and professionalized political institutions. By turning the North into the 
preserve of the Republican Party and the South into the preserve of the 
Democratic Party, the tumultuous partisan elections of the 19th century 
were gradually replaced by candidate- centered elections.
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In the context of congressional elections, the consequences of the 1896 
realignment meant that members of Congress could control their own dis-
trict in a way that had been previously impossible. Fewer representatives 
suffered electoral defeat. Moreover, the creation of single- party dominated 
districts also drastically reduced voluntary retirements from Congress. 
Incumbents increasingly decided to run for reelection and win. The result 
was to transform the House from a body of amateurs to a body of profes-
sionalized, careerist politicians. The consequences of this transformation 
cannot be overstated. Indeed, the vast literature on congressional politics— 
including research on the incumbency advantage, the electoral connection, 
the vanishing marginals, committee powers, campaign finance, pork- barrel 
politics, etc.— can be framed as the search for the causes and consequences 
of candidate- centered elections. Thus, the realignment narrative provides 
a sweeping explanation for the dynamics of American political history. It 
offers an account for both the turbulence of 19th- century politics and its 
replacement by the professionalized politics of the 20th and 21st centuries.
Yet this traditional narrative suffers from a number of problems. One 
problem is that the critical election perspective downplays the importance 
of other elections. Noncritical elections are typically subsumed into the 
category of “normalcy.” Yet one does not have to look far to find other 
19th- century elections that were rife with hot- button campaign issues and 
significant policy consequences: consider the election of 1874. The con-
gressional seat swings in this election easily matched those of other elec-
tions typically deemed realigning. Nor was the election of 1874 without 
profound long- term policy consequences (Mayhew 2004). This election 
brought Democrats to power for the first time since the late 1850s. With 
majority control of the House, Democrats rolled back the federal govern-
ment’s commitment to Reconstruction in the south. The impact of these 
policy decisions are hard to overstate. The actions halted Reconstruction 
in its tracks— fundamentally altering the trajectory of American politics for 
the next century.
One can readily tell similar stories about other elections. Consider, for 
example, the election of 1888. Although mostly ignored in the vast realign-
ment genre, the election of 1888 produced dramatic changes in both par-
liamentary procedure and economic policy. The subsequent 51st Congress 
featured a fundamental reworking of the legislative process (i.e., Reed’s 
Rules), an elaborate extension of the tariff system (i.e., the McKinley Tar-
iff), and a radical manipulation of the currency market (i.e., the Sherman 
Silver Purchase Act). Each of these legislative acts looms large in the United 
States’ political and economic history. Yet the election that selected this 
Congress rarely musters notice in the realignment narrative. Delving even 
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further back into American electoral history, one could point to the elec-
tion of 1802. In this election, Republicans gained 38 seats, solidified their 
grip on the national government, and set about reversing a decade worth 
of pro- Federalist public policy. Notably, the subsequent Congress voted 
to fund the Louisiana Purchase (see chapter 2), which altered the course 
not just of American history, but of world history. Yet despite the dramatic 
influence the 1802 election had on the future trajectory of American his-
tory, this election garners nary a mention in the realignment narrative.
One could easily point to other examples of transformative elections 
and pivotal legislative sessions throughout the 19th century. But even if 
we were to allow for a more expansive definition of “critical elections,”  the 
notion that some elections are more consequential than others, and elicited 
more excitement among voters,  raises more questions than it answers. Even 
more problematic is that when scholars have gone looking for evidence of 
the massive swings in popular opinion that a critical election explanation 
would predict, the evidence has been far from clear- cut. Indeed, in the con-
text of congressional elections, the vote swings of the 19th century were 
not especially large when compared to the corresponding seat swings. For 
example, in the congressional election of 1854– 55, Democrats lost only 4 
percent of their vote share from the previous election, yet lost a stunning 
74 seats. In 1894, Democrats lost 11 percent of the vote from the previous 
election, but lost 114 seats. These massive seat swings do not square well 
with the notion of critical elections being driven by equally large swings in 
popular opinion.
In an influential modification of the realignment narrative, David Brady 
(1985; 1988) first uncovered this striking pattern of 19th- century House 
elections. He found evidence that in two of the “realigning eras” of the 
19th century— the Civil War and 1890s realignments— big seat swings 
were brought on not by big shifts in mass opinion, but a systematic small 
shift in the vote being reproduced across a number of highly competitive 
districts. The result was an avalanche of legislative turnover. Based on this 
evidence, Brady argued that the Civil War and 1890s realignments were 
the result of “structural factors” rather than “the result of changes in mass 
voting behavior” (1985, 29).
Brady went on to argue that in a realigning period elections are domi-
nated by an overriding national issue (i.e., slavery in 1860; the economy 
in 1896). Because the parties take clear- cut, distinct positions on issues in 
these elections, voters are presented with stark alternatives. This nation-
alization produces a systematic vote swing across districts, a correspond-
ing seat swing, and, ultimately, large tranches of legislative turnover. The 
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result is the election of a new majority party that then enacts bold new 
policies on the dominant issue cleavage. According to Brady, both the Civil 
War and 1890s realignments meet these criteria. Thus, Brady provided a 
major refinement of the realignment narrative for the tumultuous patterns 
of 19th- century elections and policy.
While Brady’s argument and evidence are persuasive, they beg a series 
of important— and unanswered— questions. First, falling into the same 
trap as prior work on critical elections, the argument implicitly dismisses 
other elections as irrelevant or inconsequential. But other elections such 
as 1802 and 1874 display a strikingly similar pattern— small swings in the 
vote leading to large swings in seats. In 1802, for example, Republicans’ 
seat share in the House increased from 59 percent to 71 percent, although 
their vote share only increased from 56 percent to 57 percent (Rusk 2002, 
215– 17). In 1874, Republicans’ vote share dropped from 53 percent to 45 
percent, yet their seat share collapsed— falling from 69 percent to 37 per-
cent (matching the losses suffered in 1854 and 1894). Thus, lumping elec-
tions into only one of two categories— critical and noncritical— does too 
much violence to the nuanced patterns of American political history.
Second, one is left wondering why, in some years, electoral outcomes 
become nationalized, and not in others. The historical record of the 19th 
century is chock- full of national issues that dominated electoral campaigns 
and party rhetoric: war, western expansion, national banks, the extension 
of slavery, Reconstruction, suffrage, currency, tariffs, economic regula-
tion, and civil- service reform. All of these issues, at one time or another, 
pervaded 19th- century electoral campaigns. Beyond the much- discussed 
programmatic elections of 1860 and 1896, one finds national issues perme-
ating campaign platforms and contemporary newspaper coverage (Bensel 
2000; Gerring 2001; Kernell 1986). To put this in the language of statistics, 
there is little to no variation on the independent variable. National issues 
permeated 19th- century campaigns. Thus, nationalization alone cannot 
serve as a satisfactory explanation for variation in party swings and legisla-
tive turnover.
Third, even if we were to allow for a more expansive definition of 
“nationalized” congressional elections, a much larger puzzle remains unan-
swered. Why did small shifts in the vote lead to massive legislative turnover 
in some elections, but not others? Why were 19th- century congressional 
electoral results, and subsequent policy outcomes, so tumultuous? Why 
are modern congressional elections tame, compared to their 19th- century 
counterparts? These questions cut to the heart of how we understand 
American political institutions— past and present.
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Gerrymandering and the Construction of American Democracy
To answer these questions, this book turns the spotlight on partisan ger-
rymandering. The rest of this book is devoted to showing that the strate-
gic manipulation of congressional districts played a fundamental but, until 
now, ignored role in shaping the historical trajectory of American politics 
and public policy. Aside from a few initial forays by political historians, 
research on American electoral development has radically downplayed dis-
trict design. Yet politicians of this era often acted as if little else beyond ger-
rymandering mattered. Redistricting roiled legislatures across the country, 
biased electoral outcomes, made and ruined political careers, and funda-
mentally shaped political control of the national government.
In this era, before the one- person, one- vote doctrine and the Voting 
Rights Act, state legislators had nearly free reign over when and how to 
redistrict. Congress occasionally added provisions to various apportion-
ment acts mandating that district populations be as equal as possible, but 
there is little evidence that these provisions were ever enforced, much less 
achieved. Aside from the requirements that districts maintain geographical 
contiguity, and after 1842 that districts select only one representative, there 
was almost no oversight of the districting process.1 Thus, mapmakers of 
the 19th century had a much broader strategic menu to choose from than 
do their modern counterparts.
Political parties in control of state government took full advantage of 
this freedom. Unlike the modern period in which states redraw congres-
sional boundaries at regular 10- year intervals, in the 19th century, states 
redistricted almost whenever they wanted. In every year from 1862 and 
1896, with one exception, at least one state redrew its congressional district 
boundaries. Ohio, for example, redrew its congressional district boundar-
ies six times between 1878 and 1890. Other states went long stretches with 
the same boundaries. Unless prodded by a reapportionment, which added 
or subtracted seats to a states’ congressional delegation, state legislatures 
could opt out of redistricting altogether. Connecticut, for instance, kept 
the exact same congressional district lines for 70 years (1842– 1912).
The importance of incumbency and careerist aspirations among con-
gressional incumbents, although on the rise, had yet to fully take root. The 
norm of using seniority in allocating committee chairmanships had yet to 
emerge. Thus, protecting incumbents was less important than simply cap-
turing as many seats for your side as possible. As a result, parties were will-
ing to push partisan advantage to the edge. To do so, partisan mapmakers 
carved states into districts with narrow, yet winnable, margins. For exam-
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ple, consider the pro- Democratic redistricting of Indiana in 1852 where 
Democrats carved the state into a remarkable 10 (out of 11) Democratic 
districts despite only garnering 53 percent of the statewide vote.
These state- level redistricting decisions aggregated together to shape 
party ratios in the House. For much of the 19th century, and especially in 
the period after the Civil War, the national division of the congressional 
vote was razor thin. With electoral mobilization at its maximum, parties 
looked in other directions for electoral advantage. Redistricting offered 
one such tool. The timely partisan shift of a few seats could make the dif-
ference between majority and minority status in the House. In 1878, for 
example, the mid- decade redistricting perpetrated by Democrats in Ohio 
and Missouri created just enough seats to allow Democrats to hold onto 
the House. Similarly, in 1888, Republican legislators in Pennsylvania engi-
neered a last- minute redistricting that helped ensure a narrow Republican 
majority in the House.
By making districts competitive in the quest for short- term partisan 
advantage, parties were often able to wring a disproportionate number 
of seats out of their vote share. Yet this strategy sometimes backfired. By 
manufacturing competitive districts, state parties, at times, created an elec-
toral system where small swings in the national vote could lead to immense 
swings in seats. For instance, in 1874, the Republican percentage of House 
seats dropped from 69 percent to 36 percent (94 seats) despite their national 
vote dropping only 7 percent. The explanation for these dramatic reversals 
in electoral fortunes lies with the highly competitive congressional districts 
of the 19th century. And, pushing the argument back one step further, this 
competitive electoral system was, to a large extent, the product of strategic 
mapmaking.
The consequences of highly partisan, and unpredictable, redistricting 
also extended to the career decisions of politicians. Because states drew 
such competitive districts, political careers were often cut short. Incumbent 
members of Congress faced a more variable redistricting schedule, and one 
that was more partisan when it happened. These two factors provide part 
of the explanation for the short tenure of 19th- century representatives. 
Directly, the partisan redrawing of districts could end a career. Indirectly, 
because redistricting was less predictable, planning for a long- term career 
in the House was hampered. The uncertainty surrounding when, and if, 
one would be redistricted likely decreased the willingness of members to 
make long- term investments in a congressional career.
Not only does redistricting provide a key to unlocking the puzzle of 
19th- century electoral patterns, subsequent changes in the frequency and 
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nature of redistricting help explain the emergence of candidate- centered 
politics in the 20th century. By the 20th century, the frequent and highly 
partisan redistricting gave way to an era of limited redistricting. Where 
redistricting in the 19th century was frequent, in the 20th, redistricting 
became comparatively infrequent. Because the courts had yet to enter 
the political thicket, there was no compulsion for states to redraw district 
boundaries. As competition for the state legislatures declined from their 
earlier heights during the early to mid- 20th century, the incentives to 
frequently redistrict for partisan advantage lost much of its steam. Many 
states consequently opted out of the redistricting game altogether.
As I show in chapter 8, redistricting became less frequent, less partisan, 
and, hence, less transformative in its consequences. Representatives could 
plan and build careers in the Congress without having to fear that their dis-
trict would be redrawn at any moment. And as careerism took off, changes 
in the internal distribution of power in the House— and, by implication, 
American national politics— radically shifted. With more members serving 
for longer, norms of seniority emerged to allocate positions of power such 
as committee chairmanships. The net result of these changes in redistrict-
ing practices was to lay down the building blocks for the rise of candidate- 
centered elections.
Gerrymandering and Public Policy
While this book is ultimately about political history, its subject is of tre-
mendous political and practical importance. The collisions between party 
elites during the 19th century profoundly shaped the policy landscape, and 
the reverberations of these collisions continue to roil American politics.
To take one example, the American South is still emerging from a leg-
acy of Jim Crow laws and one- party domination. The federal abandonment 
of Reconstruction and African- American suffrage rights in the 1870s and 
1880s shaped Southern, and national, politics for succeeding generations. 
Indeed, it is little exaggeration to say that much of national elections and 
policy making between the 1870s and 1960s revolved around the dynamics 
of Southern politics. The one- party South guaranteed Democrats a nearly 
100- seat head start in the race for majority control of the House, and, for 
much of this period, gave the southern wing of the Democratic Party a de 
facto veto over national policy making (e.g., Katznelson and Mulroy 2012; 
Key 1949). The subsequent transformation of Southern politics and soci-
ety that has taken place since the 1960s has shaped not just policy and soci-
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ety in the South— it has also transformed American politics at the national 
level.
While this part of the narrative of American politics is well known, I 
show in chapters 4 and 5 that gerrymandering played a central role at piv-
otal junctures in Southern history. For example, gerrymandering strategies 
in the early 1870s helped bring Democrats to national power for the first 
time since the Civil War. In Southern states, gerrymandering was used as a 
tool to oust Republicans and bring Democrats into power both in the state 
legislatures and Southern congressional delegations. In the North, highly 
responsive gerrymanders swept Democrats into power for the first time 
since the Civil War.
Back in control of the House, the Democratic majority proceeded to 
undermine the foundations of Reconstruction policy. The result was to 
return the South to Democrats. In 1892, Democratic gerrymanders helped 
Democrats gain a majority in the House. With majority control, they were 
able to put the final nail in the coffin of African- American suffrage rights in 
the South by officially repealing the federal statutes that had been created 
to enforce the 15th Amendment. The federal abandonment of suffrage 
protection would profoundly shape Southern politics and society for the 
next century. It would be another 70 years before the federal government 
would intervene in Southern electoral politics. The legacies of these events 
continue to cast a long shadow over American politics and society.
Gerrymandering also shaped other foundational policy trajectories of 
the 19th century. As we will see in this book, the Louisiana Purchase, the 
Kansas- Nebraska Act, tariff regimes, and currency policy were all influ-
enced by political alignments that had been manufactured by gerrymander-
ing. Similarly, in the 20th century, district design fundamentally altered the 
policy priorities of the federal government. For example, malapportion-
ment in House districts in the early to mid- 20th century consistently pro-
duced rural majorities in the House. The result was to bias federal policy 
making toward agricultural interests at the expense of policies favored by 
metropolitan interests. From sugar subsidies to funding of school lunches, 
gerrymandering and malapportionment was implicated.
Gerrymandering also played a starring role in the parliamentary evolu-
tion of the House. Consider, for example, the passage of Reed’s Rules— 
arguably the most consequential parliamentary development in the history 
of the House (Binder 1997; Cox and McCubbins 2005; Strahan 2007; Val-
lely 2009). In the 51st Congress, following the 1888 election, the Republi-
can Speaker of the House, Thomas B. Reed (R- ME), successfully enacted 
a series of parliamentary rule changes that allowed the majority party— 
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and the speaker in particular— to break the ability of the minority party to 
obstruct and delay legislation.
Reed’s gambit centralized legislative scheduling in the hands of the 
Speaker and reduced the power of minorities to obstruct legislative busi-
ness; in effect, transforming the House into the highly partisan institution 
that it is to this day. Indeed, prominent congressional scholars like Gary 
Cox and Mathew McCubbins (2005) have argued that the history of the 
House can be divided into two periods: before and after Reed’s Rules. Left 
out of the story, however, is that Speaker Reed, and his fellow Republicans, 
owed their narrow majority to a timely pro- Republican gerrymander in 
Pennsylvania just prior to the 1888 election. Without the strategic gerry-
mander in Pennsylvania, Republicans likely would have been in the minor-
ity in the 51st Congress. The subsequent development of the House— and 
American politics— would have been quite different.
In addition to these long- term policy and parliamentary reverberations, 
the evolution of redistricting created political and legal reverberations that 
continue to mold modern redistricting politics. The current set of laws and 
regulations surrounding redistricting emerged directly out of the conse-
quences of redistricting politics in the mid- 20th century. In the final chap-
ter, I examine the current political and legal nature of modern redistricting 
and how it has been directly shaped by the earlier history of redistricting.
Gerrymandering Dismissed?
It is natural at this point to ask: if district design has been so influential 
throughout political history, why have students of U.S. politics missed its 
importance? I believe that the primary reason is because modern political 
science research has radically underestimated the importance of gerryman-
dering. For most political scientists, gerrymandering has more bark than 
bite when it comes to explaining electoral outcomes. Indeed, the majority 
of political- science research concludes that congressional redistricting has 
“minimal effects” on elections and the national distribution of seats. Bruce 
Cain and David Butler (1991) summarize this conventional wisdom among 
political scientists: “Virtually all the political science evidence to date indi-
cates that the electoral system has little or no systematic partisan bias, and 
that the net partisan gains nationally from redistricting are small” (Cain 
and Butler 1991).2
Past research has offered a number of explanations for these modest 
effects. These explanations generally fall into one of two camps. The first 
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focuses on the legal constraints under which modern redistricting takes 
place. The second argues that gerrymandering is inherently a limited tool 
for achieving political power. These two perspectives are not incompatible, 
but they do put different emphasis on the reasons why modern gerryman-
ders have been limited in impact.
Turning first to the legal constraints, modern mapmakers face a number 
of hurdles that may limit their ability to pursue full out partisan gerry-
manders. Perhaps most important is that states must create congressional 
districts with equal population. This requirement is the outgrowth of a 
series of Supreme Court decisions handed down in the mid- 1960s that out-
lawed the malapportionment of legislative districts in both House and state 
legislative districts. The aftermath of these cases fundamentally reshuffled 
political power in both the state legislatures and in Congress (Ansolabe-
here and Snyder 2008; Cox and Katz 2002). Across the country, politi-
cal power was redistributed away from rural areas to urban and suburban 
regions (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2008; Cox and Katz 2002; McCubbins 
and Schwartz 1988).
Beyond the immediate impact on political alignments in the 1960s, the 
legal doctrine set down in these cases, and elaborated upon in subsequent 
litigation, continues to shape contemporary redistricting controversies. 
First and foremost, the reapportionment revolution fully enmeshed judges 
in the redistricting process. Redistricting nowadays takes place under the 
watchful eye of the courts. Although partisan gerrymandering per se has 
not been ruled unconstitutional, there are a number of judicially enforced 
rules that place limits on the creativity of partisan mapmakers. The ruling 
that districts must contain nearly equal population presumably has nar-
rowed the strategic options of partisan mapmakers. Moreover, the need to 
adjust for intrastate population inequalities compels every state (with more 
than one representative) to redraw districts once a decade. Prior to the 
1960s, states had much more leeway over when, and even if, to redraw dis-
trict boundaries. One result was that in many states, district lines remained 
frozen for decades— often leading to gross inequalities in district popula-
tions and substantial partisan biases.
Alongside the one- person, one- vote doctrine, the Voting Rights Act 
has also given the judiciary and the Department of Justice the statutory 
basis for overseeing parts of the redistricting process (Canon 1999). Sec-
tion 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires states with a history of discrimina-
tion against minorities— most in the South— to preclear their redistricting 
maps with the Department of Justice or with courts. Moreover, Section 2 
of the Voting Rights Act allows the Department of Justice or private par-
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ties to challenge a redistricting plan that would dilute the voting power of 
racial minorities. The upshot of these various constraints is that full- blown 
partisan gerrymanders may be difficult to engineer without running afoul 
of some established statute or legal doctrine.
A second perspective argues that the partisan gains to be had from redis-
tricting are simply limited. Politicians are often more interested in protect-
ing themselves than in knocking off members of the opposition. This leads 
incumbents of both parties, it is argued, to collude with each other and 
create electorally safe districts for both sides. Moreover, the frequency of 
divided government in the states— where both parties hold a veto over any 
new plan— creates further conditions favorable to pro- incumbent plans. 
Finally, a pro- Democratic gerrymander in one state may be cancelled out 
by a pro- Republican gerrymander in another state, cumulating into a mini-
mal nationwide effect. Thus, for many scholars, the political conditions for 
gerrymandering to matter nationally are very hard to produce.
Overall, then, the dominant view in scholarly literature is that redis-
tricting has minimal impact on elections and public policy. Yet this research 
is based on the redistricting cycles that have occurred since the court- led 
reapportionment revolution of the 1960s. This narrow focus has led to 
three disadvantages. First, it has caused a huge blind spot for students of 
American political history. If one is told by modern researchers that ger-
rymandering does not matter in the present, it becomes natural to assume 
gerrymandering failed to matter in the past as well— this would be a falla-
cious conclusion. By moving beyond the relatively fixed institutional and 
political context of modern redistricting, 19th- century elections provide a 
unique opportunity to assess the competing explanations for the supposed 
minimal effects of contemporary redistricting.
The second disadvantage concerns contemporary efforts to reform 
the politics of redistricting. Contemporary politicians, Supreme Court 
justices, appellate judges, lawyers, and citizen- reform groups wrestle with 
these complex issues every decade. Too often, however, current debates 
over reforming redistricting are devoid of any historical context. It is my 
hope that this book will add some much- needed historical clarity to these 
debates.
The third disadvantage of this narrow focus is that a failure to under-
stand the history of gerrymandering has led to an underestimation of ger-
rymandering on contemporary politics. Modern political science has been 
asking the wrong counterfactual. The standard approach to assessing ger-
rymandering is to ask whether electoral competition changes immediately 
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after a redistricting. Because of the preoccupation with short- term, year- 
to- year changes, scholars have missed the long- term structural impact of 
districting. Did redistricting in one year alter the partisan balance nation-
ally? But this is not the only, and maybe not the best, way to frame the 
counterfactual. Another, reasonable, counterfactual is to ask: what would 
elections to Congress look like if districting returned to pre- Wesberry 
standards?
Modern studies of redistricting analyze marginal year- to- year changes. 
For example, a typical study will ask: did electoral competition in Con-
gressional elections shift between 2000 and 2002 in relation to party con-
trol of state legislatures? If not, many scholars conclude, gerrymandering 
does not matter. But this focus on marginal changes ignores the “base.” 
Think of the districting system as like an iceberg. Studying electoral 
changes over a simple two- year cycle is like looking to see if the iceberg 
alters its course if a few ice chips are taken off. But this misses the impact 
of the iceberg itself.
Thus, one also needs to consider other counterfactuals beside a change 
from one year to the next. Another counterfactual is what gerrymander-
ing and its consequences would be like if we returned to pre- Wesberry 
standards. Once we begin to look at gerrymandering through this lens, it 
throws into sharp relief the idea that strategic district design has, and will 
continue, to shape American politics. We need to ask: what is the full range 
of districting possibilities, and how does that stack up against contempo-
rary practices?
Thus the wide variation in 19th century districting practices provides 
for a powerful and unique research opportunity. This variation can allow 
us to test whether the conventional political- science wisdom of minimal 
effects holds generally, or reflects the institutional constraints peculiar 
to modern redistricting. In analyzing redistricting plans and their elec-
toral results before the 1960s, this book demonstrates substantial conse-
quences of gerrymandering. In both the original decision by Congress to 
mandate single- member districts, and the subsequent state- level discre-
tionary decisions to redraw district boundaries, the strategic calculations 
of political parties drove the nature and timing of institutional choice. 
In turn, the redistricting plans drawn by state governments in this era 
systematically shaped the competitiveness of congressional elections, the 
career paths of representatives, the partisan composition of congressional 
delegations, and, on occasion, even decided party control of the House 
of Representatives.
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Plan of the Book
This book is divided into three sections. The first section (chapters 2 and 
3) analyzes the causes and consequences of districting during the early 
republic— from 1789 to 1842. In chapter 2, I examine how district design 
and the rise of political parties interacted to shape the trajectory of elec-
toral politics in the early republic. This chapter shows that districting 
became a partisan weapon almost from the very beginning of the repub-
lic. Moreover, some states opted not to use districts at all. Although we 
now take election by single- member districts for granted, the Constitution 
makes no mention of them. In fact, during the early republic, a number of 
states elected their House representatives in a system of statewide at- large 
elections, known as the “general ticket.” Under this system, each voter cast 
as many votes as there were House seats to fill; the winners were the top M 
vote- getters, where M was the number of seats to fill. Congress banned the 
practice in 1842 when, as an amendment to the decennial Apportionment 
Act, they mandated that all states use geographically contiguous, single- 
member districts.3
Chapter 3 examines the politics behind this pivotal, but often over-
looked, transformation in America’s electoral structure. The majority party 
in Congress at the time— the Whigs— calculated they would be the losers 
in most general- ticket states heading into the upcoming midterm election 
(1842). By carving up general- ticket states into districts, Whigs stood to 
gain extra seats in the election and preserve their narrow majority status. 
The analysis of floor debates, electoral returns, and roll- call votes reveals 
how short- term political calculations led to the creation of this defining 
and enduring electoral institution.
The second, and longest, section of this book (chapters 4 through 7) 
examines the causes and consequences of redistricting between 1842 and 
1900. This 60- year period overlaps with what political historians have 
dubbed “the partisan- factional” era of American politics (Silbey 1991). 
These years constituted a distinct political era, with unique political and 
partisan characteristics. The historian Joel Silbey summarizes these fea-
tures: “To put it broadly, what happened in the era between 1838 and 1893 
was the replacement of a political nation based on personal, family, and 
clan ties, and deferential informal structures, with one based on collective 
behavior and regularized, impersonal institutions. . . . Most critically, the 
political world now became deeply partisan. The primacy of political par-
ties was the dominant fact of this political era (and of no other). Parties 
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defined the terms of political confrontation and shaped the behavior of 
most participants in the many levels of political activity” (1991, 8– 9).
Nowhere was the primacy of partisan politics more fully prevalent than 
in the design of congressional district maps. State legislatures in the 19th 
century did not hesitate to redistrict whenever they wanted. Some states 
redistricted frequently— often more than once a decade— while other 
states opted out of redistricting altogether. Chapter 4 investigates the tim-
ing of redistricting events during the 19th century. When a new major-
ity party captured state government, and the existing districts were drawn 
by the out party, the probability of redistricting dramatically spiked up. 
On the other hand, when there was divided party control, or one- party 
domination— and the state neither gained nor lost seats at the decennial 
apportionment— the probability of redistricting was close to zero.
Once a state party chose to redraw district boundaries, it then faced the 
decision over how to redistrict. Chapter 5 examines the effects of redistrict-
ing on state congressional delegations and the resulting partisan composi-
tion of the House. Using statewide electoral data, the first section of this 
chapter shows that when a single party controlled the districting process, 
they were able to systematically engineer a favorable statewide partisan 
bias. The second part chapter 5 turns to a detailed district- level investiga-
tion of redistricting. Using county- level electoral data, the chapter demon-
strates that when a single party controlled the districting process, they used 
districting to systematically stack the electoral deck in their favor. These 
partisan biases systematically structured the partisan composition of state 
congressional delegations and, at times, even determined party control of 
the House.
Chapter 6 examines competition in congressional elections. 19th- 
century congressional elections are notable for their intense competitive-
ness. Modern research argues that redistricting either reduces competition 
or has no effect. The results from the 19th century show that redistricting 
was actually used to increase competition. In an attempt to maximize their 
seats, parties carved states into districts with narrow, yet winnable, margins. 
The result was to manufacture competition. This chapter also explores 
the consequences of these strategic decisions and shows that redistricting 
helped contribute to the landslide elections of 1854, 1874, and 1894.
Chapter 7 explores how the variegated redistricting cycle of the 19th 
century shaped the decisions of congressmen to run for reelection. One 
of the long- noted features of the 19th- century House of Representatives, 
which distinguishes it from the modern Congress, is the substantial turn-
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over in membership. This chapter shows that redistricting was a significant 
contributor to the high levels of 19th- century turnover. When districts 
were redrawn, incumbents were much less likely to run for reelection. 
Through a series of counterfactuals, I show that redistricting acted as a 
drag on the development of careerism in the House.
Chapter 8 examines the causes and consequences of malapportionment 
(i.e., unequal district sizes). It was the inequality of legislative districts, after 
all, that finally goaded the judiciary into action in the 1960s. This chapter 
examines the level of malapportionment and the causes of malapportion-
ment. I show that while malapportionment did indeed exist, it accounts for 
only a small portion of partisan biases in the 19th century.
The final section of the book (chapters 9 and 10) carries the story for-
ward to the present. Chapter 9 explores redistricting between 1900 and 
the 1960s, when the federal courts finally entered the redistricting arena. 
Chapter 10 concludes the book by reviewing what this research implies for 
the modern theory and practice of redistricting. I conclude chapter 10 by 
discussing the lessons provided by this book for recent developments in 
redistricting politics.
Part i




Districting and the Construction 
of Early American Democracy
Students of U.S. politics have long viewed political parties as essential in 
making a large- scale republican democracy work. Political parties coordi-
nate the collective actions of elites and citizens. They provide for a modi-
cum of collective responsibility that the constitutional separation of powers 
otherwise makes so difficult. Because political parties hold this prominent 
place in U.S. politics, the study of the early development of America’s par-
ties remains of much interest to political scientists and historians. In this 
large literature, the traditional narrative has focused heavily on contesta-
tion for the presidency (e.g., McCormick 1982) and the construction of 
legislative coalitions within Congress (e.g., Aldrich 1995; Hoadley 1986). 
The larger- than- life personalities and dramatic stakes of these battles pro-
vide much of the scholarly fodder for studies of the creation and evolution 
of America’s first political parties.
But to a much greater extent than has been recognized by students of 
American political parties, congressional redistricting played a vital part 
in the evolution of party politics in the early republic. Although Governor 
Elbridge Gerry’s remap of Massachusetts in 1812 is deservedly enshrined in 
the American political history hall of fame— and, subsequently, has become 
the textbook example of electoral manipulation— district design for parti-
san gain was not isolated to this one incident. Partisan collisions over dis-
tricting pervaded the early republic, and even had antecedents in the colo-
nial legislatures. Indeed, the construction of the first congressional districts 
elicited howls of protest and claims of manipulation. In Pennsylvania, for 
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example, Federalists in the state legislature eschewed districts altogether. 
Instead, they made provisions to select all of Pennsylvania’s congressmen 
in a statewide election. The result was a clean sweep for Federalist congres-
sional candidates (Tinkcom 1950). In Virginia, Anti- Federalists in the state 
legislature, led by Patrick Henry, attempted to prevent James Madison’s 
bid for a seat in the U.S. House. Henry placed Madison’s home county 
(Orange) in “a Congressional district otherwise composed of counties con-
sidered heavily antifederal” (Ketcham 1971, 275).1 Although Madison nar-
rowly eked out a victory over James Monroe, the episode highlights that 
from the very outset of the new Constitution, party politicians— or their 
factional predecessors— looked to district design in the quest for political 
power.
Because the Constitution left to state governments the principal deci-
sions about how to elect members of Congress, the state legislatures 
became primary agents in the partisan pursuit of national power. The 
resulting battles shaped party politics and legislative outcomes in a way 
that reverberated over the next two centuries and created legacies that we 
are still living with today. As party elites collided over district design, they 
forged the foundations of Congress and set the country on a fully partisan 
trajectory.
Choosing Districts
In forging the Constitution, the framers left many of the knotty decisions 
about election administration to the states. Nowhere was this more evident 
than in the rules governing congressional elections. Aside from specifying 
membership requirements and term lengths, the Constitution is otherwise 
silent on the specifics of how members of the U.S. House are to be elected. 
Although Article I, Section 5 provides Congress with the power to regu-
late the “times, manner, and places” of congressional elections, for much 
of the 18th and 19th century the federal government left it to the states 
to determine the mode of election. In particular, the Constitution makes 
no mention of House representatives being elected from geographically 
defined districts.
As a result, the means by which members were elected to the House dif-
fered considerably across states. Notably, a number of states elected their 
House representatives through a system of statewide, at- large elections, 
known as the “general ticket.” In the first Congress, for example, five states 
chose to use districts and five states chose the general ticket (the other 
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three states were allotted only one representative). In general- ticket elec-
tions, voters cast as many votes as there were seats to fill and all candidates 
were listed on a single slate. The winners were the top M vote- getters, 
where M was the number of seats to fill. Consequently, a party that gar-
nered over 50 percent of the vote statewide could expect to win all of the 
congressional seats. In contrast, states divided into single- member districts 
allowed smaller, geographically concentrated constituencies to gain repre-
sentation, reducing the chances of a party sweep of the delegation. Thus, 
the choice between the general ticket and districts often meant the choice 
between a unified or divided state party delegation.
Between 1789 and 1840, over a quarter of the states in any given Con-
gress used the general- ticket method of electing representatives, yielding 
an average of 15 percent of the House membership (see fig. 2.1). Under 
the general ticket, candidates campaigned statewide in at- large elections. 
Each voter was allotted as many votes as there were seats to fill, but could 
not give any candidate more than a single vote.2 If a majority of voters in 
the state preferred one party over the other, the result would almost always 
be a one- party sweep of the delegation (Calabrese 2000; Scarrow 1999). A 
stylized depiction of the winner- take- all nature of general- ticket elections 
is illustrated in figure 2.2. This figure plots a hypothetical vote- seat curve 
for general- ticket elections. As can be seen, the translation of votes into 
seats is an all or nothing affair. Parties polling over 50 percent of the two- 
party vote receive everything while parties polling anything less than 50 
percent can expect to receive nothing.
By contrast single- member districts fail to reward larger parties nearly 
as much (at the state level). A party that polls less than 50 percent still has a 
fighting chance of winning some seats— provided their supporters are geo-
graphically concentrated enough to constitute a majority in one or more 
districts. The s- shaped curve in figure 2.2 represents a stylized depiction of 
the single- member district votes- to- seats translation. This figure presents 
the familiar cube law, which the modern electoral- systems literature uses 
to serve as a rough approximation of the vote- seat translation in regimes 
using first- past- the- post single- member districts (King 1989; Rae 1967; 
Tufte 1973). As the two curves illustrate, a party winning, say, 40 percent of 
the statewide vote can expect to get roughly a quarter of the state delega-
tion under single- member districts, whereas under the general ticket, they 
would get nothing.
The depictions of the vote- seat curves in figure 2.2 are, admittedly, the-
oretical. How well do they stack up against actual congressional election 
results during the early 19th century? Figure 2.3 plots the actual Demo-
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cratic statewide vote share against their statewide seat share for both dis-
tricts and general ticket from 1800– 1840.3 The pattern largely conforms to 
what one would expect. The all- or- nothing nature of the general ticket is 
abundantly clear with almost all of the seat shares falling at the extremes 
of zero or one. The vote- seat plot for districts, on the other hand, is more 
evenly distributed.
More detailed evidence of the consequences of these two systems for 
the partisan composition of state delegations can be seen by examining the 
incidence of unified delegations under both districts and general ticket. 
Table 2.1 presents these percentages for all congressional elections, for 
states with more than one representative, from 1800 to 1840. Over 95 per-
cent of the elections held under general ticket resulted in unified party 
delegations, while only 28 percent were unified under districts. As these 
numbers indicate, a general- ticket election did not always guarantee a uni-
fied delegation, but compared to districts, the probability of a party sweep 
was significantly greater.
Given the striking differences between the two electoral systems, one 
would reasonably suspect that choosing the rules would create a ripe 
opportunity for either partisan gain or partisan retrenchment. We can 
more clearly see the impact of partisanship on the decision to adopt dis-
fig. 2.1. Percentage of states and congressional membership using the general 
ticket, 1788– 1840. (data compiled by the author from information in martis 
1982, table 2, 4– 5.)
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tricts or the general ticket by considering the logic which would produce 
changes in the electoral laws governing congressional elections at the state 
level. Changing the electoral system required both an opportunity and a 
motive. On the opportunity side, we would expect any changes to the elec-
toral system to only occur when there was unified partisan control of state 
government. During periods of divided control, each side can block the 
others’ schemes. Thus, one would expect changes in the electoral laws to 
occur only when there was unified party control of state government.
But of course there were a large number of cases of unified party con-
trol that failed to produce a switch in electoral system. Hence the next 
fig. 2.2. hypothetical vote- seat translation under general ticket and single- 
member districts
TABLE 2.1. The Incidence of Unified House Delegations, 1800– 1840
 Districts General Ticket
Unified Delegation         74 (27.7%)       116 (95.1%)
Nonunified Delegation        193 (72.3%)         6 (4.9%)
Total 267 122
Source: Rusk 2001.
Note: Column percentages in parentheses.
χ2 = 152.1; p < .01. 
fig. 2.3. vote- seat distribution under general ticket and single- member districts, 
1800– 1840
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question is: what motivated parties to either alter the electoral system or 
continue with the status quo? The logic would be that in states where a one 
faction could expect to consistently outpoll the opposition in a statewide 
vote, the general- ticket mode of election would maximize their seat share. 
In effect, they could turn a majority vote into a winner- take- all electoral 
system. On the other hand, where parties (or factions) might anticipate 
their vote share to decline in the future, switching, or maintaining, districts 
would make more sense.
Ideally, one would like to test these expectations with an empirical 
model, but the absence of reliable data on party ratios in the early state 
legislatures makes a straightforward empirical test difficult. Nevertheless, 
one can find ample anecdotal evidence of political shenanigans driving the 
choice of electoral system in various state histories. For example, in Penn-
sylvania, the system for choosing representatives to the national govern-
ment emerged as a major source of contention within the state legislature. 
The Pennsylvania legislature chose to adopt the general ticket for the first 
federal elections. In doing so, Federalists in the state legislature sought to 
ensure a unified Federalist delegation to the House. Prior to the next elec-
tion, the state switched to districts. The switch to districts passed by a single 
vote and was prompted by concerns of western Pennsylvanians— the site of 
growing Republican sentiment— that they were underrepresented by the 
general ticket (Hoadley 1986, 36; Tinkcom 1950). The switch passed by 
a single vote in the assembly with Republican- leaning legislators siding 
in favor. In 1792, the state again switched back to the general ticket on a 
closely divided vote within the legislature (Tinkcom 1950, 51), and then 
finally settled on districts in 1794.4
New Jersey provides another interesting case. From 1788 to 1840, New 
Jersey operated primarily with the general ticket. But two attempts to move 
the state onto the district system illustrate the political machinations that 
the freedom of district design created. The early decision to adopt the gen-
eral ticket was pushed by factions in west New Jersey who were primarily 
supportive of the Federalists. Confident that they would win the statewide 
vote, they saw a clear advantage in employing the general ticket (McCor-
mick 1953, 107). In three subsequent legislative sessions, Anti- Federalists 
attempted to pass a districting plan, “but met with defeat in the legislature” 
(McCormick 1953, 108). Republican forces finally succeeded in carving 
the state into districts for the 1798 election. The effort paid off as Republi-
cans converted a 0– 5 deficit in the previous election into a 3– 2 majority of 
the congressional delegation. Federalist forces in the state legislature, two 
years later, responded by switching the state back to the general ticket. The 
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switch, although motivated by partisan concerns, backfired on the Federal-
ist Party as they narrowly lost a statewide majority, and, therefore, lost all 
of their seats in Congress. As the political historian Richard P. McCormick 
wryly noted, “Once in control the new party [Republicans] abandoned its 
earlier advocacy of district elections and capitalized to the fullest extent on 
its power” (1953, 108).
Partisan jockeying over electoral systems was not confined to North-
ern states. In 1841, the Democratic- controlled state legislature in Alabama 
passed a general- ticket law, seeking to convert a narrow 3– 2 Democratic 
advantage in the congressional delegation into a 5– 0 advantage in the sub-
sequent congressional elections. The effort succeeded. As we see in the 
next chapter, the actions in Alabama prompted members of the Whig Party 
in Congress to respond in- kind and outlaw general- ticket elections alto-
gether.
These anecdotes provide ample evidence that state politicians, early on, 
realized the potential gains from the manipulation of electoral law. As we 
see in the next chapter, it was only with federal intervention in 1842 that 
put an end to the widespread use of the general ticket.
Designing Districts
For states that opted to divide their state into districts, the decision became 
how and where to place district lines. The entry of the term “gerrymander-
ing” into the political vernacular, in 1812, can lead to the mistaken impres-
sion that partisan monkey business started in 1812. However, one can easily 
find examples of district manipulation well before 1812 and Gerry’s map. 
In this era before court supervision, states were free to construct districts 
largely as they sought fit. The maps were codified through the standard 
statutory process, which meant that the two chambers of the state legisla-
ture had to jointly agree to pass a redistricting bill and that bill then had 
to be signed by the governor. Where a single party had majority control of 
the state legislature and the governorship— or had a large enough majority 
to override a gubernatorial veto, or the governor lacked a veto— they were 
in prime position to draw maps to greatly advantage their congressional 
brethren.
In designing districts for partisan advantage, mapmakers typically chose 
from one of two recipes. One was to pack as many of the opposition voters 
into a single district while spreading their followers into narrow, yet win-
nable, districts. This strategy concedes one or more districts to the opposi-
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tion, but in such a way as to force the opposition to waste many of their 
votes. While the packing strategy has many advantages, it has one draw-
back: it concedes one or more districts to the opposition. Thus, a second 
gerrymandering strategy is to turn each district into a microcosm of the 
statewide vote. Where the dominant party can expect to win the statewide 
vote in the near future, an optimal strategy is to have each district mirror 
this favorable statewide vote (Cain 1984, 1985; Owen and Grofman 1988). 
By efficiently distributing its supporters in marginal, but winnable, dis-
tricts, this “efficient gerrymander” strategy allows the controlling party to 
win every seat in the state.
Were state parties of the early republic using redistricting to alter the 
partisan tilt of their state congressional delegations and possibly alter the 
partisan composition of the House of Representatives? One way to answer 
this question is to analyze the effect of districting partisanship on the trans-
lation of votes into seats. Applying standard reasoning in the redistricting 
literature, one can think of districting plans as affecting two elements of 
the vote- seat translation: partisan bias and electoral responsiveness (e.g., 
Gelman and King 1994; Tufte 1973). Partisan bias is defined “as the differ-
ence between the expected seat share that the Democrats would get with an 
average vote share of 0.5 and their ‘fair share’ of 0.5 (half the seats for half 
the votes)” (Cox and Katz 1999, 820). A districting plan that packed Fed-
eralist voters into a few safe districts and placed Democratic- Republicans 
in a number of marginal, yet winnable, districts, would produce a pro- 
Democratic- Republican bias. In other words, they would win more than 
their fair share of seats given their overall vote.
Electoral responsiveness— or the swing ratio— is the change in a par-
ty’s aggregate seat share given a 1 percent change in their vote share. For 
example, a responsiveness value of three indicates that a shift in the state-
wide vote from 50 percent to 51 percent would produce a corresponding 
three- percentage- point seat shift. A districting plan with a number of mar-
ginal, highly competitive districts will have a high value of responsiveness 
(i.e., a small swing in the statewide vote will generate a large swing in seats). 
A plan with numerous safe seats will have a lower level of responsiveness 
because it will take a large swing in the statewide vote before seats start 
changing hands.
With these twin concepts in hand, one can model the impact of dif-
fering redistricting plans on electoral outcomes. Data on the timing of 
redistricting events comes from Martis (1982) which lists the precise date 
when every redistricting plan became law. Matching these dates with 
party control of state government allows us to classify the partisanship 
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of redistricting plans. The data on party control of the state legislatures 
during this period comes from Dubin (2007). In the small number of 
cases where Dubin’s information on the partisanship of the state legisla-
ture was missing, the winner of the U.S. Senate election served as a proxy 
for party control of the state legislature. Because state legislatures chose 
senators during this era of indirect elections, the victor of the Senate 
contest should provide a close approximation of party control of the state 
government.
Using the information on the date of redistricting and partisanship 
of state government at the time of redistricting, redistricting plans from 
1800 to 1824 were classified into one of three categories: Democratic- 
Republican, Federalist, or Bipartisan. From 1826 to 1832, plans were clas-
sified as Democratic (Jacksonian), National Republican, or Bipartisan. 
Then, from 1834 to 1840, new plans were coded as Democratic, Whig, or 
Bipartisan. Bipartisan plans were plans passed during periods of divided 
government. This happened either when there was split partisan control of 
the legislature or when there was a unified party legislature, but the legisla-
ture lacked sufficient votes to override the veto of an opposition party gov-
ernor. It is worth noting that during this period there were few bipartisan 
plans; almost all were passed by unified partisan majorities.
Following standard practice in the electoral systems literature (e.g., 
Grofman 1983; Tufte 1973), one can estimate the bias and responsiveness 
of districting plans using the following vote- seat equation:
ln(sit/(1 − sit)) = λ + ρ(ln(vit/(1 − vit))) (1)
where sit is the proportion of seats won by the Democratic- Republicans, 
and vit is their vote share in state i at time t.
5 The model includes a constant, 
λ, measuring partisan bias, and an independent variable, ln(vit/(1 − vit)), 
with the coefficient ρ measuring electoral responsiveness.6 Like Cox and 
Katz (2002), the measures of bias (λ) and responsiveness (ρ) were estimated 
separately for each type of districting plan. In addition, anticipating that 
congressional elections within a state might affect one another, the model 
was estimated with an extended beta- binomial distribution (Cox and Katz 
2002; King 1998).7 This model is appropriate given that the dependent 
variable is a proportion and that there is potential correlation in the prob-
ability across districts (within a state) of a Democratic- Republican victory.
The estimates of partisan bias and electoral responsiveness are dis-
played in table 2.2. The top panel displays the results from 1802 to 1820. 
They show that Republican dominance of the House was greatly aided 
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by districting regimes. Partisan Republican plans produced a bias of 8.66 
percent in favor of Republican candidates. In other words, with 50 per-
cent of the statewide, Republicans won 58.66 percent of the congressio-
nal seats. Interestingly, bias for Federalist plans was not significantly dif-
ferent than zero. The likely explanation is the relatively small number of 
Federalist redistricting plans. Moreover, in states where Federalists had 
drawn the maps, Republicans continued to perform well. Nevertheless, the 
strong bias produced by Republican plans coupled with the larger number 
of Republican- drawn plans helped produce Republican dominance of the 
Congress from 1802 to 1820. Aside from a brief resurgence of Federalists 
in the early 1810s, following a negative public reaction over the War of 
1812, the Federalists were relegated to permanent minority status.
From 1822 to 1840, one finds a strong bias in favor of Democratic (and 
later Jacksonian Democratic) plans. Indeed, the bias was staggering. With 
TABLE 2.2. The Vote- to- Seat Translation in the Early Republic
1802– 20
Plan Type Partisan Bias Electoral Responsiveness







Number of Observations 108
1822– 40
Plan Type Bias Responsiveness
Democrat- Republican/Jackson 17.92* .85*
Democrat (2.99)  (.21)
Bipartisan 21.30 5.08*
 (14.11) (2.16)




Log- Likelihood −995.58 
Number of Observations 159 
Note: The table presents maximum likelihood estimates of partisan bias and electoral 
responsiveness using an extended beta binomial distribution. Standard errors are in pa-
rentheses.
*p < .05.
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50 percent of the vote, Democrats could expect to win 67.92 percent of 
the statewide seats. Moreover, the responsiveness of Democratic plans was 
almost one. In other words, Democratic plans during this period produced 
very low levels of competition and substantial level of bias. On the other 
side, National Republican (and later Whig) plans produced insignificant 
amounts of bias. Although the coefficient on bias was negative, indicating 
a small amount of pro- National Republican/Whig bias, it was nowhere 
near statistical significance. Again, like the results for the Federalists, these 
insignificant results partially reflect the small number of redistricting plans 
that were drawn by National Republicans or Whigs.
Turning to the estimates for electoral responsiveness, one finds rela-
tively low levels of responsiveness for all of the partisan redistricting plans. 
These results show that it took a fairly large change in the vote to produce 
a big swing in seats. Some of this may have reflected the comparatively 
modest levels of competition for control of the House of Representatives. 
Rather than scouring for extra seats, by boosting the swing ratio, the maps 
appeared to lock in the gains that Republicans had already made. This 
strategy contrasts with the one pursued by parties later in the 19th cen-
tury. As we see in later chapters, as mass- based political parties emerged in 
the 1840s, mapmakers adjusted their strategies; pursuing plans with much 
higher swing ratios and more competitive district margins, with the aim of 
ratcheting up their seat shares. As we will see, this shift in strategies toward 
hyperresponsive gerrymanders reverberated across the political landscape, 
producing fiercely fought congressional elections and rapid turnover of the 
congressional membership.
Redistricting and Reapportionment
The previous section shows that parties— and, in particular, the Democratic- 
Republicans (and later the Jackson Democrats)— successfully used district 
design to drastically bias electoral outcomes in their favor. Coupled with 
the strategic use of district design was the interaction with federal reap-
portionment. Then as now, following each census, the states are reallo-
cated seats in the House proportional to their state population. Nowadays, 
because the size of the House has remained fixed at 435 (since 1911), seats 
are simply reshuffled among the states; with some states gaining a few seats 
and some state losing a few. Because modern population shifts within the 
country over the course of a single decade tend not to be overly dramatic, 
the number of seats gained or lost by a state tends to be modest. But in the 
Districting and the Construction of Early American Democracy 33
19th century, the size of the House was not fixed. Typically following a cen-
sus, Congress voted to increase the size of the House to adjust for both the 
admittance of new states into the Union and overall population growth. 
Consequently, most states received additional seats following a census. And 
some states received a large bounty of new seats. Following the 1801 reap-
portionment, for example, New York saw its House delegation increase 
from 10 to 17. Ten years later, New York’s allotment increased again, rising 
from 17 to 27.
These sizable increases in seat delegations provided crafty mapmak-
ers with ample material to radically increase their partisan seat shares. By 
packing opponents into a few safe districts and shoehorning the new seats 
into favorable territory, state parties could quickly and dramatically ramp 
up their House delegations. To see what extent the interaction of parti-
sanship and reapportionment influenced election results, table 2.3 pres-
ents a model predicting increases in partisan seat shares. The dependent 
variable is the difference in Democratic- Republican seats, within a state, 
between the current and prior election. Thus, the dependent variable tells 
us whether, and by how many, Democratic- Republicans increased (or 
decreased) their seat shares within a state in a given election. The key inde-
pendent variable indicates what type of redistricting plan was implemented 
when a state gained seats: Democratic- Republican, Federalist, or Biparti-
san. From 1826 to 1834, plans were classified as Democratic (Jacksonian), 
National Republican, or Bipartisan. Then, from 1834 to 1840, new plans 
were coded as Democratic, Whig, or Bipartisan. The type of partisan plan 
was then interacted with a variable indicating whether the state redistricted 
or not in a given year. This interactive variable tells us whether redistrict-
ing increased seat shares conditional on the type of redistricting plan that 
was drawn.
The results in table 2.3 demonstrate a clear impact of partisan district-
ing on electoral outcomes. Setting the prior seat share and change in vote 
share at their average values, the model predicts that when Republicans 
redistricted, their seat shares increased by an average of 2.16 seats. The 
model also predicts that in non- redistricting years, under Republican- 
drawn maps, the change in seat shares were statistically indistinguishable 
from zero. This suggests that the big marginal impact of redistricting and 
reapportionment happened right after a new map was drawn. Put together 
with the prior estimates of partisan bias, the results show that parties typ-
ically maintained this seat boost over the course of a redistricting plan. 
Given that the model controls for changes in Republican vote shares, the 
seat increases can fairly be attributed to redistricting.
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Interestingly, the model predicts that Federalists (and later Whigs) 
gained little marginal increase from reapportionment and redistricting. 
In both cases, the predicted increase in seat shares following a Federalist 
or Whig redistricting was statistically indistinguishable from zero. Given 
that most of the growth in population happened in western regions, which 
tended to be rich with Democratic- Republican (and later Jacksonian 
Democratic) votes, it is little surprise that Federalists found little aggregate 
gain in the reapportionment process. Thus, federal reapportionment and 
control of redistricting at the state level reinforced the dominance of the 
Democratic- Republicans following the election of 1800. This advantage 
held for the next 40 years. As we see later, in the rest of this section, the 
gains made by Democratic- Republicans from redistricting reapportion-
ment put them in a position to not only further enhance their own for-
tunes, but to fundamentally alter the trajectory of American history.
1802: Reapportionment, Redistricting, and the Louisiana Purchase
Perhaps nowhere was the impact of redistricting and reapportionment 
more pivotal than in the 1802– 03 congressional elections and the subse-




Redistricting × Federalist (or National Republican or Whig) Plan −1.96*
 (.89)
Redistricting × Bipartisan Plan 3.35*
 (.62)










Number of Observations 258
R2 .35
Note: The dependent variable is the change in Democratic- Republican seat shares between 
the prior and current election. Robust standard errors, clustered by state, are in parentheses.
*p < .05.
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quent 8th Congress. In the 1801 reapportionment, Congress made provi-
sions to increase the House from 106 to 142 members.
Because growth in southern and western regions of the country far out-
paced growth in the Northeast, states with significant western land saw 
their seat shares radically increase. Table 2.4 reports that the states gaining 
seats tended to be more Democratic- Republican than other states. States 
where Democratic- Republicans controlled the redistricting process saw 
their total seat share in the House increase from 61 seats in 1800 to 98 
seats in 1802. The biggest gains came in states like New York (+7), South 
Carolina (+3), and Pennsylvania (+5), which all had significant population 
TABLE 2.4. The Joint Impact of Reapportionment and Redistricting
1802
  Democratic- Republican  
Type of Plan Total Seat Change Seat Change
 1800 1802 Change 1800 1802 Change
Democratic- Republican 61 98 +37 45 71 +26
Federalist 14 17 +3 5 7 +2
General Ticket 21 27 +6 10 15 +5
1812
  Democratic- Republican  
Type of Plan Total Seat Change Seat Change
 1810 1812 Change 1810 1812 Change
Democratic- Republican 104 137 +33 79 89 +10
Federalist 6 6 0 6 2 −4
General Ticket 28 33 +5 15 14 −1
1822
  Democratic- Republican  
Type of Plan Total Seat Change Seat Change
 1820 1822 Change 1820 1822 Change
Democratic- Republican 105 134 +29 90 87 −3
Federalist 20 13 −7 4 6 +2
General Ticket 27 36 +9 24 26 +2
1832
Type of Plan Total Seat Change Democratic Seat Change
 1830 1832 Change 1830 1832 Change
Democratic 75 118 +16 75 88 +13
National Republican 53 57 +4 17 21 +4
Bipartisan 3 7 +4 3 6 +3
General Ticket 28 30 +2 14 22 +8
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growth in the western parts of their states; areas which tended to favor 
Democratic- Republicans. The Federalists, on the other hand, only gained 
three total seats.
Second, Democratic- Republicans controlled redistricting in most of 
the states slated to gain the largest number of seats. They were able to 
use their control to enhance their numbers in Congress. The effectiveness 
of Republican district maps can be seen in the second panel of table 2.4, 
which lists the number of seats gained by Republicans across the different 
redistricting regimes. Of the 37 total House seats gained in states where 
Republicans controlled redistricting, 26 elected Republicans to Congress. 
The lopsided results in big states where Republicans controlled the redis-
tricting process— that is, Pennsylvania, New York, and Virginia— swung 
the national political balance firmly in Republicans’ favor.
So potent was the impact of Republican redistricting efforts that Repub-
licans achieved that rara avis of American politics— a presidential gain in 
midterm elections. Republicans increased their share of House seats from 
60 percent to 71 percent despite an increase of only 1.2 percent in vote 
share (Rusk 2002). Most of this gain can be directly attributed to the fed-
eral reapportionment and how the resulting districts were redrawn.
The added seats, moreover, transformed what had been a modest 
Republican majority in the prior Congress into a formidable legislative 
machine bent on reversing a decade worth of Federalist policy (Cun-
ningham 1963; Smelser 1968). Nowhere was the legislative power of the 
Republican majority more fully exercised than in the decision to expand 
the United States into a continental power. During the 8th Congress, the 
primary legislative battle was over whether to accept, and approve a fund-
ing plan for, the Louisiana Purchase. Arguably no federal action had a more 
dramatic impact on the trajectory of American history than the Louisiana 
Purchase. The acquisition of the Louisiana territory from France for $15 
million doubled the territory of the United States and removed France as a 
rival in the western interior. The purchase opened the western continent to 
the United States, and, thereby, fundamentally altered the future of Ameri-
can history.
Although the story of the Louisiana Purchase is now told as a bravura 
act of negotiation by Thomas Jefferson— or, more accurately, his diplo-
matic delegates James Monroe and Robert Livingston— over Napoleon 
Bonaparte, the purchase generated considerable domestic opposition. 
In particular, a formidable resistance to the purchase arose in Congress. 
Although the Jefferson administration had taken the lead in negotiating 
the treaty, Congress still played an essential role in making the purchase 
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happen. While the Senate was responsible for ratifying the treaty, the pur-
chase also required a funding plan. As a result, assent from the House was 
necessary if the purchase was to go through.
When the issue came before Congress, it met with considerable oppo-
sition. In particular, the battle lines were refracted through the polarized 
partisan atmosphere of the time. As Theriault has argued, the two parties 
“were the organizing units behind the Louisiana Purchase debate” (Theri-
ault 2006, 310– 11). A number of Federalist leaders in Congress, in particu-
lar, were vocal in their opposition to the purchase. The central rhetorical 
plank of the opponent’s argument was that France had no legal basis to sell 
the land to the United States in the first place. These opponents argued 
that the land belonged to Spain, and that France was therefore not in a 
legal position to sell the territory.8
There were four votes in the House related to the purchase. But two 
stood out. First was a vote in the House on a resolution to require Presi-
dent Jefferson to turn over all his documents related to the retrocession 
of the Louisiana Territory. The motivation behind the request was an 
attempt by Federalists to challenge whether Spain had actually ceded the 
Louisiana Territory to France. The amendment, offered by the New York 
Federalist Gaylord Griswold, called upon Jefferson to produce a copy of 
the original treaty between France and Spain, and the deed ceding the 
territory from to France. Griswold, and other Federalists, contended that 
Spain had never ceded the land to France, and therefore, “Napoleon had 
concocted a fraudulent sale to squeeze money out of the United States” 
(DeConde 1976, 189). The political motive behind this legislative maneu-
ver was to nullify the purchase and ultimately embarrass the president 
(DeConde 1976, 189– 90).
Defeating this resolution, therefore, was a necessary step in the Repub-
licans’ path to approving the purchase and appropriating the requisite 
funds. The vote failed by a mere two votes: 57 to 59. All but one Federalist 
voted against, while Republicans split. Thus, had there been more Fed-
eralists in the House the resolution likely would have passed and created 
a major stumbling block to congressional approval of the purchase and 
subsequent appropriations.
A second vote on approving the act also narrowly passed (Theriault 
2006, 312). This vote too broke down largely along party lines. The Feder-
alists, looking for a wedge issue to distinguish themselves from the Jeffer-
son administration, voted against the purchase, while Republicans almost 
uniformly voted in favor. Again, the padded Republican majority gave them 
enough votes to secure passage of the appropriations bill. On both of these 
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pivotal roll- call votes, we can see the vital role played by gerrymandering. 
Absent the additional seats picked up in the 1802 round of redistricting, 
Republicans likely would have failed to defeat the Federalist attempts to 
block the purchase. It is an understatement to say that the course of Ameri-
can history would have been radically different had the purchase deal fallen 
through.
From the perspective of national party politics, the Louisiana Purchase 
“guaranteed a further lightening of New England’s relative weight in the 
national scale” (Smelser 1968, 76). More pointedly, it further lightened the 
relative weight of Federalists in national politics. Thus, the purchase sig-
naled the beginning of the end for the Federalists as a viable national party. 
Although they would continue to win the occasional congressional and 
state election in the Northeast, their time as an effective nationwide party 
was soon to come to an end.
1812:  War and the Original Gerrymander
The interaction between party fortunes, electoral rules, and policy out-
comes continued throughout the next decade. The 1811 reapportionment 
provided for an increase in the size of the House from 142 to 182 members. 
As table 2.4 shows, states where Republicans controlled the redistricting 
process gained the lion’s share of these new seats. However, before Repub-
licans could fully translate their control of maps into seats, political events 
intervened. Voter dissatisfaction with the War of 1812 led to significant 
Republican vote losses in the 1812– 13 election. Their seat share in the 
House dropped from 70 percent to 61 percent. Yet Republican dominance 
of mapmaking staved off a full- blown electoral disaster. Without the cush-
ion given to them by redistricting, Republican seat losses likely would have 
been a lot worse. The Republicans’ total share of the national vote was 
49.9 percent while the Federalist share was 48.7 percent. In other words, a 
dead heat. Despite the virtual tie in vote shares, Republicans still captured 
control of the House, winning 110 seats to the Federalists’ 72 (Rusk 2002, 
215– 18).
The extra boost in seats provided Republicans with a solid working 
majority in the House despite evenly splitting the congressional vote with 
Federalists. And they needed every one of these votes to pursue their 
policy agenda. The 13th Congress took place in the middle of the war 
with the British Empire that had started in 1812. House Federalists, gen-
erally opposed to President Madison’s prosecution of the war, sought to 
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draw a strong contrast with both congressional Republicans and President 
Madison (Ketcham 1971, 591– 92). The end product of this strategy was 
fierce partisan polarization. Indeed, the 13th Congress was one of the most 
polarized in U.S. history. Of the 352 roll- call votes in the House, 303 met 
the traditional definition of a party unity vote, where at least 50 percent of 
the membership of one party voted in opposition to at least 50 percent of 
the other party. Thus, 86 percent of roll- call votes split along party lines. 
In fact, this Congress had the second- highest level of party unity voting 
in the history of the House (second only to the 58th Congress, which was 
elected in 1902).
Congress fought over a number significant issues ranging from appro-
priations to the military, whether to shut down domestic ports to prevent 
supplies reaching British forces in the states, how to respond to British 
impressment of seamen on American ships, and whether to recharter the 
temporarily defunct national bank. Each of these issues was decided in 
close votes along partisan lines. Congress even split along party lines over 
the appropriate response to the burning of the Capitol Building. In a nar-
rowly decided vote, Republicans defeated a bill that would have temporar-
ily removed the seat of government from Washington, DC, until the end 
of the war.
One place where Republican districting efforts may have backfired was 
the redistricting in Massachusetts— the original “gerrymander.” The now- 
famous map, and much of the outrage, concerned the districting of the state 
senate by Republicans. But congressional districts were also crafted with an 
eye toward boosting Republican seat shares in Congress. The map, how-
ever, failed to prevent a Federalist triumph in the 1812 election. Federalists 
won 80 percent of the House seats in the 1812 election and recaptured 
control of the state legislature. Presaging events in Texas 190 years later, 
the new Federalist majority set about remapping congressional districts to 
further enhance the prospects of Federalist congressional candidates in the 
1814 election. The remapping efforts succeeded as Federalists captured 18 
of the state’s 20 seats. With 66 percent of the statewide vote, Federalists 
won 90 percent of the congressional seats.
Outside of northeastern states like Massachusetts, however, the pros-
pects for the Federalists as a national party remained bleak. Growing 
population in the West and South, combined with the partisan crafting of 
congressional districts by Republican mapmakers ultimately doomed the 
Federalists in congressional elections. By the late 1810s, Federalists ceased 
to exist as an effective party competing on a national scale.
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1822: Redistricting in the Era of Good Feelings
The demise of the Federalists ushered in the so- called Era of Good Feel-
ings. This ironic title denoted the brief period in which Republicans 
dominated the government. Given the absence of interparty competition, 
the incentives to gerrymander for partisan gain briefly lost some of their 
steam. In a few places, however, mapmakers still found room and reason to 
manipulate district lines. In particular, where the last vestiges of Federal-
ism still existed, they sought to mold districts to shut out Republicans. In 
Massachusetts, notably, Federalists still controlled the state government. 
Prior to the 1822 election, Federalists “sought to shut out their opponents 
in the congressional election by resorting to partisan districts” (Griffith 
1907, 101). Their efforts paid off. Federalists, despite being knocked down 
nationally, held onto 7 of the 13 districts in Massachusetts in 1822. Out-
side of Massachusetts, however, Republican dominance of the redistricting 
process helped reproduce their dominance in congressional elections (see 
table 2.4).
1832: Redistricting and the Bank War
The emergence of the Democratic Party behind the candidacy of Andrew 
Jackson in the presidential election of 1828 reenergized two- party com-
petition both across the country and within the House. By the time a new 
reapportionment was scheduled to take place in 1831, two- party competi-
tion had reemerged in many parts of the country. The rise of party com-
petition also reignited redistricting battles across the states. Reapportion-
ment aided Democrats in greater numbers than the National Republicans. 
States where Democrats controlled the redistricting process gained 16 
new seats in the reapportionment compared to 4 in National Republican- 
controlled states. This increase in seats combined with partisan control of 
the mapmaking process greatly reinforced Democrats’ hold on the House. 
In Massachusetts, for example, the bill to redistrict congressional districts 
was subject to four weeks of heated debate in the legislature (Griffith 1907, 
106). National Republicans in the legislature sought not just to dilute the 
Democratic vote, but also to snub the upstart Anti- Masonic vote. The map 
worked, as Republicans won 11 of the 12 congressional seats with 57.9 per-
cent of the statewide vote. The map also put an end to any hope the Anti- 
Masons had of establishing themselves as a viable opposition in the state. 
As Griffith writes, “Not long after this election, the Antimasonic party in 
Massachusetts began to be merged in other parties and gradually lost its 
identity” (Griffith 1907, 108).
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Outside of the Northeast, however, the vast bulk of districting plans 
worked to the advantage of Democratic congressional candidates. As the 
estimates of partisan bias indicated, Democratic plans in this period heavily 
favored Democratic candidates. The product of this bias can be seen in the 
1832 congressional election. In the election, Democrats won 60 percent of 
the House seats despite garnering a slim 51.4 percent of the national vote 
(Rusk 2002, 222).
The majority in the House proved decisive during the subsequent Con-
gress. The 23rd Congress was extremely turbulent. Prior to the election 
of 1832, President Andrew Jackson had, in a highly controversial decision, 
vetoed the rechartering of the Bank of the United States. Following his 
reelection in 1832, President Jackson continued his battle against the bank 
by unilaterally withdrawing federal funds from its control (Remini 1967). 
The decision created a massive uproar and roiled the 23rd Congress. The 
Senate, in particular, was not inclined to sit back and support the president’s 
actions. The Senate was controlled by anti- Jackson forces led by Senator 
Henry Clay. Indeed, the Senate, for the only time in its history, formally 
censured the president. Given Senate hostility toward Jackson, Democratic 
control of the House became essential in providing political cover for Jack-
son’s decision to withdraw funds from the bank. Democrats in the House 
were by no means fully supportive of Jackson’s decision. However, they did 
eventually line up behind the president, passing a series of resolutions sup-
porting the funding withdrawal. Absent a majority in the House, the Bank 
War likely would not have been won by Jacksonians. The consequences 
were enormous and reverberated beyond the narrow confines of economic 
policy. As the historian Daniel Feller has written, Jackson’s victory in the 
Bank War “shaped the new Whig and Democratic parties and reshaped 
the balance of power within the federal government” (Feller 2004, 164). 
As we will see in the rest of this book, the emergence of fierce competition 
between these two mass- based political parties ushered in an entirely new 
era of redistricting politics.
Parties and Institutional Choice in the Early Republic
A vast literature in political science has analyzed the profound impact of 
voting rules and the translation of into seats on the behavior of legislatures 
and parties. Electoral rules profoundly shape the behavior of legislators and 
the structure of party systems. In the contemporary United States, political 
parties compete within a relatively well- defined and regulated institutional 
framework. Federal elections are held on the same day. Balloting rules are 
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nearly similar across states. Rules for financing federal campaigns are stan-
dardized across jurisdictions. Thus, it can be easy for modern observers 
to miss the pervasive influence of electoral rules on political competition.
During the early republic, however, the rules were themselves objects 
of violent contestation. Parties arose not just in response to the incentives 
provided by electoral rules, but also as a means to bend and influence the 
rules for personal and partisan gain. The high- stakes politics of the early 
republic included fights over the rules themselves. The result was great 
variance across states over how elections were conducted. Nowhere was 
this more evident than in the decisions over how to elect congressmen. 
Whether to elect members in geographic districts or in statewide at- large 
elections constituted one choice. States choosing to use districts then faced 
a second- order choice: where to place district boundaries. The result of 
this freedom was wide diversity in how members of the House were elected 
and how they behaved in the legislature.
By 1840, however, diversity began to give way to uniformity. This quiet 
revolution in electoral laws has gone largely unnoticed, but it is essential 
to understanding the early development of American politics. According to 
the historian Richard L. McCormick, “To put the matter simply, the rules 
under which the political game was to be played changed greatly between 
1800 and 1840. The most obvious development was a trend from diversity 
to uniformity in governmental structures and electoral procedures from 
state to state. The magnitude and significance of this quiet revolution in 
the electoral environment has generally been ignored, except for a curi-
ous preoccupation with modification in suffrage qualifications” (McCor-
mick 1967, 110). The next chapter explores one of the transformational 
moments in this institutional revolution— the decision by Congress to 
mandate single- member districts for all House elections.
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The Origins of  
Single- Member Districts
As we saw in the previous chapter, between 1789 and 1840 over a quarter of 
the states in any given Congress used the general- ticket method of electing 
representatives. But in 1842, Congress abruptly voted to end the practice. 
Why did Congress change the rules of the game and why did it happen 
in 1842? Given that the electoral rules had clear partisan consequences, 
one might suspect that reform was ripe for strategic manipulation. By the 
election of 1840, the second- party system had reached full steam (Aldrich 
1995; McCormick 1966; Silbey 1991). The parties had developed into 
large- scale electoral machines focused on winning mass- based elections 
and capturing control of the national government. The intense competi-
tion to win elections on a nationwide scale further increased the incentives 
for parties to seek out every possible advantage, including manipulating the 
rules of the game.
This incentive was evident in the switch to single- member districts. The 
census of 1840, which formed the basis for reapportioning state represen-
tation in the House, indicated that most of the general- ticket states where 
Democrats were strong would be gaining seats, while the general- ticket 
states where Whigs were strong would be losing seats. Single- member dis-
tricts gave Whigs a greater chance of winning some seats in Democrats’ 
general- ticket bastions. By outlawing the general ticket, Whigs were try-
ing to pick up extra seats— or, at the least— minimize the potential loss of 
seats that the new apportionment promised. In addition, Whigs had the 
opportunity to make such a change. For the only time in their brief his-
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tory, Whigs had control of both Congress and the presidency. Thus, the 
switch to single- member districts was the result of the newly dominant 
Whigs manipulating the rules of the electoral game to try and maintain 
their majority in the House.
Beyond highlighting this pivotal, but often forgotten, transformation 
in the American system of representation, this chapter makes a broader 
contribution to our understanding of the origins of electoral rules. A vast 
body of research demonstrates the consequences of electoral institutions 
on party systems and representation. Electoral institutions, however, are 
not preordained (e.g., Bawn 1993; Cox 1997; Remington and Smith 1996). 
They are fashioned by politicians who have a vested interest in their effects. 
The results presented in this chapter remind us that even the seemingly 
most fundamental of political institutions can be created out of short- term 
political considerations.
The Apportionment Act of 1842
Political historians generally acknowledge the election of 1840 as a water-
shed moment in the development of American political parties (McCor-
mick 1966; Silbey 1991). The famous campaign of “log cabins and hard 
cider” marked the culmination of party development that began with the 
rise of the Jackson- led Democratic party in the 1820s and emergence of the 
Whig Party as Democrats’ main competitor. By the election of 1840, Whig 
and Democrat organizations were fighting on an even basis in almost every 
state. By 1840, nearly 80 percent of the states had a competitive two- party 
system, compared to only 10 percent in 1824 (see fig. 3.1).
Coupled with this rise in competitive elections was the nationalization 
of party labels and party organization. By 1840, national elections were 
carried out under the banner of two strong political labels commanding a 
habitual following among voters. As opposed to the shifting factionalism 
of early American politics, voters in the second- party system responded 
“to candidates and issues as Whigs or Democrats” (McCormick 1975, 
102). According to the political historian Michael Holt (1984), the transi-
tion between 1836 and 1840 “was also marked by the elaboration of party 
machinery and by the emergence of impressively high levels of internal 
party cohesion and interparty disagreement. . . . For the first time . . . the 
parties articulated coherent and contrasting platforms regarding proper 
governmental policy at the state and national levels” (17). Rampant par-
tisanship also pervaded the legislative process. Offices within Congress— 
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such as the Speaker of the House— were recognized as the property of the 
majority party. It was also accepted that the majority party would use its 
position to dole out federal jobs and contracts based on party affiliation. 
Thus, by the 1840s, voting behavior, campaign organization, and winning 
office had become thoroughly linked by political parties.
Against this backdrop the 27th Congress, which assembled in 1841, 
faced the decennial ritual of reapportioning the House of Representa-
tives. The election of 1840 had thrust the Whig Party into control of 
both the White House and Congress (Holt 1999). Riding the coattails of 
their victorious presidential candidate— the military hero William Henry 
Harrison— Whigs wrested control of both the House and Senate from the 
long- dominant Democrats. Upon the opening of the 27th Congress in 
1841, Whigs held 142 seats to Democrats’ 98, while the split in the Senate 
was 29– 22 in their favor.1
Most of the first and second sessions of the 27th Congress were spent 
attending to the nation’s economic crisis and the financial troubles afflict-
ing the states (Holt 1999, 122– 61). The completion of the census in Janu-
fig. 3.1. Percentage of states with competitive congressional elections, 1824– 
40. this figure presents the percentage of states where the statewide margin 
between the top two parties was less than 10 percent in congressional 
elections. (data compiled by the author from data in rusk 2002.)
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ary of 1842, however, meant that Congress would have to turn some of its 
attention to the constitutional obligation of reapportioning the House. In 
the House, the task of crafting an initial apportionment bill was given to 
a special committee chaired by Horace Everett (W- VT). The committee 
reported at the end of January, but the full House did not take up consider-
ation of the bill until April (Shields 1985, 365). The bill contained two pro-
visions. The first called for a ratio of 68,000 people per representative. The 
second required that every state with more than one representative divide 
its seat allotment into geographically contiguous, single- member districts.
Debate on the floor revolved around these two features of the bill. First, 
there was substantial disagreement over the appropriate ratio of people per 
representative, and, hence, the size of the House.2 After flirting with vari-
ous ratios, the House finally agreed on 50,179 people per representative, 
which would enlarge the House from 242 to 255. Second, the House also 
spent a week contentiously debating the merits and constitutionality of 
the districting provision. The vote to include districting into the final bill 
passed by a razor- thin margin of two votes (101– 99), while the vote to pass 
the entire bill and send it to the Senate was 113– 87 (Congressional Globe, 
27– 2, 471).
In the Senate the Judiciary Committee, chaired by Georgia Whig John 
Berrien, considered the Apportionment Bill. The Senate modified the 
House version, however, increasing the ratio for apportioning the House 
to the much higher 70,680 people per representative. The immediate 
implication was that the House would be reduced in size from 242 to 223. 
The Senate also agreed to keep the districting provision, despite numerous 
attempts on the floor to pass amendments that would limit its reach. The 
penultimate vote striking the districting provision fell 19– 24, after which 
the entire bill passed 25– 19 (Congressional Globe, 27– 2, 614).
The Senate’s alterations did not initially sit well with many House 
members. Upset that it had tinkered with the apportionment ratio, the 
House nevertheless agreed to the Senate version, and, in June 1842, sent 
the bill to the White House. President Tyler, despite initial concerns of 
Whig congressmen that he might veto, grudgingly signed the bill into law.3 
Thus, the House was to be reduced in size, and any state using the general 
ticket would now be required to carve up their state into districts.
The decision to reduce the size of the House is intriguing (and will be 
relevant for the rest of the story), but the main interest here concerns the 
districting provision.4 Section 2 of the act stated:
That in every case where a state is entitled to more than one repre-
sentative, the number to which each state shall be entitled under this 
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apportionment shall be elected by districts composed of contiguous 
territory equal in number to the number of representatives to which 
said state may be entitled, no one district electing more than one 
representative. (5 Stat. 491 (1842))
Why did Congress mandate this requirement? One explanation found in 
the historical literature is that it was a good government reform aimed 
at creating uniform electoral standards to protect the interests of minor-
ity constituencies. The general ticket limited geographically concentrated 
minorities from gaining seats commensurate with their vote share. Dis-
tricting, according to this argument, would increase the chances of minor-
ity interests to receive some representation. As Shields observes, “while 
each party’s members insisted that the other would corrupt any system, 
most legislators agreed that equality of representation was a desirable 
goal and that uniform districting might increase the fairness of elections” 
(1985, 362).
A second explanation, offered by Calabrese (2006), presents a partisan- 
centered rationale. Calabrese argues that when there is a newly dominant 
party— defined as one which controls both the presidency and Congress— 
they have an incentive to mandate single- member districts. Parties with 
unified control of national government, typically elected at a presidential 
election, should anticipate a loss at the midterm elections and thereby have 
an incentive to switch to single- member districts. This switch, he argues, 
will help insulate incumbents of the dominant party from adverse politi-
cal tides. This argument offers a potentially satisfying explanation for the 
switch to single- member districts. It certainly fits the surface details of the 
period. Yet there is a problem. The glitch is that the argument mispre-
dicts the timing of the switch to single- member districts. If the argument is 
right, then the transition to single- member districts should have happened 
prior to 1840. Why didn’t the Jeffersonian Democratic- Republicans man-
date single- member districts following their sweep of the 1800 election? 
Why didn’t the Jacksonians do the same following their triumph in 1828? 
There had to be something more than a new regime taking power in 1840 
that finally triggered the change.
A third explanation centers on battles between large and small states. 
Zagarri (1989), for example, argues that the districting law was the result 
of a coalition of Whigs and small- state representatives. Prior to 1842, small 
states were the primary users, and main defenders of, the general- ticket 
system. But, according to Zagarri, Whigs were able to peel off some of 
these small- state members by playing on their fears that, absent univer-
sal districting, large states might adopt general- ticket elections, produc-
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ing unified delegations that would then act against small state interests 
(130– 31). “In the end,” Zagarri argues, “the support of senators and rep-
resentatives from small states such as New Hampshire, Georgia, Missouri, 
and Mississippi, which still had general- ticket elections, was crucial to the 
passage of the bill” (131). There is, however, a serious problem with this 
story— the members from these states overwhelmingly voted against the 
districting provision.
In contrast, one might reasonably surmise that, as the majority Whigs 
surveyed the political landscape, they observed an opportunity to pick 
up extra seats in the next House elections by carving up general- ticket 
states into districts. Whigs recognized that general- ticket elections greatly 
improved the prospects that a majority party could sweep a state’s entire 
delegation and shut out the minority party. As they recently saw in Ala-
bama, in 1840, their party garnered 43 percent of the statewide vote, yet 
did not receive a single seat (Holt 1999, 155; Thornton 1978, 94). More-
over, Whigs discerned that under the new apportionment they were going 
to be net losers in the states using the general ticket. Whigs had done well 
in general- ticket states that were slated to lose seats in the new apportion-
ment. Democrats, on the other hand, had done well in general- ticket states 
that were slated to gain seats. A switch to districts would provide Whigs a 
chance, in the strong Democratic general- ticket states, to win seats more 
commensurate with their vote share. Thus, it was not that the general 
ticket merely punished minority constituencies. Nor was it simply that 
Whigs were a new party in power; there had been newly dominant parties 
before. Instead, what the new census numbers revealed was that any new 
federal apportionment was going to hurt Whigs’ primary constituency— 
themselves.
How the General Ticket and the  
New Apportionment Affected Whigs
The proponents of districting argued that it was necessary in order to pro-
tect the interests of minority constituencies and prevent large states from 
overrunning small states. During the debates, however, a number of mem-
bers charged that the districting provision had nothing to do with protect-
ing “minority interests” and everything to do with simple party politics. 
These charges of partisanship originated from Democrats’ side of the aisle. 
Democrats dismissed the proponents’ (i.e., Whig) arguments as subterfuge, 
claiming that Whigs were simply trying to boost their prospects in the 
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upcoming election. For example, Senator Lewis Linn (D- MO), after dis-
missing the proponents’ arguments, leveled the following accusation— as 
summarized by the Congressional Globe:
It seemed to him, therefore, the question assumed a political 
aspect— a party one. He would not disguise his opinion upon this 
point; he believed it was a party question. He believed— and he 
chose to speak plainly— that the Whig party would derive a positive 
advantage from this particular clause of the bill. (Congressional Globe 
27- 2, 596)
Senator Arthur Bagby (D- GA) went one step further, equating districting 
with the French “Reign of Terror” (Congressional Globe 27- 2, 612). Demo-
cratic protests, such as these, suggest that partisan motives may have played 
a central role in the switch to single- member districts.
At first glance, however, it would appear that Democrats’ claims of par-
tisan manipulation were unjustified. Seven states elected their representa-
tives to the 27th Congress via general ticket— New Hampshire (5 seats), 
Rhode Island (2), New Jersey (6), Missouri (2), Alabama (5), Georgia (9), 
and Mississippi (2). Of these seven, three— Rhode Island, New Jersey and 
Georgia— returned unified Whig delegations for a total of 17 members. 
The other four states all went against Whigs, resulting in 14 seats for 
Democrats. Among general- ticket states, Whigs actually had a slight (3 
seat) advantage. Thus, from this cursory counting of seats, it appears that 
Whigs would lose by banning the general ticket.
The results of the census and the consequent redistribution of House 
seats under the new apportionment, however, fundamentally altered this 
political accounting. Politicians knew the recent census’ reshuffling of seats 
to the general- ticket states would advantage Democrats. Recall that the 
House and Senate had each proposed different bases for apportionment; 
the House version called for an increase; the Senate, a decrease in the size 
of the House. The Senate version was the one finally agreed upon (and the 
one I will work with here). The first four columns of table 3.1 lists each 
general- ticket state, their old apportionment, the number of seats they 
were entitled to under the upcoming apportionment, and the net change.
Using past election results, Whigs could categorize the partisan direc-
tion of each state. Presumably, in this pre- polling era, the best informa-
tion politicians had about the upcoming election were the results of the 
previous election (Kernell and McDonald 1999, 803). Thus, Whigs in 
1842 could anticipate which way a state was expected to go based on the 
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most recent election returns. The fifth column of table 3.1 lists how each 
state voted in the elections to the 27th Congress (the elections of 1840 and 
1841). Based on these results, New Hampshire, Missouri, Alabama, and 
Mississippi could safely be called strong Democratic states. New Jersey, 
Rhode Island, and Georgia fell into the Whig camp. By combining the 
partisan direction of each state with the future gain or loss in seats, Whigs 
recognized how the general ticket disadvantaged them. Since these states 
returned unified delegations, Whigs could reasonably calculate the result-
ing aggregate partisan breakdown. In the strong Democratic states, there 
were potentially seven new seats that would fall into the Democratic col-
umn: New Hampshire (−1), Missouri (+3), Alabama (+2), and Mississippi 
(+3). On the Whig side, there was going to be a net loss of two seats: Rhode 
Island (no change), New Jersey (−1), and Georgia (−1). Thus, Democrats 
were poised to gain seven seats, while Whigs dropped two. According to 
this political arithmetic, under the new apportionment, Whigs would have 
15 seats in general- ticket states, compared to Democrats’ 21.
These estimates, while bad for Whigs, are conservative. Whig politi-
cians had reason to consider even worse scenarios. They had suffered a 
crushing defeat in the recently held Georgia state elections (August 1841), 
when Democrats captured both the state legislature and governor’s office 
(Debats 1973; Holt 1999). If, as appeared likely, Georgia swung away from 
Whigs in the next congressional election, this eight- seat shift would pro-
vide Democrats a new general ticket advantage of 29– 7.5
Moreover, during congressional deliberations, word trickled in from 
Maine that the state legislature had recently ended its session by passing 
a contingent redistricting plan. Unsure how many seats it was going to 
receive in the next election (it currently had eight), Maine’s legislature 
drew up a districting plan for an apportionment of eight seats. If, however, 
the new apportionment gave it seven or nine seats, the plan called for elec-
tion by general ticket (Niles National Register, April 9, 1842, 85; Congres-
TABLE 3.1. The Partisan Distribution of Seats in General Ticket States
 Old  New Net Statewide Party Controlling 
State Apportionment Apportionment Change Democratic Vote State Government
New Hampshire 5 4 −1 58.1 Democrats
Rhode Island 2 2 0 0 Whigs
New Jersey 6 5 −1 48.2 Whigs
Missouri 2 5 +3 58.1 Democrats
Alabama 5 7 +2 58.3 Democrats
Georgia 9 8 −1 42.5 Democrats
Mississippi 2 5 +3 53.4 Democrats
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sional Globe 27- 2, 590). Congressional members in both parties knew that 
the new apportionment allotted seven seats to Maine, thereby triggering 
a switch there to a general- ticket election. The current Maine delegation 
was evenly split four to four, but in the recent state elections (September 
1841), Democrats won in a landslide.6 Hence, if the general ticket were 
installed, the ominous political winds blowing in from Maine would cost 
Whigs another three, possibly four, seats under the general ticket. Thus, if 
one added Georgia and Maine to the Democratic column, the split among 
general- ticket states was now 36– 7 against Whigs. In short, Whigs were 
about to suffer large losses and possibly lose control of the House.
Carving the general- ticket states up into districts gave Whigs a chance 
to avoid this huge swing of seats toward Democrats. Although Demo-
crats were in control of state government in all the general- ticket states, 
except New Jersey and Rhode Island, there are constraints on the district-
ing process— geographic distribution of voters, respect for county lines, 
incumbent protection, etc.— which limit the ability of strong parties to ger-
rymander clean sweeps (Cain 1985; Cox and Katz 1999). Thus, Whigs saw 
districting as a way to stave off complete electoral disaster. While Whigs 
were judiciously circumspect about speculating on their reform’s partisan 
affects, Democrats were quite willing to reveal Whigs’ political motivation. 
The following summary of Senator Alfred Cuthbert’s (D- GA) speech in 
the Congressional Globe illustrates that Democratic politicians keenly under-
stood the workings of electoral institutions:
Mr. Cuthbert observed that it may operate for the benefit of a 
party— he would not say what party. But he would explain what 
he meant. Suppose Alabama was entitled to nine members; while 
under the general- ticket system, she would have the whole nine of 
the party now in the minority in Congress; but, under the district 
system, the same party would have probably but five; would not that 
be proof that this clause acted for the benefit of the party forcing the 
bill now with this clause? (Congressional Globe 27- 2, 590– 91)
In the next section, we see that each side acted as if it had thoroughly 
grasped these lessons in institutional manipulation.
State Competition versus Party Strategy
Was the districting mandate a result of competition between large and 
small states or was it an attempt by Whigs to take away seats from Demo-
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crats? Fortunately, we can test these competing explanations using the roll- 
call results on districting in the House and Senate.
Evidence in the House
The clearest way to test for the effects of partisanship and state size is to 
examine how each member voted on the amendment to include districting 
in the final bill (H.R. 73). If Whigs were the driving force behind district-
ing, then we should find them overwhelmingly voting in favor of reform, 
and Democrats in opposition. To test for the effects of state size, the most 
straightforward measure is the population of the state in which the mem-
ber resides. One might also expect that individual members would differ 
in their support for districting based on the manner in which they were 
elected. House members from general- ticket states, all else being equal, 
should be less likely to vote for districting since their jobs were directly 
threatened. To account for this possibility, I included a dummy variable 
indicating whether or not the member was elected by general ticket.
The results, estimated via logit and presented in table 3.2, indicate the 
strong influence of partisanship. Even after controlling for state population 
and manner of election, Whigs, as expected, were significantly more likely 
to vote for districting. The coefficient on the state size variable is insignifi-
cant. In addition, members from general- ticket states were less willing to 
vote for districting (p < .01).
TABLE 3.2. The Determinants of Voting for 
Districts in the U.S. House (logit estimates; 
dependent variable = vote on districting 
provision)
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To see the differential effects of partisanship and electoral structure 
more clearly we can convert the coefficients into probabilities of voting 
yea. Combining party with electoral structure gives us a two by two matrix 
of possible combinations. The predicted probabilities for each combina-
tion are displayed in table 3.3. Democrats were overwhelmingly opposed 
to districting, regardless of how they were elected. The probability of a 
Democrat voting yea was near zero (.04 and .01, for district- and general- 
ticket based representatives, respectively). Whigs, on the other hand, had 
a much higher probability of voting yea, as expected. Whigs chosen by 
general ticket, however, were less likely to favor the reform than were their 
district- elected brethren. The probability of a district- based Whig voting 
yea was .86, while for general- ticket Whigs, it was only .56.
Examining the general- ticket Whigs more closely illustrates how collec-
tive interests competed with individual interests. The general- ticket Whigs 
came from two states: Georgia and New Jersey. The Whigs from Geor-
gia all voted against districting, while the New Jersey contingent voted in 
favor. What might be driving this differential result? The clearest answer 
seems to hinge on which state party would be controlling the process of 
drawing the new districts. Democrats, as noted earlier, had captured con-
trol of Georgia’s state government, while Whigs were the majority party in 
New Jersey. Although we lack direct testimonial evidence, these patterns 
are consistent with the conjecture that congressional members from these 
states were calculating the expected utilities of life under districts versus 
general ticket. With fellow Whigs in control of drawing districts, New Jer-
sey congressmen could count on securing favorable districts (Levine 1977; 
McCormick 1953). Whig representatives from Georgia, on the other hand, 
facing an opposition state legislature, could expect much less friendly treat-
ment. Thus, taking their chances under the general ticket may have seemed 
a better proposition.
TABLE 3.3. Probability of Voting Yea in the House
 Whigs Democrats
General Ticket .56 .01
 (.29, .80) (.0007, .04)
Districts .86 .04
 (.71, .95) (.004, .14)
Note: Predicted probabilities with population set at its 
mean value; 95% confidence intervals in parentheses.
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Evidence from the Senate
Voting on districting in the Senate was even more clear- cut in terms of par-
tisanship. Unlike the House, the Senate entertained a number of proposed 
amendments to the districting provision. Most of these were put forward 
by Democrats attempting to exempt particular states from districting, or 
trying to postpone its implementation. The penultimate vote on districting 
was an amendment offered by Senator Allen (D- OH) to eliminate the pro-
vision from the bill altogether. The vote on this amendment failed 19 to 24. 
As can be seen in table 3.4, the vote to keep districting broke straight down 
party lines. No Democrats defected, and the only Whig to cross party bar-
riers was the states- rightist Berrien, of Georgia (Debats 1973). Thus, the 
results in the Senate further confirm a party- centered explanation for the 
single- member- district mandate.
The Best- Laid Plans . . . 
Two events conspired to mute the impact of the Whig plan. First, they 
“suffered one of the most staggering reversals in off- year congressional 
elections ever witnessed in American history” (Holt 1999, 151). Their rep-
resentation in the House plummeted from 59 percent to 36 percent. Fac-
tional battles in Congress, bickering between President Tyler and Whig 
congressmen, and the failure to enact adequate legislation to cope with 
the nation’s economic crisis all contributed heavily to their losing control 
of the House. Second, four of the general- ticket states— New Hampshire, 
Georgia, Mississippi, and Missouri— did not obey the districting mandate, 
electing their representatives to the 28th Congress via general ticket. These 
states sent a combined 22 members, all Democrats, to the House. Whigs 
contested their seating, but Democrats, now with a 61- seat majority, held 
to party lines and voted to ignore the districting law. Thus, the general- 
ticket Democrats defied the districting mandate and took their seats.
TABLE 3.4. The Senate Vote to 
Eliminate the Districting Provision
 Yea Nay
Democrats 18  0
Whigs  1 24
χ2 = 39.11; p < .01.
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One reason why the partisan explanation offered in this chapter may 
have previously been overlooked is because of the initial failure of the 
districting act. This does not mean, however, that the act did not mat-
ter. Congress now had the statutory basis to unseat members elected by 
general ticket. The critical factor was a congressional majority finding it 
in their political interests to enforce the law. Indeed, the hold- out states 
may have switched to districts in anticipation of having their delegation 
unseated. While Georgia shifted to districts in December 1843, after 
Whigs recaptured the state government, the other three states— New 
Hampshire, Mississippi, and Missouri— did not switch until the election 
of 1846. Democrats in these states anticipated that Whigs would recapture 
the House, and, hence, not seat their representatives. Throughout 1846, 
Whigs mounted an unprecedented nationwide midterm election campaign, 
eventually winning back majority control of the House (Holt 1999, 236– 
45). Thus, Democrats in the holdout states likely discerned that national 
political tides had turned against them and, fearing that their delegations 
would not be seated, preemptively switched to districts. The convergence 
to single- member districts in congressional elections was now complete.7

Part ii




The Strategic Timing of 
Congressional Redistricting
Following the 2002 election, Republicans in Texas’ state legislature found 
themselves in an unfamiliar position: the majority. The combination of a 
new state House majority and the reelection of Republican Governor Rick 
Perry produced the first unified Republican government in Texas in more 
than a century. Many credited the efforts of then House Majority Leader 
Tom DeLay with the Republican victory, noting that he had been instru-
mental in candidate recruitment and fundraising. DeLay’s efforts ended 
up personally damaging—DeLay was convicted of money laundering in 
the state legislative elections—but the political effects of the redistricting 
clearly benefited Republicans nationally.
One of DeLay’s primary goals in helping the Texas Republicans secure 
a state legislative majority was the redrawing of the state’s U.S. House dis-
tricts. Following a legislative stalemate over congressional redistricting in 
2001, a federal- court panel had designed a districting map for Texas that 
produced a 17– 15 Democratic advantage in the state’s congressional del-
egation. This Democratic advantage occurred despite a statewide vote of 
56.6 percent for Republican candidates and Republican control of all 29 
statewide elected offices. DeLay and many Texas Republicans saw their 
newfound majority as a golden opportunity to devise a plan that would 
accurately reflect the partisan leanings of Texas voters and enhance the 
Republican majority in the House of Representatives.
DeLay’s redistricting gambit consumed the Texas legislature in 2003. 
Democrats sought to block the new plan— first by fleeing to Oklahoma 
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and later to New Mexico to prevent a quorum, and to avoid being detained 
by the Texas Rangers. The stalemate was finally broken and a new plan 
enacted after Democratic state senator John Whitmire abandoned the quo-
rum boycott and returned to Austin. The new plan produced a dramatic 
shift in the partisan composition of the Texas delegation. Five Democratic 
incumbents were defeated, and the 109th Congress began with Republi-
cans holding a 21– 11 advantage over Democrats—a net shift of six seats to 
Republicans. These six seats allowed Republicans to hold onto their slim 
majority in the House of Representatives.
The Texas case drew nationwide attention and scorn from many poli-
ticians, pundits, and press members, who labeled it unprecedented, anti-
democratic, and illegal. The Washington Post, in an editorial entitled “The 
Soviet Republic of Texas,” chastised the Texas legislature for violating a 
“longstanding tradition” against mid- cycle redistricting, calling the plan 
“a new low . . . [that] will aggravate the triumph of extremes in Washing-
ton while further sovietizing America’s already- fixed electoral game.”1 The 
issue eventually ended up in front of the U.S. Supreme Court. A divided 
court upheld the constitutionality of mid- decade gerrymanders and parti-
san gerrymanders more generally (League of United Latin American Citizens 
v. Perry, 2006).2 Democrats vowed to seek revenge in other states, giving 
rise to fears of a redistricting arms race.
Had Democrats looked back in history, however, they may have been 
chagrined to find out that what goes around comes around. In the spring 
of 1878, the Speaker of the House, Samuel J. Randall (D- PA), sent out an 
urgent missive calling on Democratic- controlled state legislatures to redis-
trict and manufacture additional Democratic seats. Terrified that Republi-
cans were on the brink of capturing the House in the upcoming midterm 
elections, Speaker Randall decided that drastic action was in order. In April 
1878, the New York Times reported:
Samuel J. Randall, Speaker of the House of Representatives, has 
written to leading Ohio Democrats that it is of the utmost impor-
tance to the Democratic Party that the Ohio Legislature should 
redistrict the state. Mr. Randall gives as a reason that the indications 
point to Republican success in carrying the next House unless some 
effort of this kind is made by Democrats where they have power. 
(New York Times, April 23, 1878)
Democratic leaders in the Ohio and Missouri state legislatures heeded 
Randall’s call for a new redistricting. The resulting maps crucially swung 
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nine seats to Democrats, and helped Democrats maintain their slim major-
ity in the House.
The Texas Democrats of 2002 were also not the first group of politi-
cians to flee a legislature while trying to block an unfavorable redistricting 
plan. In 1861, for example, Democratic legislators walked out of the Indi-
ana State Senate to prevent the passage of a pro- Republican congressional 
districting map. According to a historian of Indiana politics, after Demo-
crats bolted from the chamber, the following exchange occurred:
“I saw them pretty nearly all in a batch, and the answer was, ‘Tell 
them to go to hell,’” said the Republican doorkeeper who tracked 
down the absentees. “I move that we don’t do that [go to hell],” 
said Senator Michael D. White with levity. After White’s motion 
was agreed to, Republicans dropped redistricting, and Democrats 
returned. (Walsh 1987, 217)
Indiana was unable to redistrict until 1867, when Republicans secured a 
large enough majority to overcome the continuing threat of Democratic 
bolts.
Thus, the practice of mid- decade redistricting had many precursors 
in the 19th century. The impetus to redraw districts became even greater 
following the congressional decision in 1842 to mandate single- member 
districts in every state. Political parties in the states quickly seized upon the 
potential for partisan gain that followed from this switch to single- member 
districts. In New Jersey (one of the states affected by the 1842 law), the 
Whig- controlled legislature, in 1843, quickly passed a districting law 
intended to maximize their share of the congressional delegation. When 
Democrats regained control of the state legislature, in 1845, they returned 
the favor and drew up new districts favorable to Democratic congressional 
candidates. Whigs, in 1847, once again back in charge of the legislature, 
none too surprisingly, imposed another new plan (Levine 1977).
This back- and- forth redistricting may strike modern observers as quite 
peculiar. Nowadays, congressional redistricting takes place at regular 10- 
year intervals following the census. Indeed, part of what made the recent 
Texas mid- decade remap so newsworthy was its seemingly exceptional 
occurrence. In the context of recent history, it was. Yet in the 19th century, 
states displayed few qualms about redistricting mid- decade. To visualize the 
near constancy of redistricting during the partisan era and how it compares 
to other eras of American politics, figure 4.1 plots the number of states 
redrawing district boundaries between 1790 and 2010. Between 1862 and 
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1896, there was only one election year in which at least one state did not 
redraw its congressional districts (fig. 4.1). Ohio, for example, redistricted 
seven times between 1878 and 1892— at one point conducting six consecu-
tive congressional elections with six different plans.
While some states redistricted frequently, others went decades without 
writing a new districting plan. In addition, states sometimes threw newly 
gained seats into at- large elections or chose their entire congressional del-
egation on a statewide ballot. In this chapter, I examine the logic behind 
the variation of redistricting events in the 19th century. The central argu-
ment is that party competition drove state decisions to rewrite the rules 
of the electoral game. When a new party came into power, and the cur-
rent districts were drawn by the out party, the probability of redistricting 
sharply increased. These gerrymandering arms races typically happened in 
competitive, battleground states like Ohio and Indiana, where the close-
ness of the statewide vote greatly increased the payoffs to manipulating 
district boundaries. At other times, party competition led states to freeze 
their districts for long stretches of time. As long as a state’s representation 
in the House went unchanged, strong parties often found it in their inter-
est to keep the congressional districts dormant. These silent gerrymanders, 
to borrow V. O. Key’s (1956) evocative phrase, normally happened when 
fig. 4.1. the percentage of states redistricting, 1790– 2010. states with only 
one congressional seat were excluded. (data compiled by the author from 
information in martis 1982.)
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there was divided partisan control of state government or one- party domi-
nation, such as in the post- Reconstruction South and the Northeast after 
the elections of the mid- 1890s. It is worth also noting the sharp decline 
in redistricting during the early to mid- 20th century and the subsequent 
changes in redistricting patterns following the 1960s. We will return to 
these important trends in chapter 9.
In addition to shedding light on the factors inducing institutional 
change, the diversity of 19th- century redistricting highlights the impor-
tance, for the legislative elections literature, of looking beyond the mod-
ern era of redistricting. Almost everything we know about the politics of 
redistricting comes from research inspired by the wave of court- ordered 
redistricting in the mid- 1960s. The conventional finding of this work is 
that redistricting has a minimal impact on the partisan makeup of con-
gressional delegations (Abramowitz 1983; Campagna and Grofman 1990; 
Niemi and Winsky 1992).3 The inference normally drawn from this find-
ing is that state legislators prefer to protect incumbents of both parties 
rather than increase their party’s share of the House delegation. Moving 
beyond modern redistricting allows us to ask whether this finding holds 
more generally. How do politicians behave when freed from the shackles 
imposed by courts? Do they more aggressively pursue partisan interests?
Uncovering the logic behind the timing of 19th- century redistricting 
events can also illuminate contemporary decisions by state parties to redis-
trict. The courts have set the floor on the timing of redistricting— states 
must readjust their district boundaries at least once a decade. But the courts 
have yet to impose a ceiling— states can still redistrict more than once a 
decade, unless prohibited by their state constitution (Cox 2004). This was 
affirmed by the recent Supreme Court decision— League of United Latin 
American Citizens v. Perry (2006)— which upheld mid- decade redistricting. 
Thus, identifying the conditions which prompted mid- decade redistricting 
in the 19th century may provide important insights into understanding 
recent mid- decade redistricting efforts.
The Timing of Redistricting Before One- Person, One- Vote
In the modern era, the nature and timing of districting choices available to 
states are relatively circumscribed. The court enforced one- person, one- 
vote doctrine induces regular redistricting. Because population naturally 
shifts over the course of 10 years, states are compelled to bring the equality 
of their districts back into line. The Voting Rights Act— and its subsequent 
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amendments— serves as another major constraint on contemporary map-
makers. States, or localities, covered by the Voting Rights Act (i.e., those 
with a past history of discriminatory barriers in the electoral process) must 
submit any proposed maps to the Justice Department or a federal district 
court for preclearance.
Redistricting in the 19th century, by contrast, was largely unfettered. 
Although the reapportionment of congressional seats following the decen-
nial census often prompted states to redistrict, there was much broader dis-
cretion available to states. A state could find itself in one of three scenarios 
depending on whether or not the size of their congressional delegation 
stayed the same, grew, or shrank.4
If a state did not gain any seats then, absent a new redistricting plan, 
the old districts stayed in place. Nothing legally compelled states to redis-
trict. As long as a state’s representation in the House went unchanged, its 
district boundaries could remain untouched. On the flip side, there were 
also no restrictions on how often a state could redistrict. States were free 
to redistrict in years other than those immediately after a census and could 
redistrict more than once a decade.
If a state gained seats, it faced slightly different options. Before 1872, if 
a state gained seats, and failed to redistrict, they reverted to their current 
plan and forfeited the representation of any newly gained seats. Because 
states naturally disliked losing representation they almost always redrew 
their maps to incorporate additional seats. This changed, however, in 1872 
when Congress attached a provision to the Apportionment Act allowing 
gaining states to keep their old plan intact and elect any new seats in a 
statewide, at- large election until a new redistricting plan could be passed. 
The at- large provision was repeated in every following Apportionment Act 
until 1929 (and remained in force until 1967).5
Finally, when a state lost seats the choices were more drastic. Although 
states infrequently lost seats during the 19th century, it did occasionally 
happen (see column 3 of table 4.1). Prior to 1882, federal law did not 
stipulate what would happen if a state lost seats and failed to redistrict. 
Apparently these states faced the unacceptable threat of their delegation 
not being seated in the House. Consequently, every state that lost seats 
between 1842 and 1880 redistricted. In 1882, Congress passed a provi-
sion allowing a losing state to temporarily elect its entire delegation in 
statewide, at- large elections (i.e., general- ticket elections) (22 Stat. 5).6 
This momentarily lifted the ban on general- ticket elections. Although this 
provision was not part of the Apportionment Act of 1892— presumably 
because no states lost seats in that years apportionment— it was included 
The Strategic Timing of Congressional Redistricting 65
in both the 1901 and 1911 Apportionment Acts and stayed in force until 
the 1960s.
All told then, a state could find itself in one of three scenarios depend-
ing on whether or not the size of their congressional delegation stayed the 
same, grew, or shrank. Since each scenario had a varying effect on the deci-
sions faced by state legislatures, and the strategic choices faced by political 
parties, it is necessary to analyze each separately.
Unprompted Redistricting
This section examines unprompted redistricting— that is, redistricting 
that was not triggered by changes in a states apportionment of seats. This 
encompasses both non- census years and those years following a census, 
but where a state did not gain or lose seats during the congressional reap-
portionment. The key question is why some states redistricted frequently 
while others went decades without redrawing district boundaries. The 
answer lies in the interaction between the party currently in control of 
state government and the party that had last drawn the districts.
The first condition that had to be in place was unified party control of 
state government. Although parties may have wanted to gerrymander in 
order to solidify and extend partisan gains, they first had to be in a position 
to pass the requisite legislation. Their ability to do so hinged on whether 
they could overcome the separation of power constraints laid out in their 
state constitution. The procedural requirements for passing legislation— 
specifically, the constitutional provisions for a gubernatorial vetoes and 
legislative overrides— varied considerably across states. Many states sim-
ply mirrored the U.S. Constitution, providing for an executive veto and a 
TABLE 4.1. The Reapportionment of Seats in the U.S. House, 1840– 1900
 Number of States  Number of States Number of States 
Apportionment Decade with No Change Gaining Seats Losing Seats
1840 1 8 13
1850 11 9 7
1860 6 5 7
1870 6 26 1
1880 9 22 3
1890 20 18 0
1900 20 18 0
Source: Martis 1982.
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super- majority override requirement (usually two- thirds, but in some cases 
three- fifths). A number of state constitutions, however, broke from the fed-
eral mold, requiring only a simple majority in each legislative chamber to 
override a veto, while others dispensed with an executive veto altogether. 
In these states, when one party controlled both chambers, the legislature 
did not need the assent of the governor. In what follows, I assume that a 
state was under unified control if one party controlled all the formal veto 
points, and divided party control otherwise.
The distinction between unified versus divided control is crucial for 
understanding the baseline conditions that produced an unprompted 
redistricting. If both parties controlled at least one branch of the state 
government, then any new plan had to be agreed upon by both parties. 
Since redistricting typically involves zero- sum change (i.e., there is no plan 
that simultaneously makes both parties better off), each party would natu-
rally veto the others schemes. Hence, as long as a states’ delegation size 
was unchanged, one would not expect to see a redistricting event during 
divided government.
This expectation is borne out by the historical record. Between 1840 
and 1900, only twice did a state, unprompted by a seat change, redistrict 
when there was divided partisan control. The exceptions occurred in Geor-
gia in 1850 and Tennessee in 1880. In both cases, third parties held a sub-
stantial number of seats in the legislature, and perhaps formed a majority 
coalition with one of the other parties.
What, then, triggered redistricting? We can think of state parties as 
surveying the political landscape and weighing the costs and benefits of 
redistricting.7 Negotiating a new district plan, appeasing congressional 
incumbents, satisfying local party organizations, and agreeing on how best 
to allocate partisans into new districts were among the many transaction 
and opportunity costs that had to enter into any party’s utility calculation. 
When the net benefits of switching to a new plan outweighed the political 
costs of crafting a new plan, a state party should have found it profitable to 
redistrict. This most likely should have happened when the gap between 
the dominant party’s ideal plan and the status quo plan was fairly large. 
When there was little difference between the dominant party’s ideal plan 
and the status quo their motivation to redistrict would have been low, but 
as this gap widened, their incentive to redistrict would have increased.
What considerations might have altered the utility calculus in such a 
way to increase the probability of a redistricting event? Two conditions, 
in addition to unified government, had to be met before the probability 
of redistricting became substantial. The first condition was when one uni-
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fied party surrendered to another. When a new party came into power, we 
might suspect that it would want to adjust congressional districts to solidify 
or extend any partisan gains. In Indiana, for example, Republicans captured 
control of the state government from Democrats in the 1866 election and 
promptly redrew congressional districts.
However, not all new majority parties wanted to redraw congressional 
districts. When new majorities discerned that the possibilities were highly 
discrepant with the current districts, one would expect increased incentives 
to redistrict. This most likely occurred when the out party crafted the cur-
rent districts. Here the gap between the status quo and the in- party’s ideal 
plan was relatively wide. Consider the story of New Jersey described in the 
opening of this chapter. Democrats took control of the state legislature 
from Whigs in 1845. Whigs had drawn the existing districts; thus, Demo-
crats had both the opportunity and motive to redistrict. The shoe was on 
the other foot two years later when Whigs retook control of the state leg-
islature. They too were a new unified party facing an unfavorable reversion 
plan and promptly redrew more favorable maps.
Thus, we should expect a spike in the probability of redistricting when 
there was both a party turnover and an out- party districting plan. On the 
other hand, when the current districts were drawn by the in party, the cur-
rent majority’s interests should have been reflected in the status quo. Here, 
the majority party should have been happy to keep the districts as is.
To test these predictions, I collected all of the relevant data for every 
state legislative session from 1840 to 1900. We first need to know when 
states redistricted. Fortunately, Martis (1982) lists the precise date when 
each redistricting statute was passed into law. These passage dates were 
then matched with the partisan composition of the state legislature and 
governor using Burnham’s (1985) data on state legislatures and various 
state histories. I coded each legislative session into one of three govern-
mental types: Unified Democratic, Divided, or Unified Republican/Whig. 
The coding took into account the veto provisions of each state. To see 
how this worked, consider a state that only required a simple majority to 
override a gubernatorial veto. If, for example, the state had Democratic 
majorities in each legislative chamber, but a Republican governor, the state 
would still be coded as Unified Democrat. If, on the other hand, the state 
gave the governor a veto and Democrats did not have sufficient majorities 
to override a veto, then the state was coded as Divided.
The dependent variable is whether a state passed a redistricting plan or 
not during a given legislative session. Between 1840 and 1900, there were 
32 unprompted redistricting events. I exclude all state- years in which a 
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state gained or lost seats, or had only one congressional member. In addi-
tion, for the former Confederate states, I exclude the first plan passed after 
the Civil War because new congressional districts were a precondition of 
their readmittance placed on them by the federal government.
The two critical conditions suspected to prompt redistricting are 
whether or not there was a party turnover of state government and whether 
the out party controlled the last redistricting. Combining these two factors 
together produces four possible categories: (1) party turnover and an out- 
party redistricting, (2) party turnover and an in- party redistricting, (3) no 
party turnover and an out- party redistricting, and (4) no party turnover 
and an in- party redistricting. I expect the largest probability to occur when 
there is both a party turnover and an out- party reversion. When only one 
or neither of these conditions is met, I expect the probability to be com-
paratively smaller.
Given that the unit of analysis is a state legislative session, the appro-
priate statistical model is a binary time- series cross- sectional model— or, 
equivalently a grouped duration model (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). To 
control for any duration dependence, I included dummy variables for every 
year since the most recent redistricting (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). The 
standard errors are clustered by state to account for any nonindependence 
within states.
The results are presented in table 4.2. Consistent with expectations, 
when there was a new unified regime and the current district were written 
TABLE 4.2. Estimating the Likelihood of an Unprompted 
Redistricting, 1840– 1900 (logit estimates; dependent 
variable = redistricting)
 Coefficients  
Variable (robust standard srrors)
Party Turnover and 2.31**
 Out- Party Reversion (.39)
Party Turnover and 1.23**
 In- Party Reversion (.48)
No Party Turnover and .19
 Out- Party Reversion (.59)






Note: Robust standard errors (clustering by state) in paren-
theses.
**p < .05, *p < .10.
The Strategic Timing of Congressional Redistricting 69
by the out party, the probability of a redistricting was positive and signifi-
cant. In addition, the coefficients for the other two regimes were insignifi-
cant. The impact of no party turnover and an in- party reversion is reflected 
in the intercept and is negative.
To more clearly see the substantive impact of the independent vari-
ables, I converted the results into the probability of a redistricting event. 
Setting Years Since Last Redistricting at its median value of eight years, we 
see striking evidence, presented in table 4.3, of parties strategically timing 
their redistricting events in response to their electoral circumstances. The 
largest probability of redistricting arose when there was both a switch in 
party control and the previous districts were written by the out party. Here, 
the probability of a redistricting spiked to .25. Yet when there was neither 
a party turnover nor an out- party reversion, the probability plummeted to 
.03. The near- zero probability in the lower right cell of table 4.3 indicates 
that once a favorable plan was in place parties tended to pursue a strategy 
of neglect.
Ohio
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, between 1878 and 1892, Ohio 
redistricted a remarkable six times. The key to understanding this redis-
tricting frenzy begins by considering Ohio’s peculiar rules for apportioning 
the state legislature. Ohio had an interesting system where apportionment 
of state- legislative districts was conducted by a three- person commission: 
the governor, lieutenant governor, and state auditor. They conducted this 
apportionment under fairly strict guidelines laid out in the state consti-
tution. The upshot was that state legislators were proscribed from craft-
ing their own districts. This prevented parties from using district maps to 
create a single- party hegemony in the state legislature. The even balance 
TABLE 4.3. The Effects of Party Turnover and Reversionary Districts 
on the Probability of Redistricting
Party Turnover Current Districts Written by the Out- Party
 Yes  No
Yes .25 .10
 (.18, .35) (.05, .18)
No .04 .03
 (.01, .10) (.02, .06)
Note: The cells contain the simulated probability of a redistricting event; 
95% confidence intervals in parentheses.
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between the two parties statewide thereby produced shifting, and often 
precarious, legislative majorities.
While the state constitution strictly limited partisan shenanigans 
regarding state legislative districts, no limits were placed on the design of 
congressional districts. Moreover, Ohio’s state constitution did not provide 
the governor with a veto. As long as party loyalty held, whichever party 
captured the state legislature could, if it wanted, implement a congressional 
district map of their choosing. Table 4.4 displays the combined effects of 
party turnover and out- party districts for Ohio between 1878 and 1890. In 
every case where there was party turnover and an out- party redistricting 
plan, a new replacement map was promptly put in place. Each new regime 
then made it one of their first orders of business to redraw the states’ con-
gressional districts (Argersinger 1982). The only exception was 1882 when 
Ohio gained a seat in the federal apportionment and was required to redis-
trict anyway.
Party leaders sometimes went to great legislative lengths to pass a new 
redistricting plan. In 1886, for instance, Republicans engineered a plan to 
unseat four Democratic state senators from Cincinnati based on charges of 
electoral fraud. These four seats gave Republicans a firm majority in the 
state Senate, to go with their majority in the lower House, and opened the 
door for Republicans to replace the pro- Democratic congressional map 
that been put in place two years earlier. According to the New York Times, 
“The ousting of the four fraud representatives from Cincinnati means a 
redistricting of the State, or rather the undoing of the Democratic gerry-
mander” (New York Times, May 3, 1886). As we see in the next chapter, these 
maps were partisan to the hilt. The results were district maps that at times 
determined partisan control of the national government. Indeed, it would 
not be an exaggeration to say that during the Gilded Age, as Ohio’s district 
maps went, so went Congress.
TABLE 4.4. The Impact of Party Control on Redistricting Decisions in Ohio, 1878– 90
 Previous Control of  Current Control of Partisanship of 
Year State Government State Government Previous Plan Redistricting?
1878 Republican Democratic Republican Yes
1880 Democratic Republican Democratic Yes
1882a Republican Republican Republican Yes
1884 Republican Democratic Republican Yes
1886 Democratic Republican Democratic Yes
1888 Republican Republican Republican No
1890 Republican Democratic Republican Yes
aGained seats in the 1882 apportionment.
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Connecticut
At the other end of the spectrum was Connecticut. The state redrew its 
congressional districts after the 1842 reapportionment and did not redis-
trict again until 1910. Just as in Ohio, the interaction between the consti-
tutional structure and party control of the state legislature drove the fre-
quency of redistricting. But whereas in Ohio these factors led to frequent 
redistricting, in Connecticut they combined to forestall redistricting for 
70 years.
The first thing to note is that Connecticut neither gained nor lost seats 
in any of the federal reapportionments between 1850 and 1900. The state 
had exactly four congressional representatives for this period. As a result, 
there was no outside prod that compelled the state to redistrict. If con-
gressional districts were to be redrawn, the motivation had to come from 
within the state legislature itself. But the state legislature— and, in par-
ticular, the Republicans who dominated the state legislature— found little 
reason to consider redrawing the congressional map.
Connecticut, like many northeastern states, used a town- based rep-
resentation system for the lower house of the state legislature. The rule, 
written into the state constitution, required that every town receive a 
representative— regardless of the town’s size. The result was egregious 
malapportionment. According to C. K. Yearley, in the late 19th century, 
“Four of the states smallest towns with a total population of 1,500 enjoyed 
four representatives against only twice that number to represent the 
407,715 inhabitants of the four largest cities. Thus, Tolland County with 
3% of the State’s population in sparsely settled farming country sent 8.3% 
of the representatives to the legislature although New Haven, by contrast, 
with 30% of the population supplied only 16.6% of the representation” 
(Yearley 1970, 40). These “rotten boroughs” inflated Republican (and 
Whig) numbers in the legislature given their strength in the rural, small 
towns. Even in pro- Democratic election years, Democrats found it nearly 
impossible to overcome the unfavorable electoral bias of the lower house.
Thus, with a congressional district plan that favored Republican con-
gressional candidates and Republicans in firm control of the lower house 
of the state legislature, there was little motivation in the state legislature to 
adjust the congressional district boundaries. And Democrats could not gain 
the necessary majorities to pass a new plan. Over time, this led to stunning 
discrepancies in House district populations. In 1842, the districts had actu-
ally been roughly equal in population— the largest district had 90,000, and 
the smallest had 72,543. This difference, although not strictly equal, was 
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minor by 19th- century standards. By 1900, however, the population differ-
ences had reached enormous levels. In 1900, the largest district (the 2nd) 
had nearly three times as many people as the smallest (the 3rd)— 310,923 
to 129,619. Perhaps not surprisingly, the most populous district— the 2nd, 
which contained New Haven— consistently had the highest Democratic 
support of any district in the state. The 70- year logjam was finally broken 
in 1912 when Connecticut gained a new seat in the federal apportionment 
and was finally motivated to redistrict.
At- Large Elections
Not all states that gained seats, however, opted to redistrict. Another tactic, 
after 1872, was to elect part of the congressional delegation in statewide, 
at- large elections. The decision to use at- large districts arose when a state 
gained new seats in the federal apportionment. Although Congress had 
outlawed statewide districts in 1842, they modified this policy in 1872 by 
allowing gaining states to temporarily elect their new members at- large. 
Typically a state would keep its old map intact and elect any newly gained 
seats at- large. Many states took advantage of this opportunity, not only in 
1872, but also in every subsequent apportionment (until 1967, when Con-
gress finally banned at- large elections). Between 1872 and 1940, 47 of the 
121 states that gained seats elected their new members through at- large 
elections.
For some states, at- large elections arose because of the inability of fac-
tions within the state legislature to agree on a new set of districts (Martis 
1982, 4– 5). Typically, this happened when there was divided partisan con-
trol of state government. Since both parties could veto the other’s preferred 
redistricting scheme, stalemate would lead to the use of at- large elections.
In other cases, strong political parties may have used at- large elections 
to preserve or extend their dominance. As Martis notes, “Another possible 
scenario is that the party in power with the allegiance of the majority of 
the state’s electorate would be certain their at- large candidate would win 
the election. Re- dividing the state into several smaller districts could make 
some districts more vulnerable to defeat by creating a large opposition fac-
tion in each” (1982, 4).
Thus, we should expect to see an increased probability of at- large elec-
tions under two different conditions. The first is when there is divided 
partisan control of state government. The second, following the conjecture 
offered by Martis, is that unified governments would prefer at- large elec-
tions when it was confident of winning the statewide vote.
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To test these predictions, I examined the choices states made when 
they gained seats and the use of at- large elections was an option (i.e., after 
1870). Because the time frame from 1870 to 1900 provides so few obser-
vations, I extended the data collection up through 1940. This provides 
enough observations for us to make reasonable inferences from the data. 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable coded one if a state redis-
tricted upon gaining new seats and zero otherwise. To test the prediction 
that at- large elections should be more likely during periods of divided gov-
ernment, I included a dummy variable for unified partisan control (Unified 
Government). I expect this coefficient to be positive. To test the possibility 
that strong parties would be more likely to use an at- large election the 
stronger they believed they could carry the state, I interacted Unified Gov-
ernment with the strong party’s statewide vote in the most recent congres-
sional election. Before polling, the vote tally from the past congressional 
election likely served as the most reliable indicator of a party’s upcoming 
prospects (Kernell and McDonald 1999, 803). I expect the coefficient on 
this interaction to be negative, indicating less willingness to redistrict the 
larger their expected vote share. In addition, I included controls for the size 
of the state’s delegation (Delegation Size) and years since last redistricting. 
As in the previous section, I estimate the model using a probit maximum- 
likelihood estimator.
The results are presented in table 4.5. The coefficient for Unified Gov-
ernment is, as expected, positive and significant. Redistricting became more 
TABLE 4.5. Estimating the Probability of Redistricting when a State 
Gained New Seats, 1870– 1940 (probit estimates; dependent variable = 
redistricting)
 Coefficients  
 (robust standard errors)
Unified Government 1.732**
 (.661)
Strong Party’s Vote Share in Last −.014*
 Election × Unified Government (.008)
Delegation Size −.018
 (.012)






Note: Robust standard errors (clustering by state) in parentheses.
**p < .05; *p < .10.
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likely during periods of unified partisan control. It also means that at- large 
elections were more likely during periods of divided control. Moreover, the 
interaction between unified government and strong parties statewide vote 
share was negative and significant (at .10).
To see the substantive effects of the variables more clearly, I converted 
these estimates into the probability of a state redistricting upon gaining 
a new seat (where the converse is an at- large election). When there was 
divided government, and the control variables are at their median values, 
the probability of a redistricting is .35. When there was unified govern-
ment, and a statewide vote share of 55 percent, the probability of redis-
tricting jumps to .71. Moreover, this probability increases with the size of 
the strong party’s most recent vote share. Increasing a party’s vote share 
from 50 percent to 70 percent boosts the probability of redistricting by 
10 percent. Thus, as state parties became more confident they would carry 
the statewide vote, the more willing they were to keep the current districts 
dormant and elect new members at- large.
The strategic use of at- large elections could also aggregate into national, 
partisan ramifications. In fact, the impact of at- large elections on party 
ratios in Congress may have been the impetus behind the congressional 
decision in 1871 to allow at- large elections in the first place. First, consider 
that that 16 of the 19 elections held at- large in 1872 went to Republicans. 
Not coincidentally, Republicans held control of Congress and the presi-
dency, and were the chief proponents of the at- large provision.
Further evidence of a partisan motivation behind the adoption of the at- 
large provision comes from floor debates in the House. Because the appor-
tionment of 1872 boosted the size of the House by over 20 percent, a large 
proportion of states were slated to receive new seats. This worried many 
congressional Republicans who realized that without an at- large provision 
they risked losing many of these additional seats. For example, Indiana’s 
Republican delegation expressed concern that they would lose their two 
additional seats because the state legislature had already adjourned for the 
year. The Republican John Shanks of Indiana reported that:
In Indiana we have today no legislative body that can meet until 
an election shall take place under a proclamation of the Gover-
nor, and there will probably be no such election in time to have 
legislative provision for the election of additional members by dis-
tricts . . . If we do not elect the additional member at- large then we 
shall not get our full quota. (Congressional Globe, 42nd Congress, 
2nd Session, 63)
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Confident they could carry the Indiana statewide vote, and knowing the 
Republican governor was averse to calling the Democratic- controlled leg-
islature back into session, Congressional Republicans saw at- large elec-
tions as a way to pick up a few extra seats.
More explicit charges of partisanship emerged from the Democratic 
side of the aisle. Democrats recognized that a statewide minority would 
be shut out of any at- large representation, and in strong Republican states 
like Illinois, which was gaining four new seats, Democrats were poten-
tially facing substantial losses. Samuel Marshall, a Democrat from Illinois, 
identified the looming pitfalls to a statewide minority party if the at- large 
provision were adopted:
Suppose that in Kentucky, Missouri, or in the State of Illinois, there 
should be two, three, four, or five additional Representatives to 
be elected by the State at large, to allow the majority party in the 
State to elect all of those members, and to hold out a temptation to 
the Legislature to refuse to redistrict the State, thus depriving the 
minority of any representation through these additional members, 
would be an outrage which this Congress, I am sure, would not tol-
erate for one single moment. (Congressional Globe, 42nd Congress, 
2nd Session, 63)
Unfortunately for Marshall, and his fellow Democrats, Congress did toler-
ate the at- large provision. Eleven states chose to use elect their new seats 
at- large. These states combined for a total of 19 at- large seats, 16 of which 
went to Republicans. As with the case of unprompted redistricting, the use 
of at- large elections quickly became another weapon in party battles.
General- Ticket Elections
Throughout most of the 19th century, states rarely had to deal with the 
thorny problem of redistricting after losing seats. Before 1880, if a state 
lost seats and failed to redistrict, then they lost their representation in 
Congress. In the 1880 Federal Apportionment Act, Congress added a pro-
vision allowing losing states to temporarily elect their entire congressional 
delegation on a statewide ballot— the general ticket. A party that was con-
fident it could win the statewide vote could be empowered.
Although the number of states losing seats between 1880 and 1900 was 
minimal, two later cases, both following the 1930 census, illustrate how the 
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strategic game between parties often played out. The elections following 
the census of 1930 were the first since 1840 in which a substantial number 
of states lost seats. Because the federal government had not apportioned 
the House in nearly 20 years, and the size of the House did not change, 
a number of states saw their representation in Congress decrease. The 
first case comes from Missouri. There the Democratic governor vetoed 
the Republican- controlled legislature’s attempt at a partisan gerrymander, 
throwing the entire delegation into a general- ticket election. Confident 
that Democrats would win the statewide vote, the governor knew he could 
safely veto. Democrats went on to sweep all 13 of Missouri’s seats with 
only 62 percent of the statewide vote. After this massive setback, Republi-
cans relented and drew up a districting law benefiting Democrats (Mitchell 
1968).
In Minnesota, the Republican legislature passed a partisan gerryman-
der, mistakenly believing— or hoping— that it could pass a redistricting law 
without the governors’ signature.8 Governor Floyd Olson, a member of 
the opposition Democratic- Farmer- Labor party, vetoed the bill, thereby 
forcing all the congressional seats onto a general- ticket ballot. Two years 
later, Republicans relented and grudgingly agreed to a plan favoring the 
Democratic- Farmer- Labor party. “The Republicans disliked the Farmer 
Labor version of congressional reapportionment,” writes Olson’s biogra-
pher, “but accepted it rather than face another election of representatives 
at large” (Mayer 1951, 139). Thus, at least in Missouri and Minnesota, the 
strategic deployment of a general- ticket election dramatically strength-
ened the hand of the party with the strongest electoral future.
The Past and Future of Mid- Decade Redistricting
Part of the impetus for studying the history of redistricting is that it can 
also provide insight into modern redistricting politics. As noted in chapter 
1, many political observers worried that other states would follow the lead 
of the 2002 Texas remap and devise their own mid- cycle maps. The result 
would be a gerrymandering arms race. Indeed, both Colorado and Georgia 
attempted to redraw their districts mid- decade, although with less drastic 
consequences than the map in Texas.
As the results presented earlier indicate, just because a state can legally 
redistrict mid- decade, it does not follow that it will. The political condi-
tions that would motivate a party to take the dramatic step of redistricting 
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mid- decade also need to be present. Thus, the findings with respect to 
the timing of redistricting raise an interesting question: why hasn’t there 
been more recent mid- cycle redistricting? How often have modern state 
legislatures found themselves in a position similar to that of the Texas 
Republicans in 2002 or Ohio Democrats in 1878? To answer this question, 
I collected data on the partisan composition of state legislatures and the 
party affiliation of governors for the time period 1972– 2005. I combined 
this with data on the type of redistricting plan each state had enacted in 
the previous redistricting (Carson and Crespin 2004). Redistricting plans 
were classified as either non- legislative, meaning they were drawn by a 
commission or judicial officers; bipartisan, meaning they were enacted by 
non- unified state governments; or partisan, meaning they were enacted by 
either a unified Democratic or Republican government.
Eliminating the nonpartisan, unicameral Nebraska legislature, and 
states with only one congressional district, leaves us with 1,436 state- years 
to analyze. Table 4.6 presents the tabular results. Perhaps the most strik-
ing finding from these data is how few partisan redistricting plans have 
been enacted in the past 35 years. Only 10.3 percent of the state- years in 
the dataset have a unified partisan redistricting plan. The overwhelming 
majority of plans (79.9 percent) were drawn by divided state governments, 
with non- legislative plans making up the remaining 9.7 percent. The fact 
that so few plans have been enacted by unified party governments in the 
past three decades severely limits the motivation for a mid- cycle redistrict-
ing. The bipartisan compromise at the heart of these plans means that each 
party is invested, to some degree, in the plans. These plans are often drawn 
to protect congressional incumbents, which makes it even more difficult 
for state legislatures to enact new plans that would disrupt entrenched con-
gressional incumbents.
Table 4.6 also displays the frequency with which unified or divided state 
governments faced plans drawn either by the other party, a non- legislative 
entity, or a bipartisan plan. By far, the most common occurrence in the 
data is a divided state government living under a bipartisan plan. In these 
cases, we would not expect there to be a majority sentiment to change 
to a more partisan plan in the state. In the instances in which we see a 
unified state government facing a partisan plan, in all but one case, the 
plan was drawn by the party in power. The one exception was Georgia in 
2005, where much like Texas, the legislature convened with a newly unified 
Republican majority. This case did not stay out of equilibrium long as the 
Georgia legislature enacted a new plan, which is the only other mid- cycle 
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legislative redistricting in the data set. All other unified state governments 
faced a plan they had drawn, a bipartisan plan, or a plan drawn by a non- 
legislative entity—all of which are more difficult to change.
The bottom portion of table 4.6 presents the comparable data for the 
period between 1870 and 1900. This was the period of most intense redis-
tricting activity and therefore offers a useful baseline to compare with the 
modern period. The first thing to note is the infrequency of divided gov-
ernment. Reading the totals at the bottom of each column we see that only 
93 state- years, or 17 percent, had divided party control of state government 
(compared to 53 percent for the modern era). This infrequency of divided 
government in the 19th century is also reflected in the paucity of bipartisan 
redistricting plans. During this period, only 6 of the 105 redistricting plans 
were passed during divided government (and all but one was prompted 
TABLE 4.6. The Frequency of State Party Control and 
Redistricting Type
1970– 2006
Party Control of State Government
 Bipartisan Democratic Republican
Existing Plan
Bipartisan 643 386 119
 (83.5) (76.9) (72.6)
Democratic 15 82 1
 (1.9) (16.3) (0.6)
Republican 16 0 34
 (2.1) (0) (20.7)
Non- Legislative 96 34 10
 (12.5) (6.8) (6.1)
Total 770 502 164
1870– 1900
Party Control of State Government
 Bipartisan Democratic Republican
Existing Plan 
Bipartisan 5 15 20
 (5.3) (6.6) (6.9)
Democratic 23 161 42
 (24.7) (71.2) (14.6)
Republican 65 50 226
 (69.9) (22.1) (78.5)
Total 93 226 228
Note: Numbers in parentheses are column percentages.
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by a change in a state’s apportionment of seats). Second, the number of 
years in which a party with unified control faced an existing plan drawn 
by the opposition was also much higher than in the modern era. There 
were 50 state- years where Democrats had a Republican- drawn plan, and 
42 instances where Republicans faced a Democratic- drawn plan.
Overall, these results indicate that the conditions that prompt off- cycle 
redistricting were much more prevalent in the 19th century. Turnover of 
state government was more frequent, unified government was more fre-
quent, and these new governments often found themselves with a distaste-
ful redistricting plan currently in place.
Conclusion
Judicial entry into the redistricting process in the 1960s revolutionized 
the process of drawing district lines (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2008; Cox 
and Katz 2002). One consequence was to set a floor on the amount of 
redistricting that had to take place. States have to redistrict at least once a 
decade. This has created a regular 10- year redistricting cycle. At the same 
time, the courts have not created a ceiling on redistricting. The Supreme 
Court confirmed the legality of mid- decade gerrymanders in their decision 
to uphold the Texas remap. Unless there is an explicit prohibition in a state 
constitution, states can continue to redistrict more than once a decade.
In this chapter, I took a historical step back and examined an era before 
court- ordered redistricting. Freed from the constraints of the courts, state 
parties gerrymandered quite differently. Sometimes they would redistrict 
frequently; at other times, they would let their districts lay dormant for 
decades. Both outcomes were tied directly to the nature of party competi-
tion within a state. When a new party came into power, and found the dis-
tricts recently drawn by the out party, the probability of redistricting shot 
up. On the other hand, once a strong party had designed districts favorable 
to their candidates, the probability of redistricting dropped practically to 
zero.
The variegated redistricting of the era interjected an often forgotten 
dynamic into 19th- century politics. Redistricting was much more variable. 
While a few states went long stretches without redistricting, many other 
states redistricted often. In the next three chapters, I examine the conse-
quences of these redistricting decisions on party ratios, electoral competi-
tion, and the decisions of representatives to run for reelection.
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Stacking the States,  
Stacking the House
The Partisan Consequences of  
Congressional Redistricting
In early 1890, the Ohio state legislature assembled for its new session. The 
state elections, held in 1889, had given the Democratic Party a slim major-
ity in both the state assembly and state senate. With their newfound major-
ity, the newly assembled Democratic caucus immediately turned to an issue 
of both local and national importance— redrawing congressional districts. 
Republicans held 16 of the 21 congressional seats. At the national level, 
Republicans held a razor- thin two- seat majority in the House of Represen-
tatives. Thus, with the November midterm elections looming, Democrats 
across the country looked to the new Democratic majority in Columbus for 
help. Seizing the opportunity, the Democratic caucus thoroughly reworked 
the states’ 21 congressional districts. No district went untouched. Reflect-
ing on the audacity of the pro- Democratic map, the New York Times wrote 
that, “The dose of gerrymandering, with which the Democratic legislature 
has repaid old wrongs of the same character, has made more changes in 
the map of Ohio than have occurred in African geography in recent years” 
(New York Times, July 25, 1890).
The gerrymander was astonishingly successful. In the November elec-
tions, Democrats won 14 seats, turning a 5- to 16- seat deficit into a 14 to 7 
surplus. The 9- seat swing to Democrats was all the more remarkable con-
sidering that Republicans actually out- polled the Democrats, 49 percent 
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to 47.5 percent. The impact of this gerrymander had far- reaching national 
implications as well. The swing of seats in Ohio, coupled with a strong 
pro- Democratic tide in other states, propelled Democrats into majority 
control of the House. With Republicans in control of the Senate and the 
presidency, capturing majority control of the House provided Democrats 
with an institutional beachhead to fight off the legislative initiatives of the 
opposition.
This highly partisan, and consequential, gerrymander was by no means 
an isolated incident. This chapter demonstrates that strategic redistrict-
ing had a profound impact on congressional election outcomes and the 
national balance of power throughout the 19th century. Throughout the 
19th century, state political parties used gerrymandering to bias congres-
sional election outcomes in their favor. Significantly, these state- level 
activities generated important ripples in the national balance of power. 
Majorities in the House during this period were often razor- thin, and 
timely shifts in a few seats could swing partisan control of the House. In 
fact, on at least two occasions— the elections of 1878 and 1888— strategic 
mid- decade gerrymanders altered partisan control of the House. Thus, 
fluctuations in party control of the House resulted not only from an 
evenly divided partisan nation, but also from the strategic manipulation 
of electoral districts.
Beyond deepening our understanding of 19th- century American poli-
tics, the results of this chapter speak directly to contemporary debates over 
the impact of redistricting. Almost everything that is known about the 
national consequences of gerrymandering comes from research conducted 
on the redistricting cycles that have occurred since the court- led reappor-
tionment revolution of the 1960s. This research typically shows that each 
of the subsequent rounds of redistricting produced, at best, only a minimal 
impact on the partisan balance of power in Congress (e.g., Glazer, Grof-
man, and Robbins 1987; Seabrook 2010; Swain, Borrelli, and Reed 1998).
However, no consensus has emerged about why gerrymandering has 
had such little influence. Some scholars have argued that constraints on 
gerrymandering in the modern period, including court oversight; one- 
person, one- vote mandates; and demands by congressional incumbents for 
secure seats, have made it virtually impossible to engage in a full- blown 
partisan gerrymander (e.g., Glazer, Grofman, and Robbins 1987; Tufte 
1973). Others contend that the partisan gains to be had from gerrymander-
ing are limited, regardless of the institutional configuration under which 
redistricting takes place (e.g., Butler and Cain 1992, 8– 10). By moving 
beyond the relatively fixed institutional and political context of modern 
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redistricting, 19th- century elections provide a unique opportunity to assess 
these competing explanations.
The results presented in this chapter suggest that redistricting can 
indeed alter partisan control of Congress, but only when the conditions 
are right. In particular, a highly polarized party system and a close divi-
sion between the two parties at the national level dramatically raised the 
incentives and payoffs from strategic partisan gerrymanders. As such, the 
findings presented in this chapter have direct implications for contempo-
rary redistricting controversies. Looking back to the late 19th century— 
also an era of polarized politics— can shed new light on the question of 
whether the recent mid- decade gerrymander in Texas is unique or if there 
are general conditions under which strategic gerrymanders can reshape the 
national balance of power.
Partisan Balance and Strategic Redistricting in the Partisan Era
Between 1840 and 1900, competition for control of Congress— and the 
House of Representatives in particular— was fierce. Figure 5.1 displays 
the Democratic share of congressional votes and seats for this period. 
Between 1840 and 1858, Democrats held a slight edge over Whigs— and 
later Republicans. On occasion, Democrats had substantial majorities in 
the House, but these majorities could be fleeting. For example, Demo-
crats were wiped out in the 1854 election— losing 74 seats— only to regain 
control of the House two years later. While seat shares fluctuated in the 
antebellum House, the national division of the vote remained close. For 
most of the period from 1840 until the Civil War, Democrats’ share of the 
national vote hovered around the 50 percent mark. The onset of Southern 
secession and the Civil War ushered in a period of Republican dominance. 
But even during the Civil War, Democrats remained a viable opposition 
party (Silbey 1977). Congressional Democrats, for instance, gained seats in 
the 1862 midterm election, and actually came close to capturing the House 
(Carson, Jenkins, Rohde and Souva 2001).
But the most intense period of electoral competition during the 19th 
century— if not the entirety of American history— was between 1872 and 
1894. The two parties were in virtual tie for most of these years. This can 
be seen in table 5.1 which presents information on party control of the 
House between 1870 and 1900. During this period, Democrats averaged 
50.7 percent of the two- party congressional vote and a similarly razor- thin 
49.7 percent of seats in the House. The dead- even balance between the 
fig. 5.1. Partisan competition in u.s. house elections, 1840– 1900. vote is the 
democratic percentage of the total congressional vote. seats are the total 
percentage of seats won by the democrats on election day. (data from rusk 
2002.)
TABLE 5.1. Party Control of the U.S. House in the Post- Bellum Era
 Democratic Democratic Party Control of  
Year (Congress) Congressional Vote House Seats the House
1870 (42) 48.91 38.93 R
1872 (43) 45.61 29.45 R
1874 (44) 52.39 61.30 D
1876 (45) 52.23 51.88 D
1878 (46) 53.65 51.88 D
1880 (47) 51.27 47.10 R
1882 (48) 54.91 60.62 D
1884 (49) 51.72 56.31 D
1886 (50) 52.01 52.31 D
1888 (51) 50.50 49.69 R
1890 (52) 54.42 71.69 D
1892 (53) 54.81 62.08 D
1894 (54) 44.87 29.97 R
1896 (55) 47.43 39.78 R
1898 (56) 48.90 48.18 R
1900 (57) 48.08 44.54 R
Average 50.73 49.73
Source: Rusk 2001.
Note: The vote is the Democratic percentage of the two- party vote. The seats are 
the total percentage of seats won by the Democrats on Election Day.
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national parties resulted from the combination of strong Democratic states 
in the South (following the end of Reconstruction), strong Republican 
states in the Northeast, and intense competition throughout the Midwest 
and border states.
This split within the national electorate was also reflected in the fragile 
partisan control of Washington, DC. The reappearance of Democratic 
southern delegations beginning in the early 1870s, coupled with the par-
ty’s success nationally in the 1874 midterm election, reintroduced fierce 
competition for control of the House. And control of the House often 
meant the difference between unified and divided government. The stra-
tegic admittance of pro- Republican western territories into the Union 
gave Republicans a structural advantage that allowed them to control 
both the Senate and presidency for most of this period after the Civil 
War (Stewart and Weingast 1992). Thus, whether partisan control of the 
national government was unified or divided often pivoted on which party 
could capture the House of Representatives. Between 1870 and 1900, each 
party controlled the House in exactly half of the Congresses (eight times 
apiece).
With voter loyalties that were tough to change (Silbey 1991) and mobi-
lization efforts near their maximum (Burnham 1982), parties searched out 
other opportunities for an extra source of advantage. The clever manipula-
tion of congressional districts was one of those opportunities. Compared 
to their modern counterparts, 19th- century parties in control of state 
governments were afforded a large degree of discretion in choosing both 
the timing and nature of their redistricting events. As seen in the previ-
ous chapter, the state legislatures exercised wide discretion over when to 
redistrict. But in addition to deciding when to redraw district lines, state 
legislatures had broad discretion in determining how to draw district maps. 
Unlike modern state legislatures, they were not bound by the one- person, 
one- vote requirements. Although Congress occasionally added language 
to the decennial Apportionment Act requiring that districts contain equal 
numbers of people, there is little evidence that these provisions were ever 
enforced, much less achieved.
Once a party decided to gerrymander, its members typically pursued 
one of two strategies. As discussed in chapter 2, the first strategy was to 
pack supporters of the opposition into one or a few districts and distribute 
in- party loyalists evenly throughout the rest of the state in marginal, yet 
winnable, districts. A good example of this packing strategy comes from 
post- reconstruction Alabama, where the majority Democrats placed every 
possible Black Belt (i.e., Republican) county into one district (the Old 
Fourth Alabama), preferring “to lose one district rather than run the risk 
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of a Republican triumph by a much smaller majority in several districts” 
(McMillan 1978, 222).
The second strategy was to create an efficient or dispersal gerryman-
der (Cain 1984, 1985; Owen and Grofman 1988). A party that was confi-
dent in its ability to win the statewide vote for the foreseeable future could 
maximize its seat share by having each district mirror this favorable state-
wide partisan distribution (Cain 1985; Cox and Katz 2002). By efficiently 
distributing its supporters in marginal but winnable districts, the control-
ling party could win every seat in the state. An illustration of this efficient 
strategy comes from Maine, where Republicans gerrymandered the state 
in 1884 and, for the next five elections, captured all four congressional dis-
tricts despite an average district vote of only 54 percent.
These anecdotes suggest that state politicians recognized the payoffs in 
the currency of congressional delegation share from gerrymandering. The 
possibility that these state- level decisions might also shape the national 
balance of power was not lost on national party leaders. For example, 
Democrats’ precarious hold on the House entering the midterm elections 
of 1878 led national Democratic leaders— including the Speaker of the 
House, Samuel Randall (D- PA)— to implore Democrats in the Ohio leg-
islature to redraw its congressional districts. In May 1878, the New York 
Times gave the following report:
Dispatches have poured in upon them [Democratic state legislators] 
from all parts of the country, and especially from the Democratic 
leaders at Washington, who have declared that the passage of this 
bill was the only way to save the next Congress from falling into 
Republican hands. (New York Times, May 14, 1878)
State party leaders in Ohio, along with Democrats in Missouri, did indeed 
redistrict— swinging nine seats to the Democrats— and, as we will see 
shortly, helped the Democrats retain their slim majority in the House. 
The re- redistricting of Ohio and Missouri provides further anecdotal evi-
dence to suggest that gerrymandering may have played an important role 
in shaping the partisan composition of state delegations and, at times, the 
composition of the House.
Stacking the States
Were state parties using redistricting to stack their state congressional del-
egations and possibly alter the partisan composition of the House? As was 
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done in chapter 2, the primary way to answer this question is to analyze the 
effect of districting partisanship on the translation of votes into seats. Fol-
lowing standard reasoning in the redistricting literature, one can think of 
districting plans as affecting two elements of the vote- seat translation: par-
tisan bias and electoral responsiveness (e.g., Gelman and King 1994; Tufte 
1973). Partisan bias is defined “as the difference between the expected seat 
share that the Democrats would get with an average vote share of 0.5 and 
their ‘fair share’ of 0.5 (half the seats for half the votes)” (Cox and Katz 
1999, 820). A districting plan that packs Republican voters into a few safe 
districts and places Democrats in a number of marginal, yet winnable, dis-
tricts would produce a pro- Democratic bias (i.e., they would win more 
than their “fair- share” of seats given their overall vote).
Responsiveness— or swing ratio— is the change in a party’s aggregate 
seat share given a 1 percent change in their vote share. For example, a 
responsiveness value of three (i.e., the cube law) means that a shift in the 
statewide vote from 50 percent to 51 percent would produce a three- 
percentage- point seat shift. A districting plan with a number of marginal, 
highly competitive districts will have a high value of responsiveness (i.e., 
a small swing in the statewide vote will generate a large swing in seats). 
A plan with numerous safe seats will have a lower level of responsiveness 
because it will take a large swing in the statewide vote before seats start 
changing hands.
If parties used redistricting to tilt electoral outcomes in their favor, 
then plans passed when a single party controlled state government would 
lead to high levels of both responsiveness and partisan bias. A bias in favor 
of the controlling party is consistent with that party skewing the districts 
in their favor. What about plans during divided government? Although 
plans passed during divided state governments were rare in the 19th cen-
tury, there were a few, and their dynamics differed from partisan plans. 
Since both parties could veto the other’s schemes, bipartisan plans typically 
protected incumbents of both parties. We should, therefore, expect to see 
lower levels of bias and responsiveness under bipartisan plans (Cox and 
Katz 2002).
Consider the redistricting of North Carolina in 1852. Whigs controlled 
the lower house while Democrats controlled the state senate. Although 
Democrats had done well in the prior election and could expect to poll well 
in the future, Whig control of the lower house in the state legislature put 
them in a position to prevent total electoral disaster. The historian Marc 
Kruman writes that, “After interminable haggling over the redistricting, 
the parties approved compromise plans. Whigs, though, clearly felt they 
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had gotten the best of the bargain since they voted more heavily in favor of 
the plans than did the Democrats. Whigs thus prevented Democrats from 
reapportioning them out of existence” (Kruman 1983, 154).
To measure the impact of different partisan regimes on electoral out-
comes, I estimated the bias and responsiveness for redistricting plans passed 
between 1840 and 1900. I matched the precise date of each redistricting 
(Martis 1982) with the partisan composition of the state legislatures and 
governors at the time of passage (Burnham 1985). With this information, 
I then assigned each election, by state and year, to one of three plans: par-
tisan Democratic, partisan Republican/Whig, and bipartisan (taking into 
account the various veto override provisions) (Cox and Katz 2002).
Similar to the empirical modeling strategy used in chapter 2, for the 
years between 1840 and 1900, I estimated the following vote- seat equation,
ln(sit/(1 − sit)) = λ + ρ(ln(vit/(1 − vit))) (1)
where sit was the proportion of seats won by the Democrats, and vit was 
their vote share in state i at time t.1 The model includes a constant, λ, tap-
ping partisan bias, and an independent variable, ln(vit/(1 − vit)), with the 
coefficient ρ measuring electoral responsiveness. The model allows λ and ρ 
to vary across the different districting plans (i.e. partisan Democrat, parti-
san Republican/Whig, bipartisan). To control for third- party movements, 
I also included the statewide minor- party vote.2 In addition, anticipating 
that congressional elections within a state might affect one another, I esti-
mated the model with an extended beta- binomial distribution (Cox and 
Katz 2002; King 1998).3 This model is appropriate given that the depen-
dent variable is a proportion and that there is potential correlation in the 
probability across districts (within a state) of a Democratic victory.
The estimates in table 5.2 show that the partisanship of districting plans 
directly affected the translation of votes into seats. Partisan Democratic 
plans produced a significant bias of 8.25 percent— in other words, for 50 
percent of the vote, Democrats received 58.25 percent of the seats. Par-
tisan Republican/Whig plans produced a significant bias of 5.7 percent. 
Bipartisan plans, however, failed to produce statistically significant levels of 
bias. Substantively, these results indicate that the partisanship of districting 
plans was systematically related to outcomes on Election Day. At 50 per-
cent of the vote, a party could expect to win roughly between 58 percent 
and 44 percent of a state delegation, depending on which party drew the 
district lines.
Both types of partisan plans produced high levels of responsiveness— 4.0 
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and 4.25 for Democratic and Republican/Whig plans, respectively. Bipar-
tisan plans, as expected, produced a lower level of responsiveness (3.68) 
than the two partisan plans. These levels are substantially higher than 
any found in the 20th century (Brady and Grofman 1991; Engstrom and 
Kernell 2005).4 They provide evidence that, in addition to biasing elec-
tion outcomes, parties also tried to maximize their seat share by efficiently 
distributing their supporters across districts.
Efficient gerrymanders were, in part, made possible because incum-
bents were not in a strong position to push for safer districts. Though this 
was a period of emerging careerism (Price 1975), congressmen were still 
at the mercy of local political organizations for nomination and access to 
the ballot. Moreover, the importance of seniority in determining commit-
tee positions had yet to fully take root (Katz and Sala 1996). An intrigu-
ing implication is that the frequency and partisanship of redistricting may 
have contributed to this era’s high retirement rates and helped slow the 
development of congressional careerism. If parties were more willing to 
pursue extra seats rather than protect sitting representatives, we should 
find incumbents more readily retiring when their district was altered. I take 
up this issue in chapter 6.
TABLE 5.2. Partisan Bias and Responsiveness under 
Different Districting Plans, 1840– 1900
 Coefficient Standard Error
Bias
Partisan Democrat 8.25* 1.96
Bipartisan 2.15 3.62
Partisan Republican/Whig −5.70* 1.84
Responsiveness
Partisan Democrat 4.00* .27
Bipartisan 3.68* .56
Partisan Republican/Whig 4.25* .31




Note: Maximum likelihood estimates of the vote- seat equation 
following an extended beta binomial distribution. The γ parameter 
captures the correlation across districts within a state in the prob-
ability of a Democratic victory. There is no constant because the 
intercept was suppressed.
*p < .05.
Stacking the States, Stacking the House 89
The Partisan Consequences of Redistricting
The results presented in the previous section are consistent with the 
hypothesis that parties drew electoral maps to bias outcomes in their favor. 
Here we consider the intent behind redistricting plans. In the 19th cen-
tury, strategic state legislators took the most recent election results, broken 
down by county and ward, and combined these data to forecast the partisan 
effects of new district lines. Because counties were the building blocks of 
most districts, politicians could easily aggregate county vote returns and 
calculate the partisan consequences of new district lines. For example, 
Governor Joseph Foraker (R- OH), bragged to the New York Times that the 
Republican gerrymander in 1886 would allow his party to capture 14 of 
Ohio’s 21 congressional seats (New York Times, May 18, 1886). Foraker’s 
dead- on predictions were based on the aggregation of the 1884 presi-
dential vote by county into the newly drawn district lines. These simple 
forecasting exercises, therefore, appeared to be standard practice for those 
redrawing district lines. With the use of historical election results and 
19th- century congressional district maps, we can do the same.
To do this, I took the two- party congressional vote by county (Clubb, 
Flanigan, and Zingale 1987) from the most recent election before a new 
redistricting and then aggregated the county results into the new district 
lines (Martis 1982). When district lines crossed county boundaries or 
multiple districts were contained within a single county (e.g., New York, 
Philadelphia, Chicago), I tracked down the necessary ward- and town- level 
election data.5 A district with an intended Democratic two- party vote share 
greater than 50 percent was assigned to the Democrats. Adding up the 
number of intended Democratic victories in a state allows for a comparison 
between the pre- redistricting election results and what would have hap-
pened had the new lines been in place.
To measure the effect of partisanship on the intent of district plans, I 
estimated an equation where the dependent variable is the intended change 
in the Democratic proportion of seats (i.e., the post- redistricting propor-
tion minus the pre- redistricting proportion). The key independent variable 
is the partisanship of those responsible for drawing the new districts (Born 
1985). This latter variable, Partisanship, is coded +1 for Democratic plans, 0 
for bipartisan plans, and −1 for Republican or Whig plans. If parties recon-
structed district lines to add to their congressional delegation, then this 
variable should be positive and significant. In addition, I also included the 
proportion of congressional seats Democrats held at the time of redistrict-
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ing (Lag Seat percent) (see Born 1985) because it is harder for a party to add 
seats if they already hold most, or all, of the congressional delegation. A 
variable indicating whether a state lost or gained seats in the federal appor-
tionment is also included as a control. This variable is scored 1 for a gain, 
0 for no gain, and −1 if a state lost seats. Finally, the analysis is confined to 
states with more than two congressional seats.
The results are presented in the first column of table 5.3. The coeffi-
cient for Partisanship is indeed positive and significant (p < .01). The value 
of the coefficient is .15, indicating that going from a bipartisan plan to a 
Democratic plan increased the intended Democratic gain to 15 percent of 
the delegation, and going from a Republican to a Democratic plan meant 
a switch of 30 percent of the delegation. In a state with 20 congressio-
nal seats, we would expect that going from a Republican to a Democratic 
redistricting plan would produce, on average, an intended swing of roughly 
six seats to Democrats.
Ohio exemplifies the immense impact partisan redistricting could have 
on the party ratios of congressional delegations. To illustrate this, figure 5.2 
plots the Democrats’ percentage of the two- party vote in Ohio along with 
the intended number of seats the mapmakers were trying to manufacture. 
Next to each data point is a label (D or R) indicating which party drew 
TABLE 5.3. Intended and Actual Seat Change for Redistricting Plans
 Intended Seat Change Actual Seat Change
Partisanship .15* — 
 (.02)
Lag Seat % −.43* — 
 (.06)
Intended Seat Change  
 (independent variable) — 1.02*
  (.22)
Actual Vote Change — .01*
  (.001)






Note: The equation in column 1 was estimated using OLS. The second equation was es-
timated using two- stage least squares. A Breusch- Pagan test revealed no heteroskedasticity 
for either column. Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05.
Stacking the States, Stacking the House 91
the district maps. One can see striking partisan intent behind these gerry-
manders. The intended seat shares flip back and forth depending on which 
party drew the maps. In 1886, for example, Republicans replaced the map 
drawn by Democrats two years earlier. The new map was intended to give 
Republicans 16 of Ohio’s 21 seats— a boost of 6 new seats for Republicans. 
Democrats returned the favor in 1890 when they redrew the state map to 
give Democrats 12 of the 21 seats.
One can also see in this figure that each party adopted an efficient ger-
rymander strategy. The vote share during this period is flat, hovering near 
the 50 percent line. Yet seat shares fluctuated wildly as each party attempted 
to capture as many seats possible. Indeed, for most of this period, the vote 
in Ohio was dead even. But as these astute politicians understood, changing 
district lines could turn a narrow statewide vote margin into a supermajor-
ity of seats.
Of course, intent may not match reality on Election Day. The best- laid 
plans of strategic mapmakers may be undone by shifting partisan tides, 
changing migration patterns, or merely poor calculations. To investigate 
the correspondence between intent and the results, I borrowed the tech-
nique used by Born (1985) in his study of modern redistricting. This tech-
fig. 5.2. Gerrymandering in ohio, 1876– 92. solid line shows the democratic 
share of the vote. dashed line is the intended number of democratic seats 
under the district maps. for the two years with no redistricting (1876 and 1888) 
the democrats’ actual share of seats was used. the symbols d and r indicate 
whether democrats or republicans redrew congressional districts.
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nique regresses the actual change in the Democratic delegation (Actual 
Seat Change) on the intended seat change. In addition, the change in the 
Democratic vote share (Actual Vote Change) and whether a state lost or 
gained seats are included as controls. Because the actual shift in seats is 
endogenous with the intended change, a standard Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) equation would be inappropriate. Instead, two stage least squares 
is employed. In the first stage, Intended Seat Change is regressed on the 
independent variables Partisanship, Gain/Loss in Seats, Lag Seat percent, and 
Actual Vote Change. The predicted values for Intended Seat Change from this 
first stage can then be used as an instrumental variable that is plugged into 
the second- stage equation. The coefficient of this instrumental variable 
will indicate to what extent the intentions of partisan mapmakers came to 
fruition.
The results are presented in the second column of table 5.3. The posi-
tive (1.02) and significant coefficient for intended vote change suggests a 
very tight correspondence between intent and Election Day outcomes.6 
On average, almost 100 percent of what was intended was actually real-
ized on Election Day. Bear in mind that this model also controls for shifts 
in the vote across elections. So, it does not mean that every gerryman-
dering simply determined future outcomes, but that after controlling for 
changes in the vote, the correlation between intended seat gains and actual 
seat gains were nearly perfect. This is a striking testament to the ability of 
19th- century politicians to skillfully draw electoral maps with precision.7 
It is even more remarkable considering mapmakers lacked modern polling 
technology and sophisticated computer software.
One might reasonably wonder how, despite technological limitations, 
mapmakers were able to accurately pull off these gerrymanders. Although 
sophisticated polling techniques had yet to exist, there is good reason to 
suspect that mapmakers had plenty of information about local electorates. 
State party leaders were kept abreast of local conditions by information 
networks that ran from local precincts up to the state capitol. The wide-
spread use of the party strip ballot— listing candidates of only one party— 
made split- ticket voting cumbersome and rare (Engstrom and Kernell 
2005). The lack of secret voting made it easy for party workers to monitor, 
and pay, voters at the ballot box (Bensel 2004; Cox and Kousser 1981). 
Altogether, these factors provided party leaders with sufficient informa-
tion about the electorate to construct efficient partisan gerrymanders. The 
numbers in table 5.2 bear this out.
As the overall pattern of results indicates, 19th- century politicians were 
clearly adept at achieving the two necessary conditions for a successful par-
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tisan gerrymander: they systematically drew state electoral maps to bias 
elections in their favor, and these efforts were largely realized at election 
time. The next section examines the degree to which these state- level deci-
sions cumulated to influence party ratios in the House of Representatives 
and the overall national balance of power.
Stacking the House
Since most of what was intended in redistricting plans came to fruition, 
one can take the state- by- state intended effects of redistricting for each 
year and simply add them to see how many national seats can be attrib-
uted to gerrymandering. So, for each year, I took the number of seats each 
party gained via gerrymandering and summed them to get a net redistrict-
ing effect. These numbers can then be used to develop counterfactuals for 
party ratios in the House. In other words, one can compare the effects of 
gerrymandering with what would have happened in the absence of ger-
rymandering.
The results of this simulation are presented in figure 5.3. The figure 
compares the simulation to the actual party ratios in the House. There are 
a number of instances in which the simulation differs from actual history. 
In 1882, for example, gerrymandering padded the Democratic majority 
by 14 seats. In 1890, Democratic efforts in Ohio wrested seven seats away 
from Republicans. In a couple of instances, pro- Democratic gerryman-
ders were counteracted by pro- Republican gerrymanders. For example, in 
1880, Democrats picked up two seats from gerrymandering, and Republi-
cans four, for a net of only two seats.
Perhaps more important are the elections of 1878 and 1888, in which 
gerrymandering actually helped determine party control of the House. In 
1878, the nine seats Democrats picked up via Ohio’s and Missouri’s ger-
rymandering allowed Democrats to retain majority control. Without these 
nine seats, Democrats most likely would not have had a majority in the 
House. In addition, Democrats’ capture of the House prevented Repub-
licans from gaining unified control of the national government. In 1888, 
Republicans in Pennsylvania carved 21 pro- Republican districts out of 28 
total despite only having 53 percent of the statewide two- party vote. This 
was just enough to put Republicans over the top in the House, and it also 
gave them unified party control of the national government. The conse-
quences of these elections on the future trajectory of American history are 
hard to overstate.
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1878: Enforcement of Voting Rights in the South
For Democrats, the House of Representatives constituted the institutional 
beachhead to fight against the Republican policy hegemony of the era. In the 
years after the Civil War, Republicans held a virtual lock on the presidency 
and the Senate. Republicans had manufactured this advantage through the 
strategic admittance of sparsely populated, but strongly Republican, west-
ern states. These western “pocket” boroughs provided Republicans with 
a head start in the Electoral College, and an almost insurmountable lock 
on the Senate (Stewart and Weingast 1992). The Republican hegemony 
allowed them to pass, and protect, currency, tariff, and other legislation 
that fundamentally determined the politics and economy of the era.
The one place where Democrats held any hope of influencing national 
policy was in the House and, in particular, through the appropriations pro-
cess (Stewart 1991). Notably, Democrats passed the Holman Rule in 1876. 
This rule allowed for riders to be attached to appropriations legislation. 
The two parties fought over the Holman Rule— and, by implication— 
national spending and policy priorities, for the next 50 years. The vote 
to pass the rule had Democrats favoring by 151– 6, while Republicans 
opposed it 4– 94.
fig. 5.3. Counterfactual composition of the u.s. house, 1840– 1900
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The most dramatic instance of the Holman Rule was in its use by Dem-
ocrats to roll back the appropriations funding U.S. Marshals to police elec-
tions in the South. Unlike existing policies which live from one congress to 
the next, appropriations bills must be passed every year; otherwise, spend-
ing reverts to zero. In cases of split control of Congress, this gives each 
party an institutional veto over funding decisions. So, even if Democrats 
had little chance of simultaneously capturing both chambers of Congress 
and the presidency in the post– Civil War years, they did have a chance 
at capturing the House. From here, they could influence national policy 
through their negative power in the appropriations process.
Nowhere was this more evident than in 1878. Given the Republican 
dominance of the presidency and the Senate, the House was the pivotal 
branch for the Democratic Party hoping to influence national policy 
on currency, tariffs, civil service, and perhaps most importantly, federal 
enforcement of Fifteenth Amendment in the South. No clearer example of 
the power of gerrymandering to shape party balances, and, hence, national 
policy, comes from 46th Congress. Recall this is the Congress in which 
timely pro- Democratic gerrymanders in Ohio and Missouri tipped the 
partisan balance and placed the Democrat Samuel Randall in the Speaker’s 
Chair.
Chief among Democrats’ aims was to restrict the supervisory power of 
the army at Southern polling stations. The implementation of suffrage, via 
the Fifteenth Amendment, in the South, depended upon its actual enforce-
ment. In the years following the Civil War, the federal government had 
used its constitutional power to regulate federal elections to send U.S. 
Marshals to police federal polling stations and prevent restrictions of suf-
frage. With a Democratic House, the result of strategic gerrymandering in 
Ohio and Missouri, Democrats finally were able to restrict army policing 
of the polls. It now became open season on restricting the franchise.
This was achieved through a rider to the army bill. Federal marshals 
were now restrained from supervising polling places throughout the South. 
In effect, the federal government had conceded the South to the Demo-
cratic Party and its supporters. Congress eventually zeroed out funding 
for the marshals in the South (Stewart 1991; Wang 1997). The vote on the 
rider to the Army Bill passed in the House 117– 96. Of the yea votes, 106 
came from Democrats, while 93 of the no votes came from Republicans. 
Not a single Democrat voted against the rider. No Republican voted in 
favor. The other 11 yea votes came from 6 Independent Democrats and 
5 Greenbackers, while the other 3 nay votes were cast by Greenbackers. 
Thus, setting aside the divided Greenbacker vote, the vote on the rider 
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split straight down party lines. Given the partisanship of the roll- call vot-
ing, it is safe to assume that if Republicans had a majority they would have 
handily defeated any restrictions on federal marshals.
President Hayes vetoed the rider, but Democrats had drawn their line 
in the sand. Thus, Democrats may not have been able to put the restric-
tions on marshals directly into law— they were able to achieve restrictions 
in practice by denying funding to the marshals. Appropriations legislation 
requires the assent of both chambers otherwise funding reverts to zero 
(Kiewiet and McCubbins 1988; Stewart 1991). This put Democrats in a 
position of power; they could zero out appropriations in a policy area by 
simply refusing to pass a piece of legislation. In fact, Democrats ended up 
getting what they wanted. Because neither party could agree on a final 
version of the appropriations bill, funding for the marshals reverted to 
zero (Stewart 1991; Wang 1997). The defunding of the marshals came at a 
decisive juncture in Southern electoral politics. Here we have a clear case 
where had partisan gerrymanders in the North not taken place, the legacy 
of Southern, and national, politics would have been radically different.
1888: Reed’s Rules, Tariffs, and Currency
The other election where gerrymandering determined majority control of 
the House was the election of 1888. For understanding modern Ameri-
can politics, one cannot overestimate the transformative impact of Reed’s 
actions as Speaker during this Congress. Scholars generally agree that 
Reed’s Rules “permanently and significantly changed voting behavior and 
policy outcomes in the House. . . . After Reed’s system of agenda control 
had been constructed, with its decisive advantage for the majority party, 
subsequent rules never pushed the playing field in the House back to any-
thing close to what it had been” (Cox and McCubbins 2005, 50– 51, 59). 
Indeed, many congressional scholars have argued that the history of Con-
gress, and, consequently, the political history of America, can be divided 
into two periods: “Before Reed” and “After Reed” (see, for example, Valelly 
2009).
As the analysis here reveals, there is an important part of the story miss-
ing. Simply put, Reed and Republicans would not have been in power save 
for a timely gerrymander in Pennsylvania. The extra seats from the Penn-
sylvania gerrymander gave Republicans, and Reed, majority control of the 
House. Also, it is worth noting that Reed was the beneficiary of an espe-
cially devious efficient gerrymander in Maine, which gave Republicans all 
four of Maine’s seats, despite a statewide Republican vote share of only 55 
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percent. At stake were more than inside- baseball issues of parliamentary 
procedure. Reed and Republicans needed stricter control over the agenda 
to achieve a vigorous policy agenda. Notably, Republicans sought to break 
Democratic obstruction in order to pass the Federal Elections Law and 
restructure “party competition in the South” (Valelly 2009, 115).
This Congress also featured the passage of a primary economic piece 
of legislation— the McKinley Tariff. Following the Civil War, the issue of 
tariffs had deeply split the parties. Republicans primarily were in favor of 
protective tariffs, while Democrats generally preferred lower tariffs and a 
more laissez- faire approach to trade. During the 1880s, the tariff system 
had worked so well in generating revenues that the federal government 
often operated with a budget surplus. Once tariffs were in place they were 
difficult to remove. Democrats, whose coalition included rural farmers, dis-
liked domestic tariffs because they led to retaliatory tariffs for U.S. exports.
Thus, unwinding the protectionist scheme built up over decades of 
Republican rule became the rallying cry for Democrats. According to 
Stewart, “In one of the most crucial policy areas of the time, the protective 
tariff, years of split control helped entrench protection as a national policy. 
In those same years, however, Democrats were able to use their bargaining 
leverage to reduce federal spending” (Stewart 1991, 224). In effect, the era 
was one in which either Republicans were expanding or retrenching pro-
tectionist tariffs. Democrats, when it came to tariffs, were only in a position 
to block further expansion of the pro- Republican tariff policies. Once tar-
iffs were written into law they were notoriously difficult to remove (Stew-
art 1991). Eliminating tariffs required a new statute. As long as Republicans 
held an institutional veto, they could protect their tariff regime.
Thus, during the 1880s and early 1890s, when Republicans were able 
to seize control of the House, it opened the door for further expansion of 
protectionist policies. In this vein, arguably the most dramatic extension 
of pro- Republican tariff policy occurred with the passage of the Tariff Act 
of 1890— more commonly known as the McKinley Tariff. The McKinley 
Tariff led to a “radical extension of the protective system” (Taussig 1931, 
283). The House passed the McKinley Tariff by a vote of 164– 142. The 
vote almost perfectly split along party lines. All but one Democrat voted 
against its passage, and all but two Republicans voted in favor. Again, the 
pro- Republican gerrymander in Pennsylvania provided the critical seats 
necessary for Republicans, and Thomas Reed, to lead the House. As seen in 
the next chapter, the subsequent electoral swing against Republicans in the 
following election helped set the stage for the dramatic electoral reversals 
of the 1890s.
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Coupled with the McKinley Tariff was the passage of the Sherman Sil-
ver Purchase Act. This act placed the federal government front and center 
into the nation’s currency markets. Farmers and western silver miners both 
pressed for the federal government to purchase silver. For farmers, saddled 
with debt, the purchase of silver, it was argued, would boost the economy 
and increase inflation, thus reducing the real debts of farmers. For miners, 
governmental purchase of silver, it was hoped, would prop up demand in 
the silver market. Because the price of silver had plummeted as a result of 
overmining and oversupply of silver, miners were eager for the govern-
ment to step in and rescue their dwindling profits. The act, which required 
the government to purchase silver every month, passed along straight party 
lines. In the wake of the 1893 economic panic, the newly elected Demo-
cratic Congress, along with President Cleveland, repealed the purchase act.
So, here we see in these two Congresses that history would have pro-
ceeded quite differently in the absence of partisan gerrymandering. These 
legislative outcomes included transformative policy decisions that would 
cast a long shadow over the future of American politics and society. Who 
would wield political power in Congress (i.e., Reed’s Rules), who would 
hold power in the South and the nation (i.e., enforcement of Reconstruc-
tion and the Reconstruction amendments), and fundamental decisions 
about economic winners and losers (i.e., tariffs and currency).
Conclusion
The image of politicians manipulating district lines for partisan gain sug-
gests that the path to national power may run through the state legislatures. 
Yet, political- science research on congressional redistricting in the 1970s, 
1980s, 1990s, and 2000s has found, at most, only minimal national partisan 
consequences (e.g., Campagna and Grofman 1990; Seabrook 2010; Swain, 
Borrelli, and Reed 1998). Taking a historical step back and examining the 
partisan consequences of redistricting in the late 19th century sheds new 
light on this debate. Between 1840 and 1900, redistricting systematically 
influenced state party delegations in ways that occasionally cumulated into 
substantial national effects.
First, the partisanship of districting plans systematically affected the 
translation of congressional votes into legislative seats. Parties in control 
of the districting process were able to engineer favorable vote- seat transla-
tions, which allowed them to magnify their share of state congressional 
delegations. The difference between Republican- or Democratic- drawn 
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district lines meant a difference of roughly 14 percent of the congressio-
nal delegation. Second, county- , ward- , and town- level vote returns before 
and after redistricting, reveal that parties successfully used gerrymander-
ing for partisan advantage. Third, these state- level effects, at times, pro-
duced important national- level consequences. On at least two occasions, it 
appears that gerrymandering helped determine party control of the House.
The reversals in party fortunes within the House also carried with it 
direct implications for national policy making. During this era, the House 
was often the pivotal branch that determined whether control of the federal 
government was unified or divided. This was especially the case between 
1870 and 1894. Given the deep partisan polarization over issues such as 
federal policy in the South (Kousser 1992) and the tariff (Stewart 1991), 
control of the House was a key ingredient for parties seeking to shape the 
direction of federal policy. As such, gerrymandering served as a potent tool 
in the pursuit of state and national power.
From this perspective, it is not surprising that strategic politicians have 
again turned to partisan gerrymandering in the bid for national power. 
The relatively tight national balance between the two parties in the current 
period has once again raised the payoffs from the manipulation of electoral 
institutions. The similarities between 19th- century American politics and 
recent mid- decade redistricting events in Texas and Georgia indicate that 
congressional redistricting is not exempt from partisan politicians’ efforts 
to stack the electoral deck in their favor.
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Electoral Competition and 
Critical Elections
Few doubt that contemporary House of Representatives elections are, on 
the whole, uncompetitive. The average vote margin for winners in recent 
House elections hovers at 70 percent of the vote (Jacobson 2009). The 
vast majority of House races are blowouts. In 2004, for example, only 32 
contests, out of 435, were decided by 5 percent or less of the vote. The 
striking absence of competition in modern House elections has prompted 
much scholarly concern. Indeed, one might frame the vast contemporary 
literature on congressional elections as a quest to uncover the causes of 
uncompetitive elections.
In this quest, scholars have examined a number of suspects. One that 
has occurred to many scholars is redistricting. The suspicion is that incum-
bents of both parties have colluded to draw lines that protect themselves 
(e.g., Hirsch 2003; McDonald 2006; Tufte 1973). As a result, seats are safe 
for members of both parties. For example, in an editorial published in the 
Los Angeles Times, constitutional scholar Mitchell Berman (2004) voiced a 
common belief stating that “Both Democrats and Republicans have sought 
to manipulate the system by drawing ‘safe seats’ for their own members. 
The result: fewer competitive elections.”
A number of other scholars, however, have argued that redistricting has 
had little impact on declining competition. Indeed, the general thrust of 
the research literature appears to be that while redistricting may margin-
ally depress competition here and there, it can only account for a small 
proportion of the overall decline in competition (e.g., Abramowitz, Alexan-
der, and Gunning 2006; Friedman and Holden 2009).1 But, much like the 
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subject of the previous chapter, the debate about the impact of redistrict-
ing on competition revolves around research conducted almost entirely 
on post– 1960s redistricting cycles. It is still an open question whether this 
minimal impact is inherent in gerrymandering, or reflects the institutional 
constraints of modern redistricting.
In this chapter, I explore the impact of redistricting on competition in 
19th- century congressional elections. Examining district- level vote mar-
gins and statewide swing ratios, I find that parties in control of redistricting 
often manufactured competitive districts in the search for partisan advan-
tage; redistricting in this era often increased district- level competition. 
Beyond establishing that gerrymandering can, at times, have pronounced 
effects on district- level competition, these findings also help explain one of 
the more striking features of 19th- century national elections— the sharp 
swings in partisan fortunes. Specifically, in this chapter, I provide a detailed 
examination of the impact of redistricting on congressional elections in 
three periods: 1850– 54, 1870– 74, and 1890– 94. These three election peri-
ods constitute, by far, the largest seat swings in U.S. history. The reversals 
of fortune were startling. In 1854, Democrats lost 74 seats (in a chamber of 
234). In 1874, Republicans lost 94 seats (in a chamber of 292). And in 1894, 
Democrats lost 114 seats (in a chamber of 357 seats). No elections before, 
or since, have approached the seat swings found in these three elections.
I argue that strategic redistricting played a fundamental role in creating 
a competitive environment and set the table for these huge swings in House 
seats. The logic of the argument is as follows. In all three periods, one party 
was in charge of redistricting for the vast majority of states: Democrats in 
1852 and 1892, and Republicans in 1872. Following the standard partisan 
strategies of the day, they drew electoral maps with narrow, yet winnable, 
margins for fellow partisans. This produced an overabundance of marginal 
Democratic seats in 1852 and 1892, and an overabundance of marginal 
Republican seats in 1872. Thus, the relatively moderate anti- majority vote 
swing in the subsequent elections— 1854, 1874, and 1894— produced a 
huge swing in seats. Previous research has demonstrated the presence of 
massive vote- seat distortions in 19th- century elections (Brady 1985; 1988), 
but no one has identified the critical aspect that strategic redistricting 
played in helping to construct these vote to seat ratios.
Competition in House Elections
Congressional elections throughout much of the 19th century were 
fiercely competitive. Certainly compared to modern standards, the mar-
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gin between winners and losers was much closer. In the late 19th century, 
nearly 40 percent of House elections were decided by 5 percent or less 
(Brady and Grofman 1991). This threshold is a traditional way of classify-
ing districts as either competitive or noncompetitive (Jacobson 2009; May-
hew 1974b). A steep drop off in the number of close contests occurred near 
the end of the 19th century. By 1920, only 25 percent of House races fell 
into this competitive range. This decline was followed by another drop off 
in the 1960s, where it has resided ever since. Competition reached its nadir 
in 2004, when only 7 percent of House contests were decided by less than 
5 percent of the vote. A further inkling of the decline in competition can 
be seen by considering the 2010 election. This election, by many accounts, 
was one of the most competitive in recent memory. Nearly 25 percent of 
the contests fell into the marginal category. Yet, even though this number is 
high by modern standards, it still pales in comparison to levels of competi-
tion in the 19th century. In 1870, for example, half of all House races met 
the definition of a marginal district.
One consequence of the intense competition at the district level in the 
19th century was that national elections, and House majorities, could turn 
on a dime. A landslide election in one direction could easily be followed two 
years later by a landslide in the other direction. No majority was seemingly 
safe. For instance, Republicans gained 64 seats in the 1872 election, only 
to surrender 94 seats in the following election of 1874. These whip- saw 
elections were common, especially in the Gilded Age. That sharp swings in 
national- party fortunes should correlate with competitive district elections 
is unsurprising; the two factors are intimately related. The more districts 
that are competitive the more districts that will shift with changes in the 
national vote (Mayhew 1974b). For instance, a district that is split 52– 48 in 
favor of Democrats will more likely flip if there is a small shift in the vote to 
the opposition party; however, a district split 70– 30 in favor of Democrats 
will be much less likely to flip even if there is a major national vote swing 
to the opposition party. In other words, the more districts that are evenly 
split the more districts that have the potential to change party hands. Thus, 
as individual districts become more competitive, the responsiveness of con-
gressional membership to changes in the national vote surges.
Against the backdrop of this hypercompetitive system, 19th- century 
mapmakers weighed their strategic options. As we saw in the previous chap-
ter, partisan mapmakers had two basic strategies they could pursue (e.g., 
Cain 1985; Cox and Katz 2002; Owen and Grofman 1988). One strategy 
was to pack out- party supporters into one or few districts while distributing 
in- party supporters evenly throughout the rest of the state. This packing 
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strategy ensured a number of easy victories for the in party, yet conceded 
some districts to the opposition. The second strategy involved drawing 
districts that are a microcosm of the statewide vote— in other words, con-
structing as many marginal, yet winnable, seats as possible. A party that was 
confident of its ability to win the statewide vote over the foreseeable future 
could maximize its seat share by having each district mirror this favorable 
statewide partisan distribution (Cox and Katz 2002). Under such a strategy, 
“the dominant party magnifies its popular vote by creating many districts it 
can reliably but narrowly carry” (Argersinger 1992, 75). This strategy has 
been termed “efficient gerrymanders” (Cain 1985) or “dispersal gerryman-
ders” (Owen and Grofman 1988).
Throughout the 19th century, state political parties were notorious 
for pursuing the efficient strategy— crafting district plans with an eye 
toward winning as many seats as possible (Argersinger 1992). In Maine, 
for example, Republicans gerrymandered the state into a solid five Repub-
lican districts despite only having 55 percent of the statewide vote. In other 
words, with 55 percent of the vote, they were able to capture 100 percent 
of the seats. This map was a masterful example of an efficient gerrymander. 
No Republican vote was wasted, and no seat was conceded to Democrats. 
Indeed, from 1884 to 1892, Republicans completely shut out Democrats, 
winning every single congressional race over this eight- year period.
As the example from Maine demonstrates, the potential gains from effi-
cient gerrymandering were immense. But the strategy also carried many 
risks. With so many districts on the knife- edge, a slight shift in the vote to 
the opposite party could spell electoral doom. So, why were parties more 
willing to pursue these efficient gerrymanders? First, on the legal side, they 
faced fewer constraints than their modern counterparts. In this era before 
one- person, one- vote, redistricting took place out of the watchful eye of 
the judiciary. Beyond adhering to the congressional mandate requiring 
single- member and contiguous districts (after 1842), states could redistrict 
whenever and however they wanted.
On the political side, many of the factors that constrain modern map-
makers from pursuing full- blown partisan gerrymanders were absent. The 
importance of careerism and seniority within the House had yet to fully 
take hold, creating less pressure by sitting congressmen for incumbent- 
friendly districts (Kernell 1977; Price 1975). Even if there was incumbent 
pressure for safer districts, local party managers had fewer reasons to heed 
their wishes. Partisan control over nominations and balloting gave party 
managers the incentives to pursue collective party interests at the expense 
of any individual candidate (Brady, Buckley, and Rivers 1999; Carson and 
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Roberts 2005). Individual politicians, therefore, owed their electoral for-
tunes to their local party organization, and had little opportunity or incen-
tive to engage in the candidate- centered activities typical of modern House 
members (e.g., Fenno 1978; Mayhew 1974a). If the party wanted to tinker 
with congressional districts, incumbents might grouse, but there was little 
else they could do.
Consider the 1886 redistricting in Ohio. Congressional incumbents of 
both parties reacted with dread upon learning that the states districts would 
be redrawn yet again. In 1886, Republicans controlled the state legislature 
and sought to undo the gerrymander perpetrated by Democrats two years 
earlier. While the new districts stood to advantage Ohio Republicans col-
lectively, sitting Republican incumbents were not thrilled. The New York 
Times reported that “Many members of the [state] House opposed the 
measure and it would have undoubtedly failed but for the very spirited 
manner in which the Washington contingent opposed it and excited the 
hostility of certain members in both branches here” (New York Times, May 
18, 1886). Ultimately, the interests of incumbents were overridden by the 
collective good of party success.
Similarly, the importance of seniority in allocating committee assign-
ments had yet to fully take root in the House (Polsby, Gallaher, and 
Rundquist 1969). The lower value placed on House seniority may have 
led state parties to refrain from pro- incumbent gerrymandering. Seniority 
puts a premium on holding existing seats and lessens the importance of 
targeting opposition held seats. Cox and Katz note this possibility arguing, 
“The more valuable seniority is, the more valuable it is to keep one’s own 
incumbents and the less valuable it is to knock off the other party’s incum-
bents” (Cox and Katz 1999, 823). The converse naturally follows. The less 
valuable seniority is, the less important it is to protect incumbents. Thus, 
we might reasonably suspect partisan mapmakers to shy away from pure 
incumbent- protection plans solely for the purpose of increasing their del-
egations seniority. Having more partisans in Congress also increased access 
to federal patronage. Federal appointments were lubricants that helped 
keep the local- and state- party machines running. Thus, state parties had a 
vested interest in securing as many congressional seats as feasible.
Efficient gerrymandering was further aided by the structure of voting 
in the 19th century. The party- ticket balloting system, in which voters cast 
ballots listing the candidates of a single party, induced a high degree of 
straight- ticket voting (Rusk 1970). The result was fairly predictable short- 
term voter behavior that further allowed mapmakers to trim districts into 
small, but winnable, margins.
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All told then, gerrymandering in this era was less about protecting 
incumbents and more about maximizing the dominant parties’ (or domi-
nant factions’) share of the congressional delegation. In many cases, these 
gerrymanders manufactured a surplus of seats despite relatively narrow 
statewide margins. As an example, consider the pro- Democratic redistrict-
ing of Indiana in 1852. Democratic mapmakers essentially fashioned the 
state into a winner- take- all system. With only 54 percent of the vote, in 
1852, Democrats won a remarkable 91 percent of the seats (10 out of 11 
seats).
Gerrymandering and Electoral Margins
If parties were pursuing efficient gerrymanders, then we should expect to 
see three things. First, at the district level we should expect that parties in 
control of drawing the maps will trim the margins of their uncompetitive 
districts (i.e., make them more competitive), and shore up the margins of 
their very close seats (Cain 1985). Moreover, they should pack their oppo-
nents districts with surplus supporters. Second, the variance of the vote 
should go down in districts of the controlling party. Third, at the state 
level, we should see redistricting plans with steep vote- to- seat translations. 
And, as a corollary, the vote- richer party should receive a substantial seat 
bonus.
Examining these claims requires a measure of the partisan intent of 
the mapmakers. Fortunately, following the behavior of 19th- century politi-
cians offers a solution. In the 19th century, state legislators would take the 
most recent election results, broken down by counties, wards, and towns, 
and combine this data to forecast the partisan effects of changes to district 
lines. Because counties were most often the building blocks of congres-
sional districts, politicians could readily aggregate county- vote returns and 
calculate the likely electoral consequences of new district lines. With the 
aid of 19th- century electoral- returns and historical- district maps, the con-
temporary researcher can do the same and, in essence, look over the shoul-
der of these mapmakers.
The procedure was to take the two- party congressional vote by county 
from the most recent election before a new redistricting, and then aggre-
gate these votes into the newly drawn district boundaries. County- level 
electoral returns for the House come from Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale 
(1987). Data on congressional district boundaries comes from Kenneth 
Martis’s Historical Atlas of U.S. Congressional Districts (1982). In those 
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instances where a county contained more than one district (i.e., urban areas 
such as Philadelphia or New York City) or congressional district lines cut 
across county boundaries, where available, I turned to historical newspa-
pers and state legislative manuals for ward- and town- level results.
District Vote Margins
The first test examines the vote margins in districts before and after a 
redistricting. If states were constructing efficient gerrymanders, parties 
in control of the districting process would draw maps such that the seats 
they control have, on average, narrower margins than in the previous elec-
tion. The construction of an efficient gerrymander implies that, under 
pro- Democratic plans, Democratic districts will be trimmed (i.e., those 
with large margins in the previous election), while those with very narrow 
margins will be shored up (Cain 1985). Under pro- Republican plans, the 
few Democratic districts not converted into Republican districts should be 
packed with more pro- Democratic voters.
To test this, I constructed a dependent variable that takes the projected 
margin of victory in the newly redrawn district minus the margin of vic-
tory in the election just prior to redistricting. The margin of victory is 
measured as the value of the winners’ two- party vote minus 50 percent. 
Critical to constructing this dependent variable is correctly matching up 
districts across a redistricting. In essence, one needs to identify the old, or 
parent, district for each new district. This was done by identifying the old 
district that contributed the largest share of population to the new bound-
aries. The dependent variable, then, is the projected margin of victory in 
the newly drawn district minus the margin of victory in the parent district. 
A negative value indicates a district was made more competitive; a positive 
value, less competitive.
The key independent variables are whether or not the district was 
intended to be a Democratic district (i.e., a projected post- redistricting vote 
above 50 percent) and a series of dummy variables for each type of redis-
tricting plan (i.e., Partisan Democrat, Bipartisan, Partisan Whig/Republi-
can). To measure how Democrats are treated under different redistricting 
plans, the Democratic District variable is interacted with each of the plan- 
type dummy variables. If Democratic mapmakers, on average, trimmed the 
margins of Democratic districts, then the coefficient on the stand alone 
Democratic District variable will be negative. Moreover, the interactive vari-
able between Democratic District and Whig/Republican Plan should be posi-
tive, indicating that under pro- Republican plans Democratic districts had 
their margins increased (i.e., more likely to be packed).
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The model is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Because 
states differ in their mean level of competition, separate state intercepts are 
included (αj). Moreover, because changes in district- level margins within 
states are likely not independent of each other, the analysis is clustered by 
state- year and estimated with robust standard errors.
The results are presented in table 6.1. Consistent with expectations, 
Democratic- controlled districts that were drawn by Democratic state par-
ties had their margins reduced by an average of 1.8 percentage points. The 
interactive variable between Republican/Whig- drawn plans and Demo-
cratic districts is positive and significant. The value of the coefficient is 
3.09. This result indicates that under a Whig plan, Democratic districts 
were made less competitive. The net effect was to increase the average 
margin in Democratic districts by 1.3 percentage points. Thus, districts 
were treated very differently depending on which party controlled the 
mapmaking process.
Overall, these results support the argument that throughout the 19th cen-
tury, mapmakers helped strategically manufacture competitive congressional 
districts for their fellow partisans. This provides strong evidence that parties 
were following an efficient gerrymander strategy; making districts they con-
trolled more competitive and making the opposition less competitive.
TABLE 6.1. The Impact of Partisan Gerrymandering on 
District- Level Vote Margins, 1840– 1900 (dependent variable 
= district level difference in margin before and after 





Democratic District × 3.09*
 Whig/Republican Plan (.88)
Democratic District × .07








Number of Observations 1,189
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by state- year, are in pa-
rentheses. State fixed effects were also estimated but not reported.
*p < .05.
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A second implication of the efficient- gerrymander thesis is that plans 
should reduce the variance of the vote in districts for the controlling party. 
Because uncompetitive districts will be trimmed and very marginal dis-
tricts shored up, there should be a reduction in the variance around the 
mean vote in Democratic districts. Each Democratic district should come 
to resemble every other Democratic district in the state. Consider the 
pro- Democratic gerrymander of New York in 1884. The map, devised by 
Democrats, carved the state into 23 Democratic districts and 11 Republi-
can districts. This was all the more remarkable given that Democrats and 
Republicans had exactly half of the statewide vote. The standard deviation 
of the Democratic vote in districts controlled by Democrats was 6.6. In 
Republican districts, the standard deviation of the vote was 18.2.
To examine this visually, figure 6.1 shows the standard deviation of the 
vote across districts, within a state, before and after redistricting. The x- axis 
displays the standard deviation of the two- party vote in districts before 
redistricting; the y- axis is the standard deviation after redistricting. Note 
that I only include districts controlled by the redistricting party in calculat-
ing these standard deviations. So, for example, in states where Democrats 
redrew districts, the “before” standard deviation is the variance of the vote 
for districts won by Democrats prior to redistricting. The “after” standard 
deviation is the variance of the vote across districts where the majority of 
the projected two- party vote, under the new maps, favored Democrats. I 
then did the same for Whig/Republican plans. This produces the two pan-
els displayed in figure 6.1. The 45- degree line indicates no change. States 
above the line had an increase in the variance of the vote; states below the 
line had a decrease. If parties were implementing efficient gerrymanders, 
then we should expect to see the observations fall below the 45- degree line.
In figure 6.1, this is largely what we see. In both panels, the bulk of 
observations fall below the 45- degree line. This is strong evidence that 
states were distributing their voters in a more efficient manner. In other 
words, districts for the controlling party came to resemble a microcosm of 
the statewide vote. Of course, not every state hewed to this strategy— a few 
observations do fall above the 45- degree line. But almost all of these were 
in states where the variance of the vote was small to begin with. Here the 
votes were already roughly allocated in an efficient manner.
One can further demonstrate this pattern by performing an F- test on 
the difference in the standard deviations before and after redistricting. For 
Democratic states, the average standard deviation before redistricting was 
10.6, and after, it declined to 6.6. This difference of four was statistically 
significant (p < .01). In Republican states, the standard deviation before and 
fig. 6.1. variance of the vote before and after redistricting. the figure displays the 
standard deviation of the two- party vote in districts held by the dominant party 
before and after redistricting. the top panel displays democratic- controlled 
districts in states controlled by the democrats. the bottom panel shows whig/
republican- controlled districts in states controlled by whigs/republicans. the 
x- axis is the standard deviation before and the y- axis is the standard deviation 
after. the solid line is drawn at 45 degrees. dots falling below the 45 degree line 
indicate a reduction in the variance of the vote across districts.
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after was 8.3 and 5.1, respectively. This difference of 3.2 was also signifi-
cant (p < .01).
Overall, the results show that parties in command of redistricting made 
the seats they controlled, on average, more competitive. This stands in con-
trast to most research on modern redistricting, which finds that it either 
reduces competition or has no effect. The results here suggest that redis-
tricting can amplify electoral competition. When parties are motivated to 
maximize seats rather than protect incumbents, redistricting can increase 
competition and accelerate seat swings. The next section considers how 
these district- by- district decisions added up to hyperresponsive state elec-
toral systems.
Votes and Seats
If state parties used redistricting to manufacture extra seat shares, via com-
petitive elections, then one should expect that state governments with 
unified party control constructed vote- seat translations with steep swing 
ratios. This would be further evidence of efficient gerrymandering. Dis-
tricting plans where the districts have very narrow margins will exhibit 
high swing ratios. Moreover, the swing ratio also indicates the size of the 
“seat bonus” that accrues to the party winning the statewide vote. The 
larger this number, the larger the size of the dominant party’s seat bonus.
Increasing the swing ratio increases the seat bonus that accrues to the 
dominant party. To see this, consider holding the vote share constant at 55 
percent and then varying the swing ratio. To see this, figure 6.2 presents an 
example of how increasing the swing ratio can increase a party’s seat bonus. 
A party’s vote percentage is placed on the x- axis. The party’s resulting seat 
percentage, at different values of the swing ratio, is presented on the y- axis. 
In the example, the party’s vote percent is 55 percent. With a swing ratio 
of three, the dominant party can expect to receive 65 percent of the state’s 
seats with 55 percent of the vote. But increasing the swing ratio to a value 
of five raises the expected seat share to 75 percent. Thus, manipulating 
district lines and efficiently distributing votes across districts can greatly 
enhance a party’s seat bonus. However, as the graphic also reveals, this 
strategy comes with increased risk. A shift in the vote leftward on the x- axis 
(i.e., against the dominant party) will be magnified in a highly competitive 
system. Not only are seats on the razor- edge when drawn competitively, 
but there are also more of them total. Thus, a large swing ratio also can 
portend large losses.
To test how redistricting changed the translation of votes into seats, I 
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estimate the average state- level swing ratios before and after redistricting. 
Building on standard practice in the electoral systems literature (e.g., Cox 
and Katz 2002; Grofman 1983; King and Browning 1987; Tufte 1973), the 
following vote- seat equation is estimated.
ln(sit/(1 − sit)) =  λ1(Pre) + λ2(Post) + ρ1[Pre × (ln(vit/(1 − vit)))]  
+ ρ2[Post × (ln(vit/(1 − vit)))]  
(2)
where sit is the statewide proportion of seats won by Democrats, and vit is 
their statewide vote share in state i at time t (the constant is suppressed 
to avoid perfect collinearity). The rho coefficients (ρ1 and ρ2) measure the 
swing ratio for pre- and post- redistricting plans, respectively. The focus 
here will be on those states with partisan redistricting plans. Those few 
plans passed under divided government are excluded.2 The critical test is 
whether the swing ratios are significantly higher after redistricting. If par-
ties were ratcheting up the swing ratio in search of partisan advantage, then 
the forecasted election under the newly drawn maps should have higher 
swing ratios than the election just prior to redistricting.3
The lambda coefficients (λ1 and λ2) on the stand- alone Pre and Post vari-
ables measure partisan bias for pre- and post- redistricting plans, respec-
fig. 6.2. example of seat bonus at different values of the swing ratio
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tively. Partisan bias is defined “as the difference between the expected seat 
share that the Democrats would get with an average vote share of 0.5 and 
their ‘fair share’ of 0.5 (half the seats for half the votes)” (Cox and Katz 
1999, 820). So, if a party wins 60 percent of a state’s House seats when its 
candidates receive 50 percent of the statewide vote, we say there is a 10 
percent bias. It is standard to transform the raw estimated lambda coef-
ficient and calibrate it to what would have happened if the vote were split 
50– 50. This is done by passing the lambda coefficient through the follow-
ing equation: exp[λ]/(exp[λ] + 1) − 0.5.
Because the dependent variable is based on a proportion— the propor-
tion of seats going to Democrats— the model is estimated using maximum 
likelihood with an extended beta binomial distribution. Using this distri-
bution also accounts for any potential correlation in the probability across 
districts (within a state) of a Democratic victory.4
The results are presented in table 6.2. If state parties were ramping 
up the swing ratio in attempt to secure more seats for their side, then the 
swing ratio in the newly drawn districts should be higher than those just 
prior to redistricting. In table 6.2, this is what we see. The average swing 
ratio in the states during the election just prior to redistricting was 3.46. 
Under the newly drawn maps, the average expected swing ratio jumped 
to 4.96. The difference of 1.5 is statistically significant (p = .02). These 
TABLE 6.2. The Conversion of Votes into Seats 
before and after Redistricting
 Coefficient
Swing Ratio Before 3.46*
 (.38)
Swing Ratio After 4.96*
 (.50)
Partisan Bias Before 2.33
 (2.35)






Note: The cell entries are maximum likelihood 
estimates that follow an extended beta binomial dis-
tribution. Standard errors are in parentheses. The 
difference between the swing ratio coefficients was 
significant at .05 (p = .02).
*p < .05.
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results suggest that the new maps pushed the states towards winner- take- 
all systems.
To better visualize the impact of these changes, figure 6.3 traces out 
the vote- seat curves associated with these swing ratios. Dashed lines indi-
cate the estimated pre- redistricting swing ratio and solid lines the expected 
post- redistricting swing ratio. First, one can see the increased seat bonus 
that accrues with steeper swing ratios under the new redistricting plans. 
For example, at 55 percent of the vote, a dominant party could expect to 
win 66 percent of a state congressional delegation before redistricting. 
After redistricting, the percentage of seats they could expect to win, with 
55 percent of the vote, jumps to 73 percent.
Thus, there were clear benefits to gerrymandering efficiently. But fig-
ure 6.3 also illustrates the potential risks. Ratcheting up the swing ratio 
magnified a party’s seat share, but it also meant that the dominant party 
now had more to lose. Moreover, steeper swing ratios meant that changes 
in the vote produced larger changes in seats. An unexpected vote swing 
could parties on the wrong side of these steep slopes. Even a relatively 
small shift in the vote could produce an avalanche of losses. Consider a 
party whose vote share drops from 55 percent to 45 percent. Under the 
pre- redistricting swing ratio of 3.45, their percentage of seats would go 
fig. 6.3. estimated vote to seat translations before and after redistricting
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from 66 percent to 33 percent. Under the post- redistricting swing ratio 
of 4.95, the percentage of seats would plummet from 73 percent to 27 
percent.
The Promise and Perils of Hyper- Responsive Gerrymanders
Thus, the redistricting strategies of the 19th century took an already com-
petitive system and made it even more competitive. While in the short 
term the strategy of efficient gerrymandering produced big partisan gains, 
it also set the parties up for big losses. Some inkling of this possibility can 
be seen by noting that the three largest seat swings in congressional history 
occurred soon after major redistricting happened across the country: the 
elections of 1854, 1874, and 1894.
The seat losses in the congressional elections of 1854, 1874, and 1894 
were astounding. In 1854, voter reaction to the Democratic- led passage of 
the Kansas- Nebraska Act, combined with rising nativism in many North-
ern states (Holt 1978), led to widespread defeat for Democrats.5 In House 
elections, they lost a startling 74 seats in a chamber of 234. The bulk of 
those losses were concentrated throughout the Midwest and Mid- Atlantic. 
In Ohio, for example, Democrats suffered a crushing defeat. In 1852, they 
won 12 of the states’ 21 districts. In 1854, they won none. The conse-
quence was a dramatic reshuffling of party coalitions and sectional alliances 
that placed the nation on a path eventually ending in civil war (Aldrich 
1995; Gienapp 1987; Holt 1999).
In the midterm election of 1874, Republicans were on the losing end 
of the seat swing. Republicans lost 94 seats (in a House of 292 total mem-
bers). The shift in fortunes handed Democrats control of the House of 
Representatives for the first time since 1856. The precipitating event was 
the economic panic of 1873. With Republicans controlling both the White 
House and Congress, voters punished the party in power. Moreover, Dem-
ocratic resurgence in a number of southern states put Democrats back in 
control of congressional delegations throughout the South (Perman 1984). 
But even after taking these important events into account, the seat swing in 
this election was dramatic; especially when placed against the vote swing. 
Democrats’ share of the vote only increased by 5 percent, yet their seat 
share rose by 32 percent.
The midterm election of 1894 was another massive reversal of fortune 
for Democrats. The Panic of 1893— the second- worst depression in Amer-
ican history— propelled the opposition Republicans into majority status in 
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the House for the next 16 years (Glad 1964). Democrats lost a staggering 
114 seats. In the Northeast, Democratic representation plummeted from 
44 seats to 7 (McSeveney 1972). In New York, for example, Democrats sur-
rendered 14 seats— their state delegation dropping from 19 to 5. Demo-
cratic losses were also devastating in the Midwest. In 1892, the midwestern 
states had sent 44 Democrats to Washington. Two years later, they sent 4.
When placed within the historical time- series of congressional elec-
tions, these three elections stand head and shoulders above the rest. The 
top panel of figure 6.4 displays the absolute value of the swings in Demo-
cratic House seats from 1840 through 2006. The seat swings in 1854, 1874, 
and 1894 clearly stand out. Indeed, the swings in more recent, but no less 
famous, elections pale in comparison (e.g., the Watergate election of 1974; 
the Republican revolution of 1994; the Democratic resurgence of 2006).
Placed against the seismic shifts in legislative seats, however, the vote 
swings in these two elections were comparatively tame. The bottom panel 
of figure 6.4 shows the absolute value of national Democratic vote swings 
from 1840 to 2006. The elections in 1854, 1874, or 1894 do not stand 
out. The Democratic percentage of the national two- party vote dropped 
7.6 percent and 7.4 percent in 1854 and 1894, respectively (Rusk 2001, 
217– 18). In 1874, Democrats increased their vote share by 6.8 percent. Of 
course, one should not downplay the size of these vote swings— they are 
indeed substantial. However, within the time- series of congressional elec-
tions, they are not outliers. Thus, we are presented with a puzzle: what was 
present in these elections that caused small vote swings to translate into 
massive seat swings?
Past research has not entirely ignored these abnormal seat swings. In a 
series of important works, David Brady (1985; 1988) found that the elec-
toral transformations of the 1850s and 1890s were not the product of over-
whelming shifts in partisan loyalties. Instead, razor- thin margins in numer-
ous congressional districts led to big seat swings. Because so many districts 
were near the tipping point, it only took a moderate anti- Democratic 
national vote swing to produce an avalanche of seat losses. Although Brady 
did not focus on the 1874 election, his logic would almost certainly apply 
there as well.
Brady’s argument and evidence are certainly compelling. Yet his find-
ings raise important questions: Why were these districts so competitive 
to begin with? Why did modest vote swings produce massive seat swings 
in these particular elections and not others? There are several reasons to 
suspect that redistricting helped set the table for the massive seat swings 
in 1854, 1874, and 1894. First, in the redistricting cycles that began these 
fig. 6.4. seat and vote swings in the u.s. house of representatives, 1840– 2006
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decades, Democrats found themselves in the position of controlling the 
state legislature and the governorship in a disproportionate number of 
states. The numbers in table 6.3 illustrate the imbalance of partisan control 
of redistricting in these cycles. In the 1850s, Democrats were the majority 
TABLE 6.3. Partisan Control of Redistricting in 1852, 1872, and 1892
1852−54
Partisan Democrat Bipartisan Partisan Whig
ME (6) PA (25) VT (3)
MA (11) LA (4) NY (33)
NH (3) MD (6) GA (8)












Districts: 110 43 54
1872−74
Partisan Democrat Bipartisan Partisan Republican
MO (13) CA (4) MA (11)
VA (9)  RI (2)
NC (8)  NJ (7)
KY (10)  IL (19)
MD (6)  MI (9)
AR (4)b  OH (20)
GA (9)b  WI (8)
TX (6)b  IA (9)









Districts: 75 4 150
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party in 14 out of the 22 redistricting states. They controlled the drawing 
of 110 districts, while Whigs were responsible for drawing only 54 districts. 
A similar pattern emerged in the 1870s. Republicans controlled redistrict-
ing in 16 states, compared to Democrats’ 9. Republicans were, therefore, 
in charge of drawing 150 districts, compared to Democrats’ drawing 75 
districts. The same thing happened in the 1890s— when Democrats con-
trolled 11 of the 19 redistricting states. This included the populous Mid-
western and Mid- Atlantic states, giving them a district- level advantage in 
drawing new lines of 148 to Republicans’ 40 districts. Thus, in each period, 
one party had a disproportionate opportunity to redraw vast swaths of the 
country’s political map.
If parties were constructing efficient gerrymanders, and the bulk of 
plans were pro- Democratic, then the national distribution of seats should 
display a surplus of marginal Democratic seats with a lesser number of 
marginal Whig/Republican seats. In figure 6.5, one can see exactly this 
pattern playing out. The x- axis plots the winners vote share based on the 
TABLE 6.3.—Continued
1892−94
Partisan Democrat Bipartisan Partisan Republican
NY (34) MN (7) OH (21)
MI (12) NE (6) CO (2)
WI (10) MA (13) CA (7)
MO (15)  OR (2)








Districts: 148 26 40
Note: The number of districts in each state is indicated in parentheses. In 
1852– 54 there were 234 total representatives in the House. In 1872– 74 there 
were 292 total representatives in the House. Tennessee also redistricted in 
1872 but that is not listed here. In 1892– 94 there were 356 total representa-
tives in the House. New Jersey redistricted in 1892 (partisan Democrat) and 
again in 1894 (partisan Republican). Only the latter is included in this table.
aRedistricting conducted prior to 1854 election.
bRedistricting conducted prior to 1874 election.
cRedistricting conducted prior to 1894 election.
fig. 6.5. the distribution of redrawn districts
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expected vote in the newly drawn districts. In the 1852– 54 round of redis-
tricting, Democrats emerged with 89 districts between 50 percent and 60 
percent of the vote. By comparison, Whigs had only 61 districts in this 
range. After redistricting in 1872– 74, Republicans had 54 districts in the 
marginal range, while Democrats had only 33. Turning to 1892, we again 
see a stark asymmetry in the distribution of districts. Democrats had 87 
districts between 50 percent and 60 percent of the vote, while Republicans 
only had 53.6
This figure provides a proximal answer for the sudden reversal of politi-
cal fortunes. First, because Democrats controlled a disproportionate num-
ber of seats they had more to lose. This surplus of seats was well above 
Democrats’ equilibrium level of seats for those particular eras (Oppen-
heimer, Stimson, and Waterman 1986). Second, the bulk of their redrawn 
districts were in a range where it would only take a modest national swing 
to turn over a great number of seats. Thus, when voters reacted in response 
to the Kansas- Nebraska Act, the Panic of 1873, and the Panic of 1893, they 
each produced a deluge of losses.
A couple of examples further illustrate the point. In Indiana, heading 
into the 1854 election, Democrats controlled 10 of the state’s 11 congres-
sional seats. This was all the more astonishing considering Democrats only 
captured 54 percent of the statewide vote in 1852. Thus, as long as partisan 
fig. 6.5. (cont.). the distribution of redrawn districts
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tides stayed in Democrats’ favor, they stood to reap huge rewards. But it 
also set them up for big losses if national tides turned against them, as it did 
in 1854. In 1854, Democrats won only two seats, although their vote share 
had only fallen to 46 percent.
In 1892, Democrats in Missouri fashioned 13 Democratic districts out 
of 15 total. This was especially remarkable given their statewide vote share 
was only 50.1 percent. In 1894, Democrats’ vote share dropped by six points 
to 44 percent. Despite this somewhat modest drop in their vote share, they 
lost a stunning eight seats. In other words, with a six- point swing in the 
vote, Democrats’ share of the congressional delegation dropped from 87 
percent to 33 percent.
What If the Swing Ratios Had Not Been So Large?
Overall, how much did redistricting contribute to these seat swings? One 
way to gauge the impact of gerrymandering is to examine a counterfac-
tual. Perhaps, the most appropriate counterfactual is to assess what the seat 
swing would have been had a “neutral” vote- seat translation been in place. 
The baseline typically used in the literature to characterize and assess 
single- member district systems is a swing ratio of three (i.e., the cube law) 
(Tufte 1973). This is also the baseline that Brady uses, and will be the one 
used here as the counterfactual.
The strategy is to run the 1852 (or 1872 or 1892) vote, for each state, 
through a vote- seat translation of three, and then do this again for 1854 
(or 1874 or 1894). Specifically, I ran the statewide vote through the follow-
ing formula: ln(Seats/(1 − Seats) = 3 × (ln(Vote/(1 − Vote)). This produces an 
expected number of statewide seats. Note that this model sets partisan bias 
to zero in order to focus the attention on the comparative impact of dif-
ferent swing ratios. Taking the difference between the predicted number 
of seats between the two adjacent elections (e.g., 1854 minus 1852) will 
tell us how many seats would have swung had a neutral set of district lines 
been in place. As an example, consider New York between 1892 and 1894. 
In 1892, the Democratic statewide vote was 48.8 percent. Passing this vote 
share through the above formula leads us to expect Democrats to win 16 
of New York’s 34 seats. In 1894, Democrats’ vote share dropped to 41.4 
percent. At this value of the vote, the expected number of seats would have 
been 9 seats. Thus, the simulated swing in seats for New York was 7 seats 
(16 − 9 = 7). In actuality, Democrats’ swing in seats in New York was 15 
seats (from 20 to 5).
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Table 6.4 reports the results of this simulation and the actual seat 
swings. These numbers reveal a substantial discrepancy between the actual 
and counterfactual seat swings. In 1854, under a neutral- districting system, 
Democrats would have lost only 21 seats compared to the 74 they actually 
lost. The biggest difference is located in states with partisan Democratic 
redistricting plans. In 1874, the simulation indicates that Republicans 
would have lost 37 seats under neutral- districting plans. This is much lower 
than the 94 seats they actually lost. The largest share of losses occurred in 
states drawn by Republicans. A similar pattern emerges in 1894. Again, 
Democrats suffered much greater losses than they would have under neu-
tral districts. The counterfactual is 59 seats compared to the actual 114. 
The greatest contributors to this difference were Democratic- controlled 
Northern states.
TABLE 6.4. Counterfactual Seat Swings
1854−55 Election
 Seat Swing in  Seat Swing in 
Type of Redistricting Plan Neutral Districts Actual Districts
Partisan Democrat 16 41
Partisan Whig 10 18
Bipartisan 2 11
Did Not Redistrict 2 7
Total 21 74
1874 Election
 Seat Swing in  Seat Swing in 
Type of Redistricting Plan Neutral Districts Actual Districts
Partisan Democrat 15 25
Partisan Republican 13 42
Bipartisan 2 11
Did Not Redistrict 7 16
Total 37 94
1894 Election
 Seat Swing  Seat Swing in 
Type of Redistricting Plan in Neutral Districts Actual Districts
Partisan Democrat 29 69
Partisan Republican 3 6
Bipartisan 2 11
Did Not Redistrict 25 28
Total 59 114
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This does not mean that Democrats would not have found themselves 
in a deep hole or would not have been the minority party in the House. 
Losing 21 or 59 seats is nothing to dismiss. This counterfactual does illus-
trate, however, that Democrats would not have had an overabundance of 
seats in 1852 and 1892. The national seat swings in 1854 and 1894 would 
have been substantially dampened. And for scholars looking backwards, 
and subsequently constructing an elaborate political theory of change and 
stability, they would not stand out.
The Policy Consequences of Hyper- Responsive Elections
1854: The Kansas- Nebraska Act
As this chapter has shown, Democratic representation in the House just 
prior to the 1854 election was well above its historical average and well 
above what its vote share might indicate. Nationally, Democrats won 50.7 
percent of the vote in the 1852 election (or 53.7 percent of the two- party 
vote), yet they ended up controlling a whopping 67.5 percent of House 
seats. A huge fraction of these seats came from states gerrymandered in 
favor of Democrats.
We can trace this extreme boost in seat shares back to the wave of pro- 
Democratic gerrymandering following the 1852 reapportionment. The 
lopsided Democratic margins in the House had enormous short- term 
policy consequences and long- term political reverberations; in fact, the 
reverberations can still be felt to this day. Notably, these manufactured seat 
shares provided Democrats with enough congressional votes to pass the 
infamous Kansas- Nebraska Act. The act was a pivotal juncture in the ongo-
ing political battle over the extension of slavery into the American West.
Notably, the act repealed the Missouri Compromise of 1820 and 
allowed for popular sovereignty in determining whether slavery would be 
allowed in the territories of Kansas and Nebraska (and future territories). 
By repealing the Missouri Compromise, the Kansas- Nebraska Act undid 
the fragile armistice over the issue of westward expansion of slavery that 
had lasted 30 years. The act passed the House on May 22, 1854, by a mar-
gin of 113– 100 (Holt 1999, 821). The bulk of support for the bill came 
from Democrats who voted in favor by a margin of 100– 44. Northern 
Democrats voted in favor 55– 43, while Southern Democrats voted in favor 
45– 1. Northern Whigs voted 7– 44, while Southern Whigs voted 6– 7. Four 
Free Soilers and one Independent also voted against the bill.
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We can see the pivotal role of gerrymandering on this transformative 
policy decision by examining how many seats Democrats would have had 
under a set of neutral redistricting plans. Passing the state vote through 
a neutral districting plan— one with no bias and a swing ratio of three— 
produces an estimate in which Democrats would have had 121 seats (or 
51.7 percent of the House seats). In actuality, however, with the same vote 
share, they ended up with 158 seats (or 67.5 percent). Given the split within 
the Northern wing of the Democratic Party, it is more than reasonable to 
assume that Democrats would have fallen short of enough votes to pass the 
Kansas- Nebraska Act.
To see this, we can consider the outcome of the vote on the Kansas- 
Nebraska Act had the House been elected through neutral state- electoral 
systems. As an approximation, consider that an individual Democratic rep-
resentative had a .7 chance of supporting the bill, while a Whig representa-
tive had a .2 chance. Using these proportional propensities to support the 
bill, we can make some rough counterfactual estimates of the outcomes of 
a Kansas- Nebraska vote under this set of neutral redistricting plans. With 
121 seats multiplied by .7 we get an estimated 85 Democratic votes in favor, 
and 36 against. Whig support was at .2, thus under the counterfactual, we 
get an estimate of 23 votes in favor, and 90 votes against. (Under the coun-
terfactual estimates, Whigs would have had 113 seats total). Hence, after 
further counting the four Free Soilers and one Independent as opposed to 
the act, there would have been an estimated 108 total votes in favor, and 
126 votes against. In other words, the Kansas- Nebraska Act would have 
failed.
Although one should be cautious when forecasting alternative historical 
trajectories, there is little disagreement about the massive consequences 
of the Kansas- Nebraska Act. As seen in this chapter, the passage of the act 
interacted with a highly responsive electoral system to produce the massive 
swing against Democrats in the subsequent 1854– 55 election. The trajec-
tory of American history was fundamentally altered. The termination of 
the Whig Party, the emergence of the Republican Party, and the fractious 
split within the Democratic Party placed the country on a collision course 
that ended in the Civil War. The war still may have happened when it did. 
However, had Democrats not passed the Kansas- Nebraska Act, there is 
ample reason to suspect that the course of the next decade would have been 
different.
These electoral ramifications directly fed into the policy course of the 
government over the next five years. In the years preceding the Kansas- 
Nebraska Act, the North and South had operated under a tacit contract. 
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Every admission of a free state would be accompanied by the admission of 
a slave state. This so- called balance rule gave the South equal representa-
tion in the Senate, from which they could maintain and protect the institu-
tion of slavery. But, as Barry Weingast (1998) has powerfully argued, the 
breakdown produced by the Kansas- Nebraska Act and the resulting elec-
tion threw the commitment of the North to the balance rule into question. 
Without explicit Northern commitment to the balance rule, Southern states 
no longer viewed Northern statements to protect slavery as credible. Once 
a Northern Republican was elected president, the South decided to secede. 
It is critical, however, to remember that this unraveling of the Northern 
and Southern détente over the slavery question can be traced back directly 
to the Kansas- Nebraska Act and the resulting election of 1854– 55.
Gerrymandering further contributed to the political tumult by pro-
ducing the massive swing in party fortunes in the following elections. As 
seen in this chapter, although the national vote swing against Democrats 
in 1854– 55 was modest, it nevertheless resulted in a massive swing in seats. 
The highly responsive gerrymanders drawn by pro- Democratic state leg-
islatures directly fostered these seat swings.
The results of the election threw the subsequent Congress into tumult. 
For example, the House spent eight weeks fighting over who would be 
the Speaker (Jenkins and Stewart 2001). Had Democrats not been wiped 
out, the fight over the Speaker likely would have been shortened, and 
Democrats would have wielded more influence. The implications went 
well beyond the narrow confines of Capitol Hill politics. The fight over 
the speakership shaped policy over the next Congress and determined pol-
icy toward the westward extension of slavery. Indeed, the political battles 
fought within the halls of Congress over slavery in the early 1850s would 
eventually erupt into civil war, and engulf the whole nation, only a few 
years later (Holt 1999).
1874: Reconstruction and Suffrage Rights
A similarly dramatic policy consequence of gerrymandering can be seen in 
the policy outcomes following the 1874 election. As seen in this chapter, 
Democrats captured the House of Representatives for the first time since 
the Civil War. The new Democratic majority spelled doom for Recon-
struction policy in the South. Because the Republican Ulysses S. Grant still 
occupied the White House, Democrats could not outright repeal Recon-
struction or the enforcement acts that had been passed in the years prior to 
1874. However, Democrats were in a position to radically affect appropria-
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tions and spending decisions. In other words, they could halt the enforce-
ment of Reconstruction policies through budget starvation.
Democrats’ position of power stemmed from the asymmetric bargain-
ing power that can arise in the federal appropriations process. In particular, 
if an appropriation bill fails to pass, then spending in that policy area reverts 
to zero. Thus, a legislative party that wants to reduce spending, even if it 
only controls one branch of government, can be granted a position of real 
leverage (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1988; Stewart 1991). Democrats used 
this leverage to their advantage to reduce spending on enforcement in the 
South whenever they gained control of the House.
In effect, Democrats’ sweeping victory in the election of 1874 began the 
death knell of Reconstruction. The federal government ceded the South 
to local elites. The dramatic consequences of federal abandonment of the 
South could most readily be seen in Mississippi, where the Democratic 
state government passed a radical plan to disenfranchise African Americans. 
Thus, even before the national government formally pulled federal troops 
out following the presidential election of 1876, the commitment of the fed-
eral government to protection of voting rights had been severely under-
mined. As the historian Kenneth Stampp has argued, “After the Democrats 
gained a majority in the House, there was no chance that additional federal 
protection would be given to southern Negroes. Instead the House Demo-
crats, in 1876, refused to pass an army appropriation bill in order to force 
the President to withdraw federal troops from the South. . . . Under these 
circumstances the absence of federal intervention when the Mississippi Plan 
went into operation is understandable” (Stampp 1965, 209).
The rapidly diminished role of the federal government in Southern 
elections can also be seen in federal prosecutions of electoral fraud in 
Southern congressional districts. In the early 1870s, Republicans passed 
a sweeping set of laws which empowered the federal government to chal-
lenge and prosecute violations of the Fifteenth Amendment. The purpose 
was to prevent violations of African- American voting rights in the South 
(and voting rights in the North). Before 1874, the Justice Department 
investigated 1,973 cases of electoral fraud in the South. Following Demo-
crats’ takeover of the House, and the reduction in appropriations for fed-
eral marshals, the number of prosecutions declined almost to zero (Wang 
1997, 300– 301). Between 1871 and 1874, the Justice Department success-
fully prosecuted 1,022 cases of fraud and vote suppression in the South. 
Between 1875 and 1880, after Democrats took control of the House— and 
control of the Justice Department budget— the number of prosecutions 
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plummeted to 38 total cases (Gillette 1979, 43; Wang 1997, 300). In effect, 
the guarantee of federal enforcement and protection of African Ameri-
cans’ Fifteenth Amendment suffrage rights vanished following Democrats’ 
sweeping capture of the House in the 1874 election.
1892– 94: The Repeal of Federal Enforcement and the One- Party South
The fight over enforcement of Fifteenth Amendment and the suffrage 
rights of African Americans continued, after 1874, for the next 20 years. As 
party power shifted back and forth in Washington, the fortunes of African 
Americans in the South shifted as well. The tenuous battle over enfran-
chisement finally came to end in 1894. The boost to Democrats’ majority 
in the 1892 election, which, as we have seen, owed much to gerrymander-
ing, gave Democrats a sufficient majority to enact one of their longstand-
ing policy goals— repeal of the Federal Enforcement Act. Thus, in 1894, 
before surrendering majority control, Democrats enacted legislation that 
pulled the plug on the Federal Enforcement Act (Wang 1997).
As seen in the previous chapter, a centerpiece of Republican- policy 
agenda following the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment was the cre-
ation of the Federal Enforcement Act. As the title of the act telegraphed, 
its purpose was to provide a statutory basis for the federal government to 
enforce the suffrage rights of African Americans laid out in the Fifteenth 
Amendment. The act had originally passed in the early 1870s; over the next 
20 years, the two parties fought over the support of the act. When Demo-
crats controlled the House, they sought to starve the enforcement bureau 
of appropriations. But with firm control of Congress following the 1892 
election, and a Democrat in the White House, Democrats were finally in a 
position to pass legislation repealing the Federal Enforcement Act.
Absent highly responsive gerrymanders, Democrats’ majority would 
have been much more modest. Using our counterfactual baseline of a 
swing ratio of 3 and no partisan bias, we would predict that the vote share 
in the 1892 election would result in 182 Democratic seats (or 51 percent). 
Democrats still may have had the necessary votes to repeal the Federal 
Enforcement Act, but the vote would have been much tighter. Or Repub-
licans may have found it possible to amend the bill and save parts of the 
repeal act. The vote split right along party lines. 194 Democrats voted in 
favor, and 102 voted against. No Republican voted in favor, and no Demo-
crat voted against (Wang 1997, 256). The long- term consequences of this 
act for the trajectory of subsequent American political and social history 
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were, obviously, enormous. It would be another 60 years before the federal 
government intervened in the Southern electoral process. The legacy of 
these decisions continues to shake American politics.
Conclusion
Starting with Edward Tufte’s (1973) pioneering article, which suggested 
a link between gerrymandering and the declining swing ratio of 20th- 
century congressional elections, there has been considerable debate in the 
political- science literature over the impact of redistricting on competition 
in congressional elections. The current status of the debate is that redis-
tricting either reduces, or has no effect, on competition. In this chapter, 
though, I have found that redistricting in the 19th century often increased 
competition. These results suggest that the impact of redistricting on elec-
toral competition is conditional upon the broader institutional environ-
ment affecting the strategies of partisan mapmakers.
The findings in this chapter also cast a new perspective on electoral 
change in American political history. A traditional, organizing perspective 
of American politics is that periods of realignment produce large- scale 
transformations in public policy and political institutions. Critical elections 
are the manifestation of pent- up public demand for changing the status 
quo, currently frustrated by the regime in power. But what if the elections 
typically considered critical were, if only unintentionally, manufactured by 
politicians via institutional design? What if instead of large shifts in mass 
opinion, the swings in party fortunes were the unintended byproduct of 
strategic politicians manipulating electoral districts?
The elections of 1854, 1874, and 1894 brought together a rare con-
fluence of events: manufactured competitiveness, an overabundance of 
marginal districts for one party created by redistricting, and a vote swing 
against that current dominant party. High vote- seat ratios were a neces-
sary, but not sufficient, condition for a huge seat swing toward one party. 
It also required that the party on the losing end of the vote swing had an 
overabundance of marginal seats. One can see this by considering what 
would have happened had there been an equivalent five- point swing the 
other way, in favor of the dominant party. Even in this extremely com-
petitive party system, such a swing would have generated comparatively 
modest gains for Democrats in 1854 and 1894, and Republicans in 1874. 
In this regard, 1854, 1874, and 1894 would have looked more like the elec-
tions of 1958 or 1964— a majority party adding to its already substantial 
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advantage— than the “critical elections” they have since been christened by 
historians and political scientists.
This argument is not meant to deny the historical and political impor-
tance attached to events such as the Kansas- Nebraska Act, the Panic of 
1873, or the Panic of 1893. The majority party at the time, in all three 
instances, would have suffered at the polls, regardless of district design. Yet, 
the magnitudes of the seat swings were directly influenced by the particu-
lar redistricting strategies pursued by state political parties. These results 
remind us that that in interpreting change in political representation it is 
critical to recognize how the strategic design of electoral districts channels 
political events to accelerate or decelerate changes in public preferences.
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A Congress of Strangers
Gerrymandering and Legislative Turnover
The contemporary Congress is a highly professionalized organization with 
a relatively stable membership. In any given election year, few incumbents 
retire, and even fewer are defeated. Most run for reelection, and most win. 
In 2008, for example, 93 percent of incumbents ran for reelection, and 94 
percent of those won. At the beginning of the 110th Congress, which fol-
lowed the 2008 election, only 12 percent of House members were serving 
in their first term. The average length of service for members of this Con-
gress was 10 years (or five terms). Thus even a fairly nationalized election, 
such as the 2008 election, produced comparatively modest turnover.
By contrast, turnover in the 19th century was immense. The start of a 
typical mid- 19th- century Congress closely resembled a body of neophytes. 
For example, at the opening of the 42nd Congress, following the 1870 
election, nearly 45 percent of the House members were serving in their 
first term. Even the “veterans” were recent arrivals; the average House 
member at the beginning of the 42nd Congress had only served four years 
(two terms). Nor was the 42nd Congress atypical. Indeed, most politicians 
of the 19th century did not view service in the House of Representatives 
as the pinnacle of the political- career ladder until very late in the cen-
tury (Kernell 1977; Polsby 1968; Price 1971). Instead, politicians tended 
to rotate among offices. A typical 19th- century political career might have 
involved serving in local office, moving onto the state legislature, serving 
in Congress for a few terms, and then returning to state or local office 
(Kernell 2003).
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To get a visual idea of turnover patterns in the 19th century, figure 
7.1 plots the number of first termers at the opening of each Congress— 
from 1790 to 2010. As this figure reveals, turnover in the 19th century was 
enormous. The average number of first- termers over this period was an 
astonishing 46 percent. Nearly half of the membership of a mid- century 
Congress, for example, would have been serving their first term. In some 
Congresses, the numbers soared even higher. The record was set by the 
28th Congress (1842) in which 67 percent of the membership was serving 
their first term in the House. One can also see in the figure the oft- noted 
decrease in turnover over the course of the century. But even after taking 
this general decrease into account, the amount of turnover in the 19th 
century still dominates the modern Congress, where the average number 
of first- termers hovers around 13 percent.
Given the importance of legislative turnover, there is little surprise that 
the evolution of turnover has attracted much scholarly attention. Students 
of the U.S. Congress generally agree that the primary determinant of 
19th- century turnover can be found in the decisions of members to run for 
reelection. In particular, voluntary retirement, rather than electoral defeat, 
was by far the leading reason for turnover (Brady, Buckley, and Rivers 1999; 
fig. 7.1. Percentage of house members serving their first term, 1790– 2010. 
(data compiled by the author from inter- university Consortium for Political and 
social research and mcKibbin 1997; and ornstein, mann, and malbin 2008.)
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Kernell 1977; Price 1975). Scholars disagree, however, in their explana-
tions for this era’s high rate of voluntary retirements. Some have identified 
the changing benefit, or value, of holding a seat in Washington, DC. As 
governing and administrative capacities gradually shifted from the state 
capitals to Washington, DC, the value of holding onto a seat in the House 
became increasingly attractive. Other scholars have argued that the intense 
party competition of the era soured members on the idea of holding onto 
a congressional seat for long stretches (Price 1975). As districts became 
safer following the landslide elections of 1894 and 1896, members found 
their electoral environments more hospitable for longer stays in Congress. 
Others have pointed to norms of “rotation” that operated in some districts 
where the party nomination would be rotated among local factions.
Likely, all of the just- mentioned factors played a role (see Kernell 2003). 
Yet, few have looked to redistricting as another potential factor contribut-
ing to this era’s high levels of voluntary departures. Given the rampant 
partisan gerrymandering of the era, one may reasonably have expected 
redistricting to have entered into the strategic calculus of 19th- century 
incumbents. As seen in the previous chapter, bipartisan pro- incumbent 
gerrymanders were rare. States instead gerrymandered to the bone, push-
ing partisan advantage as far is it would go. Even incumbents of the party 
drawing the districts were rarely given safer seats. Instead, many of these 
incumbents had their districts trimmed as partisan mapmaker’s reallocated 
voters to maximize their overall seat share. Moreover, redistricting was an 
ever- present threat hanging over many incumbents. As seen in chapter 2, 
states did not hesitate to redraw districts mid- decade. Thus, unlike modern 
incumbents who typically can count on a 10- year window of district stabil-
ity, 19th- century incumbents could find themselves having their district 
carved up at any point during a decade.
Some prima facie evidence for a link between redistricting and turnover 
can be discerned in figure 7.1. In the figure, I have labeled particular years 
where redistricting was pervasive. Strikingly, the peaks of House turnover 
occur simultaneously with these peaks in redistricting. Indeed, the all- time 
record for first- termers (setting aside the first Congress) was the Congress 
following the election of 1842– 43. In this Congress, a stunning 67 percent 
of House members were serving their first term. This massive turnover of 
legislative personnel, of course, came on the heels of the massive wave of 
redistricting prompted by the 1842 Apportionment Act. Running a simple 
regression with the total percentage of incumbents seeking reelection as 
the dependent variable and the percentage of districts redrawn nationwide 
as an independent variable, one finds a positive and significant relationship. 
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The value of the coefficient on the percentage of redrawn districts is 15.5, 
indicating that if every district were redrawn one would expect turnover to 
rise by 15.5 percent.
Although this evidence is suggestive of a link, one potential counterar-
gument is that the high percent of first- termers in reapportionment years 
may have resulted from changes in the size of the House (Fiorina, Rohde, 
and Wissel 1975). Since 1911, the size of the House has been fixed at 435 
members, but throughout the 19th century, Congress regularly added new 
seats and expanded the size of the House. For example, the 1882 Apportion-
ment Act increased the membership of the House from 293 to 325. One 
source prompting the addition of seats was the admission of new states. To 
accommodate newly admitted states, the House typically would tack on 
new seats to the overall membership. A second cause was the spectacular 
growth of the American population. As population swelled and expanded 
westward, rather than make the unpopular decision to take seats away from 
older states, Congress often opted to simply add new seats to the House. 
From the perspective of analyzing first- termers in Congress, therefore, one 
needs to take into account these new seats. Otherwise, we may overstate 
the connection between reapportionment and turnover (Fiorina, Rohde, 
and Wissel 1975).
To account for the possibility that new seats inflated the relationship 
between first- termers and redistricting, figure 7.2 presents the percent-
age of members who were replaced by someone else. In effect, this is a 
turnover measure purged of any members elected in newly gained seats 
(see Fiorina, Rohde, and Wissel 1975). As figure 7.2 shows, purging new 
seats from the time- series does not alter the overall picture. There is again 
a very visible link between reapportionment years and replacement mem-
bers. Regressing the percentage of replacements on the total percentage of 
districts redrawn yields a coefficient of 16.3 (p < .01). If every district was 
redrawn, we would expect the percentage of replacements to increase by 
16.3 percent. So, controlling for growth in the House actually accentuates 
the effect of redistricting.
These aggregate patterns also find support in various pieces of anec-
dotal evidence. For example, following the North Carolina mid- decade 
redistricting in 1847, the Whig Alfred Dockery found himself placed into 
a district with fellow Whig incumbent, Daniel M. Barringer. According to 
historian Marc Kruman, “After considering a run for reelection Dockery 
decided against it and gave his support to Barringer” (1983, 39). In Ohio, 
in 1890, a pro- Democratic gerrymander abruptly ended the burgeoning 
careers of a number of Republican incumbents. For example, Robert P. 
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Kennedy was one of those Republican incumbents. Having only just begun 
his service in the House, the new district maps cut his fledgling congres-
sional career short. The New York Times wrote, “Kennedy was elected to 
Congress two years ago from the Logan district, and hoped that his career 
would be continuous as a national lawmaker. The dream was short- lived, 
and has had a gloomy ending. His county has been bunched with Allen, 
Putnam, and Auglaize, all heavily Democratic with Hardin and Van Wert, 
both close thrown in. Nearly four thousand majority stare him in the face” 
(New York Times, July 25, 1890). Unsurprisingly, Kennedy did not stand for 
reelection.
In sum, there is good reason to suspect that incumbents responded 
strategically to changes in their district boundaries— often opting to retire 
rather than run for reelection. Indeed, some of the early research on the 
evolution of congressional careerism raised this possibility. Kernell (1977), 
for example, noted that “Nineteenth century reapportionment may have 
had a disruptive effect on congressional careers. With a growing popula-
tion necessitating periodic redistricting and highly partisan state legisla-
tures redrawing district boundaries, some congressmen may have had their 
fig. 7.2. Percentage of house members replaced, 1790– 2010. (data for 1790 to 
1970 compiled by the author from data presented in fiorina, rohde, and wisell 
1975, 29– 31. data for 1972 to 2010 constructed by the author.)
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careers abruptly ended when redistricting carved up their formerly secure 
seats” (679). Similarly, Fiorina, Rohde, and Wissel (1975), in the appendix 
to their study of replacements, noted an aggregate relationship between 
reapportionment years (i.e., years ending in 2) and the total number of new 
members in a given Congress.
Neither of these articles, however, examined the district- level decisions 
of members to seek reelection. Nor did they take into account mid- decade 
redistricting. Thus, it remains an open question whether or not redistrict-
ing curbed political ambition, increased turnover, and stunted the growth 
of careerism.
Redistricting and Strategic Entry
Whether or not an incumbent returns to Congress is primarily the joint 
product of two factors: seeking reelection and winning reelection. Other 
causes may intervene to prevent an incumbent from returning— death or 
expulsion— but the failure to seek reelection or losing reelection condi-
tional on seeking it are by far the greatest factors contributing to turnover. 
In this section, I focus on the decision to seek reelection.
Data on the individual decisions to seek reelection comes from the Ros-
ter of United States Congressional Officeholders and Biographical Characteristics 
of Members of the United States Congress, 1789– 1996: Merged Data (ICPSR 
Study Number 7803). This dataset provides detailed biographical informa-
tion on everyone who has ever served in Congress. For my interests here, 
the key is that this dataset includes information on whether or not each 
member sought reelection. If a person stood for reelection they were obvi-
ously coded as “seeking reelection.” For those who did not seek reelection, 
the dataset includes information denoting the reason why. I coded anyone 
who retired from office, sought higher office, or was appointed to some 
other office, as “not seeking reelection.” I excluded from the analysis any-
one who died in office or was expelled from Congress; the logic being that 
they had no choice about whether to seek reelection.
Less obvious was how to code those listed in the directory as “not 
receiving the nomination.” Because the records of 19th- party- nominating 
conventions are notoriously thin, one must make a choice about how 
to treat these cases. One interpretation is that these incumbents sought 
the nomination but were denied it, which would suggest treating them 
as “seeking reelection.” Another interpretation is that they did not seek 
renomination at all, and therefore should be coded as “not seeking reelec-
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tion.” I opted to code this category as “seeking reelection.” The rationale is 
that given our best guess these individuals stood for reelection, but failed to 
gain the nomination; in other words, their departure was involuntary. This 
coding is also consistent with previous research on 19th- century turnover 
(i.e., Brady, Buckley and Rivers 1999). Fortunately, only a handful fell into 
this grey area. Coding them the other way (i.e., as “not seeking reelection”) 
had no impact on the overall results.
Figure 7.3 displays the percentage of members seeking reelection. The 
average between 1840 and 1900 was 67 percent. This is substantially lower 
than contemporary rates. Between 1980 and 2010, for instance, the average 
number of incumbents seeking reelection was 94 percent. One can also see 
a distinct upward trend over the past two centuries. But the trend is not 
a straight upward journey. As with the figure on total turnover percent-
ages, the figure clearly shows that fewer incumbents ran following major 
periods of redistricting. Running a simple regression with the number of 
members seeking reelection as the dependent variable and the percent-
age of districts redrawn nationwide as an independent variable, one finds a 
significant negative relationship (see table 7.1, column 1). If every district 
fig. 7.3. Percentage of house members seeking reelection, 1790– 2010. (data 
compiled by the author from inter- university Consortium for Political and social 
research and mcKibbin 1997; and ornstein, mann, and malbin 2008.)
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were redrawn, one would expect the percentage of representatives seeking 
reelection to drop by 17 percent.
The next part of the analysis moves to the individual- level decisions of 
incumbents. If incumbents were making strategic decisions about when to 
leave Congress, we should see a district- level connection between redis-
tricting and incumbent retirements. To evaluate this relationship, I created 
a dependent variable taking a value of one if the incumbent sought reelec-
tion and zero otherwise.
The key independent variable is whether a district was redrawn or not 
prior to the election. The model also controlled for factors past research has 
found to contribute to the decision to run for reelection. These included 
the incumbent’s prior margin of victory, their age (logged), and the number 
of terms they had served in the House. To control for the upward growth 
in careerism over this period, I included a time trend variable that takes a 
value of one in 1840 and grows linearly through 1900 (i.e., 1840 = 1, 1842 = 
2, 1844 = 3, and so on).1 I also included a variable denoting whether it was a 
midterm election. The midterm election variable was then interacted with 
a variable denoting whether or not the incumbent was a member of the 
same party as the president. This should control for any strategic retire-
ment in anticipation of a midterm decline.2 Because the dependent variable 
is binary (i.e., 1 = Sought Reelection, 0 = Did Not Seek Reelection) the 
model was estimated via logit. The model also included robust standard 
errors clustered by member.
The results, in table 7.2, column 1, support the hypothesis that redis-
tricting influenced incumbent decisions to retire. The coefficient on redis-
tricting is negative and significant. Incumbents were less likely to run for 
reelection, all else being equal, following a redistricting. Setting all the 
other variables at their median value, the baseline rate of running when 
TABLE 7.1. Redrawn Districts and Turnover, 1840– 1900
 Percentage of Incumbents  Percentage of Seeking 
 Seeking Reelection Incumbents Who Won




Adjusted R2 .17 .09
Number of Observations 31 31
Note: Entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05.
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there was no redistricting was .72. With a redistricting the probability 
dropped to .66. Thus, redistricting reduced the probability of running for 
reelection by 6 percent.
It is also worth noting the pattern for results for the control variables. 
Increases in both an incumbents’ age and their length of service reduced 
the likelihood of running for reelection. Moreover, electoral marginality 
reduced the likelihood of running for reelection. Finally, in midterm elec-
tions, members who were of the same party as the sitting president were less 
likely to run for reelection. All of this provides evidence that incumbents of 
the 19th century, or the parties nominating them, were keenly strategic in 
deciding when to run for reelection. Indeed, these incumbents appear to be 
much more like their modern counterparts than is often assumed.
Winning Election
Although declining to seek reelection was the primary cause of departures 
in the 19th century (Kernell 1977), it was not the only source of turnover. 
TABLE 7.2. The District- Level Impact of Redistricting on Seeking and Winning 
Reelection, 1840– 1900
 Seeking Reelection Winning Reelection
District Redrawn −.25* −.24*
 (.06) (.09)
Age (logged) −1.28* −.25
 (.14) (.21)
Terms Served −.03 .10*
 (.02) (.03)
Previous Margin .007* .05*
 (.001) (.001)
Midterm Election −.01 .64*
 (.07) (.10)
Same Party as President −.003 .72*
 (.07) (.11)
Midterm Election × Same −.21* −1.77*
 Party as President (.10) (.15)




Number of Observations 8,041 5,248
Log- Likelihood −4,787.20 −2,343.45
Note: Entries are maximum likelihood estimates from a logit model. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses.
*p < .05.
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The other source was the failure to win election conditional on seeking it 
(Brady, Buckley, and Rivers 1999). Given that redistricting and incumbent 
entry appear to be strongly related, one might also suspect redistricting 
to affect the ability of incumbents to secure reelection, even after seeking 
it. Gerrymandering can change the partisan composition of the district in 
a more favorable direction for the opponent. Moreover, incumbents who 
have built up a personal vote may see their vote share decline among con-
stituents newly added to their district who know little or nothing about the 
incumbent (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2000; Carson, Engstrom, 
and Roberts 2007).
Looking first at the overall patterns of electoral defeats, figure 7.4 pres-
ents the percentage of running incumbents who were reelected. As the 
figure shows, reelection rates were surprisingly high during the partisan 
era. Most incumbents who ran for reelection won. The average reelec-
tion rate for running incumbents during this period was nearly 80 percent. 
Nevertheless, there does appear to be a link between redistricting and the 
percentage of seeking incumbents reelected. As the figure shows, periods 
with substantial redistricting had somewhat lower reelection rates. We can 
be more precise about the relationship by examining a simple regression. 
fig. 7.4. Percentage of running incumbents reelected, 1790– 2010. (data 
compiled by the author from inter- university Consortium for Political and social 
research and mcKibbin 1997; and ornstein, mann, and malbin 2008.)
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Using the values of this series as a dependent variable, and the percentage 
of districts redrawn as an independent variable, we find a negative and sig-
nificant relationship (in table 7.1, column 2). If every district were redrawn, 
the percentage of running incumbents winning reelection would drop by 
9 percent.
We can further test this relationship by analyzing the individual prob-
ability that an incumbent won reelection following a redistricting. Here 
the dependent variable is equal to one if the incumbent won reelection and 
zero if they lost. The independent variables are the same as those in the 
model that estimated the decision to seek reelection. Table 7.2, column 2, 
presents the results. The coefficient on the redistricting variable is negative 
and significant. This indicates that redistricting reduced the likelihood that 
an incumbent would win reelection in a redrawn district. Without redis-
tricting, and setting the other variables at their median value, the prob-
ability of incumbent reelection was .87. When there was a redistricting, 
this probability dropped to .83. Thus, redistricting reduced the probability 
of reelection by 4 percent. The magnitude, of the effect, however is not 
especially large indicating that the more substantive impact of redistricting 
came at the initial decision to seek reelection.
One point to bear in mind is that the impact of redistricting on winning 
reelection is likely understated. As the previous analysis indicted, incum-
bents who anticipated losing— or at least anticipated facing a difficult 
campaign— as a result of redistricting were probably more inclined to shy 
away from running again. Thus, the coefficient on the redistricting variable 
possibly underestimates the overall impact of redistricting. Nevertheless, 
putting the results for seeking and winning reelection together indicates 
that redistricting had a substantial impact on the career prospects of 19th- 
century incumbents.
One obvious question these findings raise is why parties would put their 
own incumbents at risk via redistricting. One possibility, and the one sug-
gested by earlier chapters, is that state political parties were simply trying 
to maximize their collective share of seats. This goal often required trim-
ming the district margins of their own congressional incumbents. There 
was clearly a trade- off here. Maximizing seat shares also made incumbents, 
on the margin, more vulnerable. Another related possibility is that districts 
were redrawn to bolster the aspirations of incumbent state legislators. One 
can find a few anecdotes in the historical literature supporting this notion, 
but there is not enough detailed evidence to offer more than speculation. 
Without more data on the career aspirations of state legislators it is dif-
ficult to say how much of this was taking place.
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The Overall Impact of Redistricting on Turnover
The previous two sections have shown that redistricting profoundly influ-
enced both who ran for reelection and who won. Having established that 
redrawing district boundaries influenced the individual components of 
turnover, the question now becomes: how much did these components 
affect overall levels of turnover? One way to assess the impact of redis-
tricting on the individual, and joint, components of turnover is to examine 
a counterfactual. We can begin by first considering the extent to which 
redistricting influenced the aggregate number of congressmen seeking 
reelection.
Recall that the estimated aggregate impact of redistricting on the per-
centage of incumbents who sought reelection was −.09 (see table 7.1, col-
umn 1). Multiplying this coefficient by the percentage of districts redrawn 
in a given year provides an estimate of how many incumbents retired due 
to redistricting. For example, in 1872, the number of congressional dis-
tricts redrawn was 50.2 percent. Multiplying this value by −.16 provides an 
estimated effect of redistricting on retirement rates of 8 percent. In other 
words, if there were no redistricting, we would have expected an additional 
8 percent of incumbents to run for reelection. Adding this estimated num-
ber to the actual total of incumbents who retired provides a counterfactual 
estimate of how many incumbents would have retired if no redistricting 
had taken place. So, in the 1872 example, we would have expected 76.9 
percent of incumbents to run for reelection if there was no redistricting, 
as opposed to the 68.9 percent who did in reality. Calculating this value 
for every election provides a counterfactual time- series where we can then 
compare to the actual percentage of incumbent retirements.
The results of this simulation, along with the actual rates of reelection 
seeking, are displayed in figure 7.5. The figure illustrates that redistrict-
ing sharply decreased the overall percentage of incumbents seeking reelec-
tion. The simulated trend line differs from the actual line substantially 
at a number of points. In 1852, for example, 52 percent of incumbents 
sought reelection, while the simulation indicates that 65 percent would 
have sought had there been no redistricting. Noteworthy is the Gilded 
Age. From 1870 through 1894, there is a consistent discrepancy between 
the simulated and actual number of Congressmen seeking reelection. The 
heightened redistricting of this period appears to have acted as a drag on 
reelection seeking.
Figure 7.6 presents a similar counterfactual estimating the impact of 
redistricting on the proportion of “seeking incumbents” winning reelec-
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tion. Here I have multiplied the percentage of redrawn districts by the 
coefficient in table 7.1, column 2 (i.e., −.09). Adding this number to the 
actual number who won reelection provides a simulated time- series of the 
percentage of seeking incumbents who would have won reelection, absent 
redistricting. The numbers again reveal discrepancies between the simula-
tion and the actual percentage of incumbent winners, but the magnitude 
of the differences is modest. In 1872, for example, the simulated number 
of incumbents winning reelection was 81 percent as opposed to the 77 
percent in actuality. The relatively smaller effect of redistricting on win-
ning reelection meshes with previous research that has found voluntary 
exits to be the primary determinant of turnover. Nevertheless, there is an 
appreciable effect of redistricting on the aggregate number of incumbents 
winning reelection.
We can now put these two sets of results together to produce a measure 
of the overall impact of redistricting on turnover. Because the coefficients 
in table 7.1 are based on different sets of incumbents, one first needs to 
estimate the number of incumbents who voluntarily retired due to redis-
tricting. I did this by first calculating the estimated number of incumbents 
who would have run had there been no redistricting. For example, in 1872, 
fig. 7.5. Counterfactual impact of redistricting on rates of reelection seeking
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168 of the potential 244 incumbents ran for reelection. In the simulation, 
188 incumbents would have run. Then we can calculate how many of those 
who sought reelection would have won given the baseline rates of incum-
bent victory in the absence of redistricting. So, continuing with the 1872 
example, we would expect the number of seeking incumbents winning 
reelection absent redistricting to be 153. The result is an estimate of the 
proportion of incumbents who would have sought election and won. We 
can then compare this proportion to the actual proportion of incumbents 
who returned.
Figure 7.7 displays the results of this exercise. Again, we see a number 
of differences between the simulation and the actual series. Not surpris-
ingly, the largest differences are found in elections following a federal reap-
portionment. In 1842, the simulation predicts that 44 percent of incum-
bents would have returned, whereas in reality only 28 percent returned. In 
1872, the simulation predicts that 63 percent of incumbents would have 
returned as opposed to the 53 percent who actually did. But the effect was 
not felt just in reapportionment years. For instance, in every year between 
1872 and 1894, one finds a substantial discrepancy. Overall, at both the 
individual and aggregate level, redistricting increased legislative turnover. 
fig. 7.6. Counterfactual impact of redistricting on incumbent winning percentage
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By no means was it the only cause of turnover during this era. But the 
frequency and partisanship of redistricting clearly acted as a drag on the 
development of careerism.
A Note on Challengers
This chapter has primarily been concerned with the decisions of incum-
bents. But incumbents were not the only actors making strategic calcula-
tions about when to run for office. Challengers represent the other side 
of the electoral coin. One might reasonably suspect that when a district 
was redrawn to make an incumbent vulnerable, one or more experienced 
candidates lined up for a chance at the nomination. Consider the Ohio 
redistricting of 1890. Following this very pro- Democratic gerrymander, a 
number of Republican incumbents found themselves in hostile territory. 
Democratic challengers throughout the state were more than ready to 
jump into the race against these newly vulnerable incumbents. The New 
York Times reported that for Republicans:
fig. 7.7. the total impact of redistricting on the percentage of returning members
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In some of the newly made districts there will woe and heaviness of 
spirit between the time of nomination and election day. No one will 
more keenly realize this than [Republican] Hon. T.E. Burton of the 
Cleveland district. He is in a gerrymandered district where a Demo-
cratic majority is almost a certainty; he is sure to be pitted against 
the strongest man the Democrats can name. (New York Times, July 
25, 1890)
In research conducted with my colleagues Jamie Carson and Jason 
Roberts (2006), we examined whether redistricting affected the decisions 
of experienced challengers to run for Congress. In that project, we gath-
ered background information on every major party candidate who ran for 
the House between 1872 and 1896. Following the standard definition in 
the contemporary literature (e.g., Jacobson 2009), we defined anyone who 
had held prior elected office as an experienced challenger. We then exam-
ined what impact redistricting had on the likelihood of an experienced 
challenger taking on an incumbent. We found that challengers with prior 
office- holding experience were more likely to run in districts that had been 
favorably altered in the redistricting process.
Table 7.3 presents the rates of collisions between incumbents and 
experienced challengers between 1872 and 1896. When districts were 
untouched, the probability of an experienced challenger taking on an 
incumbent was only 32.6 percent. When districts were redrawn, the prob-
ability of an experienced challenger entering increased to 38.4 percent. 
The data for that project only covered a portion of the 19th century, but 
the results lend further support to the larger story of this chapter. The 
decisions of challengers were just as strategic as those of challengers now. It 
also suggests a degree of electoral coordination among candidates, and the 
parties that nominated them, that many might suspect would not be pres-
TABLE 7.3. The Entry of Experienced Challengers against Incumbents, 1872– 96
 Amateur Challenger Experienced Challenger
District Untouched 67.4% 32.6%
 (1,479) (716)
District Redrawn 61.6% 38.4%
 (241) (150)
Note: The percentages are row percentages. Raw numbers are in parentheses. An “expe-
rienced challenger” is defined as anyone who has held prior elective office.
χ2 = 4.92; p < .03.
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ent in the 19th century. Moreover, this strategic coordination enhanced the 
competitiveness of districts. Where incumbents faced off against strong 
challengers, races were more closely contested (Carson, Engstrom, and 
Roberts 2006). Thus, rather than inhibiting competition, redistricting in 
the 19th century enhanced it.
Conclusion
The framers of the U.S. Constitution sought to harness the self- interested 
ambitions of office holders, and would- be office holders, by designing a 
constitutional structure that would channel these ambitions toward the 
common good. Notably, frequent elections for the House were designed 
to keep representatives accountable and attuned to the wishes of their con-
stituencies. If representatives are unconcerned about reelection, or have 
scant interest in seeking reelection, then the salutary benefits of frequent 
elections may be lost.
For this normative reason, many pundits and scholars have expressed 
concern about the lack of turnover in contemporary congressional elec-
tions. In the modern House, most members seek reelection and win reelec-
tion. This muted turnover has led to a vast literature searching for its causes. 
One suspect that has prompted much scrutiny is redistricting. In the wake 
of the 1960s reapportionment revolution, scholars such as Edward Tufte 
(1973) argued that the resulting wave of redistricting made seats safe for 
incumbents of both parties. Although many political scientists were quick 
to challenge Tufte’s argument (e.g., Ferejohn 1977), his claim about the 
dampening effect of redistricting on competition continues to echo in pop-
ular commentary. One of the oft- heard refrains among journalists, editorial 
writers, and good- government groups is that redistricting depresses legisla-
tive turnover. Democrats and Republicans have colluded, so the argument 
goes, to secure safe districts for incumbents of both parties.
This argument, however, runs into the stubborn fact that even in the 
modern era redistricting, rather than inhibiting turnover, often induces 
incumbents to depart office. For example, Cox and Katz (2002, 166) found 
that since the 1960s, incumbents have been less likely to run for reelection 
following redistricting. In an analysis of the decisions of modern House 
incumbents to retire or run for higher office, Kiewiet and Zeng (1993) dis-
covered that incumbent decisions to retire spiked when their district was 
substantially redrawn. More recently, Yoshinaka and Murphy (2009) found 
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that the 2002 redistricting cycle increased incumbent retirements, particu-
larly for incumbents whose districts were drawn by the opposition party.
An important question is whether these findings are confined to the 
modern era or whether they are a pattern found more generally through-
out American history. In this chapter, I examined the impact of redistrict-
ing on the entry and exit decisions of 19th- century representatives. When 
districts were carved up, incumbents were less likely to seek reelection. 
As a result, members of Congress often faced a highly uncertain electoral 
environment. Redistricting could come at any time. When it happened, 
more often than not, it was intensely partisan. Rather than risk defeat, 
many members simply opted to retire. For those who did run for reelec-
tion, redistricting increased the probability of defeat. The net result was to 
amplify legislative turnover and hinder congressional careerism.
These findings lead to a profoundly ironic implication. If one truly 
wants more legislative turnover, then a solution might be more partisan 
gerrymandering— not less. Partisan redistricting, rather than restrain turn-
over, can raise it. Indeed, the peaks of legislative turnover were reached 
precisely in those years when there was vigorous partisan gerrymandering. 
Whether such immense turnover is a good thing, however, is another ques-
tion. As historian J. Morgan Kousser has written, “The prospect of repeated 
interaction in the future gives careerist twentieth century members more 
reason to compromise and to develop policy incrementally. Congress-
men in the nineteenth century, who could not expect to sit long enough 
to benefit from a ‘tit- for- tat’ strategy, had less reason to compromise and 
less stake in the incremental development of policy” (Kousser 1992, 153). 
The waves of turnover found in the 19th century often produced a Con-
gress of strangers. Congressmen arrived in Washington, DC, with little 
political experience at the national level and little incentive to forge long- 
term political relationships with their fellow legislators. The future career 
opportunities of legislators resided back home, not on Capitol Hill.
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The Partisan Impact of 
Malapportionment
In the federal reapportionment that followed the 2000 census, Pennsylva-
nia was allocated 18 congressional seats. This was two less than Pennsylva-
nia’s previous allotment and therefore necessitated a thorough redrawing 
of their congressional district boundaries. The Republican Party held siz-
able majorities in the state legislature and controlled the governorship, and 
therefore had solid control of the redistricting process. Republicans took 
full advantage of their fortuitous situation by pursuing an aggressive parti-
san gerrymander. Their efforts were supported and cheered on by national 
party operatives including White House senior advisor Karl Rove (Barone 
and Cohen 2003, 1351). The resulting map eliminated four Democratic 
districts and created two new Republican- leaning districts.
Unsurprisingly, the plan was immediately challenged by Democrats, 
who filed lawsuits in both state and federal courts. In April 2002, a three- 
member federal court struck down the plan. The basis of the ruling, how-
ever, was not that the plan was an illegal partisan gerrymander. Instead, the 
federal court ruled that the map violated the one- person, one- vote doc-
trine. In particular, the judges found that district populations deviated by 
19 persons. And according to the ruling, the maximum acceptable popula-
tion deviation across congressional districts was one person.1
This episode highlights one of the striking differences between past 
and present redistricting. Contemporary mapmakers operate under strict 
population constraints. A deviation of more than a single person across 
congressional districts violates current legal doctrine. By contrast, 19th- 
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century mapmakers had ample freedom to draw districts of unequal size. 
Although Congress attached provisions to the decennial apportionment 
acts, between 1872 and 1912, stating that districts should be as “equal as 
practicable,” there is no evidence that this provision was ever enforced.
Many states responded to the absence of constraints by drawing dis-
tricts that varied widely in size. In 1882, for example, New York’s 12th 
District (comprised of Westchester County) contained 108,988 people, 
while the 3rd District (a subset of Brooklyn) contained 222,718 people: 
over double in size. Nor were these disparities confined to states with large 
urban populations. In 1872, for instance, Wisconsin’s 8th District had only 
half as many people (82,217) as the nearby 5th District (158,421).
These anecdotes suggest that districts could vary greatly in size through-
out the 19th century. Yet we know surprisingly little about how widespread 
malapportionment was during this era and its impact on the national par-
tisan balance of power. While the political and policy consequences of dis-
trict apportionment in the years immediately before and after the Supreme 
Court’s reapportionment decisions of the 1960s has received substantial 
scrutiny (e.g., Ansolabehere and Snyder 2008; Cox and Katz 2002; Erikson 
1972; Lax and McCubbins 2006; McCubbins and Schwartz 1988), there is 
almost no research on the partisan impact of malapportionment during the 
19th century.2 With the notable exception of an article by Altman (1998), 
which provides an overview of historical variations in district size and the 
nature of district contiguity, almost all of our current understanding of this 
subject is conjectural. How unequal in size were congressional districts in 
the 19th century? Did political parties in control of the districting process 
create different sized districts to rig the electoral system in their favor? If 
so, did these electoral biases cumulate across states to alter the partisan 
composition of the House of Representatives?
To see the relevance of considering unequal district sizes as a distinct 
source of partisan bias, consider the following example.3 Consider a hypo-
thetical state with five congressional districts. Assume each district has 
an identical voting population of 70,000 voters. In the first two districts, 
Democrats win by a margin of 60,000- 10,000. In the other three districts, 
Republicans win by a margin of 40,000- 30,000. This districting arrange-
ment produces a sizable pro- Republican bias— Republicans win 60 percent 
of the seats with only 44 percent of the statewide vote— yet the bias emerges 
entirely from the partisan distribution of voters across districts. Unequal 
district sizes, by construction, contribute nothing to the resulting bias.
Now consider what happens if we allow for malapportionment in these 
districts. Imagine that Republicans still win their three districts with 57 
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percent of the vote (40,000- 30,000) and Democrats now also win their 
districts with 57 percent of the vote. Except that the Democratic districts 
are twice as big— such that the vote share in Democratic districts is 80,000- 
60,000. Here both the parties win their districts by the same percentage, 
yet the overall map is again biased against Democrats. Republicans win 
60 percent of the seats. Yet, the statewide vote share is almost evenly split 
between the parties— Republicans have 240,000 votes, while Democrats 
have 250,000. In this example, therefore, the bias arises from malappor-
tioned districts. The larger Democratic districts lead to more wasted Dem-
ocratic votes.
In the rest of this chapter, I analyze the extent and partisan impact of 
malapportionment in House districts from 1840 to 1900. First, I examine 
when and how much districts varied in size. Second, I determine if these 
variations led to partisan biases both within state congressional delegations 
and, cumulatively, in the House of Representatives. To do this, I decom-
pose the bias of 19th- century congressional elections into its constituent 
parts (i.e., bias from malapportionment and bias from the distribution of 
partisan voters via gerrymandering). The results show that partisan bias 
arising from malapportionment directly correlated with state party con-
trol of the districting process, but the net effect was modest. The most 
important source of bias was the distribution of voters into districts from 
gerrymandering, and less from malapportionment.
How Unequal Were 19th- Century House Districts?
In the modern era, the one- person, one- vote standard, and its elabora-
tion in subsequent case law, necessitates that states create congressional 
districts of equal population. Because population naturally shifts over the 
course of 10 years, states are compelled every decade to bring the equal-
ity of their districts back into equality. By contrast, politicians of the 19th 
century enjoyed much wider latitude in deciding both when and how to 
construct congressional districts. Although Congress attached provisions 
to the decennial apportionment acts between 1872 and 1912 stating that 
districts should contain “as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhab-
itants,” there is no indication that this standard was imposed.
How pervasive was malapportionment during the 19th century? There 
are a number of different approaches to measuring inequality in district 
sizes.4 One simple approach is to compare the smallest and largest districts 
within a state. To get a baseline idea of how much district populations var-
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ied, table 8.1 displays a few examples of how populations differed between 
the smallest and largest districts within states. In 1842, for instance, the 
largest district in Ohio had 82,791 people, while the smallest had 61,572. 
In 1892, Pennsylvania’s largest district contained 309,986 people; the 
smallest contained 129,764.
A more systematic view of these population inequalities can be seen by 
considering the average difference between the smallest and largest dis-
trict within states. Specifically, for each state, I calculated the difference 
in population between the largest and smallest district. Averaging across 
the states in each year provides a measure of the overall levels of district 
inequality— the results are displayed in figure 8.1. During the 1860s, the 
average difference within states was roughly 30,000 people. By 1900, this 
number had climbed to 70,000 people.5 To help contextualize the 19th- 
century numbers, figure 8.1 also shows the average differences in district 
populations for the decades before and after the reapportionment revolu-
tion of the 1960s. One can see the growth in population differences that 
carried on throughout the 20th century and its abrupt reversal following 
the abolition of malapportionment.
Certainly some, if not most, of the growth in these differences can 
be attributed to the explosive growth of population in the United States. 
In 1840, the United States had roughly 17 million people. By 1900, the 
total population had risen to 76 million people. Even though the size of 
the House also grew during this period— primarily to accommodate the 
expanding country— the addition of new House seats failed to keep pace 
with population growth. One way to account for the increased size of 
House districts is to examine the ratio between the least and most populous 
districts. This metric, known as the “ratio of inequality,” helps to normalize 
the levels of inequality over time. To get an idea of how the metric works, 
table 8.1, column 4, presents some examples of the ratio of inequality. For 
example, in 1882, the ratio of inequality in New York, was 2.04 (the largest 
district had 222,718 people, while the smallest had 108,988).
To visualize how extensive these inequalities were in total, figure 8.2 
displays the average ratio of inequality for all states with more than one 
district. Specifically, I generated this figure by calculating the ratio of 
inequality for every state— with more than one district— and then averaged 
across the states to produce a national average. For the sake of comparison 
the figure also shows the average ratio of inequality for the 20th century. 
Throughout the 19th century, the average ratio hovered above 1.4, indicat-
ing that within states the largest district was on average 1.4 times bigger 
than the smallest district.6 We do not see, however, a substantial increase in 
TABLE 8.1. Representative Examples of District Inequalities
  Population in  Population in 
State Year Smallest District Largest District Ratio of Inequality
Ohio 1842 61,572 82,791 1.34
Ohio 1852 78,255 110,697 1.41
Illinois 1862 98,334 144,954 1.47
Indiana 1872 125,729 172,241 1.37
New York 1882 108,988 222,718 2.04
Pennsylvania 1892 129,764 309,986 2.38
Source: Compiled by the author from data presented in Parsons, Beach, and Dubin 1986 and Parsons, 
Dubin, and Parsons 1990.
fig. 8.1. average differences in population between smallest and largest 
congressional districts within a state, 1842– 1982. the figure shows the average 
difference between the smallest and largest populated districts following 
reapportionment years (years in ending in “2”). (data for the period between 
1842 and 1902 compiled by the author from data presented in Parsons, beach, 
and dubin 1986; and Parsons, dubin, and Parsons 1990. data from 1912 to 
1982 was collected from various issues of the Congressional directory.)
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the ratio of inequality during the 19th century. Although absolute popula-
tion differences increased steadily over this time, the ratio of these differ-
ences largely held firm. If anything, the ratio of inequality dipped slightly 
between 1850 and 1900. In the 20th century, however, one sees a surge in 
inequality and its eradication following the 1960s reapportionment revolu-
tion. The rise of malapportionment in the 20th century is explored more 
closely in chapter 9.
While the ratio of inequality effectively detects large discrepancies in 
district size within states, it can be a misleading indicator of the overall 
distribution of population differences— by definition it tracks outliers. 
Another commonly used metric of malapportionment is to examine the 
extent to which districts deviate from the state average. This measure, 
known as “population deviation,” is widely used by the courts to evaluate 
modern redistricting plans. It is calculated by determining how much each 
district deviates from the state mean and then averaging across those devia-
tions.7 Specifically, it is measured as follows:
fig. 8.2. the average ratio of inequality, 1842– 1982. (data for the period 
between 1842 and 1902 was compiled by the author from data presented in 
Parsons, beach, and dubin 1986; and Parsons, dubin, and Parsons 1990. data 
from 1912 to 1982 was collected from various issues of the Congressional 
directory.)
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Population Deviation =  |[(District Population − Population in State)/
(Population in State)] × 100|
A state with equal population across districts, for instance, would have a 
population deviation of zero. To produce a national measure of population 
deviation, I calculate the average of these state- level averages (weighting by 
the size of each state).
Figure 8.3 displays the nationwide average population deviation by 
decade between 1842 and 1982 (excluding at- large districts and single- 
seat states). For the period between 1842 and 1902, the average deviation 
was at its highest in the 1860s when it was just under 10 percent. The 
average deviation dipped to around 7 percent between 1872 and 1900 and 
then picked back up beginning with the apportionment of 1902.8 Again, 
we also see that malapportionment gained steam during the early to mid- 
20th century. Thus, whether measured by differences between largest and 
smallest districts, or population deviations, congressional districts in the 
19th century were by no means equal. The question now becomes whether 
or not these population inequalities correlated with partisan outcomes. 
fig. 8.3. average population deviation, 1842– 1982. (data for the period between 
1842 and 1902 was compiled by the author from data presented in Parsons, 
beach, and dubin 1986; and Parsons, dubin, and Parsons 1990. data from 1912 
to 1982 was collected from various issues of the Congressional directory.)
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Even though districts may have differed in size, this does not necessarily 
mean that one party (or faction) was gaining at the expense of the other. In 
the next section, I examine the extent to which partisan mapmakers used 
malapportionment as a tool for partisan advantage.
Malapportionment as a Partisan Strategy
For malapportionment to have partisan consequences, two conditions have 
to be met. First, there must be some inequality in population between dis-
tricts. The previous section has established that population inequalities 
were present throughout the 19th century. Second, these inequalities must 
be correlated with the partisan distribution of voters across districts. For 
instance, malapportionment benefiting Republicans would occur when the 
districts won by Republicans were, on average, smaller than districts won 
by Democrats. As a consequence, in this example, Republicans would pay 
less in votes for the seats they won relative to how much Democrats had to 
pay for their seats.9
In the era before one- person one- vote, partisan biases from malappor-
tionment generally arose under two scenarios. The first was the conscious 
manipulation of districts by strategic mapmakers. A standard strategic use 
of malapportionment was for the dominant party to create districts of 
small size that it won while stacking their opponents in districts of much 
greater size. This forced the opposition to waste a greater proportion 
of its votes, hence producing a bias in favor of the party that controlled 
the smaller constituencies. Two well- known examples of this strategy are 
Great Britain’s rotten boroughs before the Reform Act of 1832 and, in the 
United States, Republicans’ strategic admission of sparsely populated, yet 
staunchly Republican, western states after the Civil War to stack the Senate 
(Stewart and Weingast 1992).
A second, complimentary, way in which malapportionment produced 
partisan biases arose when states failed to readjust their district bound-
aries to account for population changes and instead allowed population 
disparities to accumulate over time. If a state did not gain or lose seats in 
the decennial apportionment, there was no requirement that they redraw 
district boundaries. Even if a state gained seats they sometimes chose not 
to redistrict and instead placed their newly gained seats into statewide at- 
large districts. As a consequence, some states went decades without redraw-
ing district boundaries. Following the reapportionment of 1892, for exam-
ple, 17 of the 38 states with more than one House seat failed to redistrict. 
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Gross population inequalities often resulted from this deliberate neglect. 
And when the changes in district sizes correlated with the partisanship of 
the district, partisan biases emerged.
Consider the case of Connecticut. With a constant four congressional 
seats between 1842 and 1912, there was no outside prod for Connecticut 
to reconfigure its districts. Consequently, Connecticut did not redraw its 
district boundaries during this 70- year period. The result was a district-
ing arrangement that, over time, produced dramatic population— and ulti-
mately pro- Republican— disparities. Connecticut’s 2nd District, containing 
New Haven, consistently had a larger population than the other districts. 
By 1900, the rural 3rd District had a population of only 130,000, whereas 
the 2nd District had over 300,000 people. This discrepancy worked quite 
well for Republicans. Between 1842 and 1912, not a single Democrat was 
ever elected from the small 3rd District, while Democratic strength in the 
state was heavily concentrated, and inefficiently wasted, in the much larger 
2nd District. Because Whigs and then Republicans dominated the lower 
house of the state legislature (itself egregiously malapportioned), they 
effectively blocked any changes to the status quo.10
This example suggests that at least some politicians were well aware of 
the possible partisan gains from strategic malapportionment. To address 
whether the use of malapportionment for partisan gain was a more widely 
used strategy, I tested whether or not deviations in district size correlated 
with party control of the mapmaking process. If parties were using malap-
portionment for partisan gain, then we should expect that in states where 
Democrats created the districting plans, Democratic districts will on aver-
age be smaller than districts won by Republicans, and vice versa. To test the 
above expectation, I estimated the following equation:
Population Deviationijt = αj + β1Democratic Districtijt + β2Republican/Whig 
Planjt + β3Bipartisan Planjt + β4Democratic Planjt + β5Democratic Districtijt 
× Republican/Whig Planjt + β6Democratic Districtijt × Bipartisan Planjt + εijt
The dependent variable (Population Deviationijt) is the percentage devia-
tion of congressional district i in state j at time t. Negative values indicate 
the district is smaller than the state average and positive values indicate 
the district is larger average districts. The key independent variables are 
whether the district was won by Democrats, and a series of dummy vari-
ables indicating which party was responsible for drawing the district lines. 
The Democratic District variable takes a value of 1 if Democrats won dis-
trict i in state j at time t and zero if Republicans (or Whigs) won. Repub-
lican/Whig Plan, Bipartisan Plan, and Democratic Plan indicate which type 
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of plan existed in state j at time t. The coefficient β1 measures the size 
of Democratic- held districts operating under a redistricting plan cre-
ated by Democrats. The expectation is that this coefficient will be nega-
tive, indicating that Democratic districts are, on average, smaller than 
Republican/Whig districts operating under a Democratic plan. Likewise, 
a positive coefficient (β5) for the interaction between Democratic districts 
and Republican/Whig redistricting plans would indicate that Democrats 
received larger districts when drawn by a Republican/Whig regime.
I estimated the above equation using Ordinary Least Squares. Because 
districts within a state are not independent, I clustered the standard errors 
by state. In addition, state fixed effects (the αj coefficients) are included. I 
excluded states with only one seat and any at- large districts.
The results presented in table 8.2 provide clear evidence of partisan-
ship guiding district sizes. The first column displays the results for every 
year between 1840 and 1900. Here we find that deviations in district pop-
ulation varied directly with party control of the districting process. The 
coefficient for the Democratic District variable is negative and significant 
(−1.11). Thus, under Democratic plans, districts won by Democrats were 
smaller, on average, than Republican/Whig districts. Moreover, under 
Republican/Whig plans, Democratic districts were significantly larger, as 
indicated by the positive and significant coefficient on the Republican/Whig 
Plan × Democratic District interaction. In other words, under Republican/
TABLE 8.2. The Impact of Party Control of Districting on Congressional District 
Size, 1840– 1900 (dependent variable = population deviation [%] of district from 
statewide average; OLS, clustered by state with robust standard errors)
 All Years Redistricting Years
Democratic District −1.11** −.92*
 (.55) (.53)
Democratic District × Republican/Whig Plan 3.01** 2.06**
 (1.38) (.99)
Democratic District x Bipartisan Plan 1.22 1.97
 (1.40) (1.89)
Republican/Whig Plan −1.33** −.98**
 (.52) (.46)




Number of Observations 7,741 1,550
R2 .003 .002
Note: State fixed effects were also estimated but not reported. Robust standard errors 
clustered by state are in parentheses.
**p < .05; *p < .10.
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Whig plans, Democratic districts increased in size. The overall difference 
between these two scenarios meant a deviation of 4.14 percent. In 1872, 
for example, a population deviation of this size would have translated into a 
difference in district population of about 10,000 people (where the average 
district size was roughly 138,000).
The second column of table 8.2 presents the results for just those 
state- years immediately following a redistricting. Here again the pattern 
of results is the same, although the size of the key coefficients decreased 
slightly.11 Again, under Democratic plans, districts won by Democrats were, 
on average, smaller than when drawn by Republicans (or Whigs). Here the 
difference in size between Democratic and Republican/Whig districts was 
2.98 percent. This slightly smaller value for years immediately following 
a redistricting suggests two things. First, redistricting parties deliberately 
used malapportionment to stack the deck in their favor. Second, the initial 
biases from malapportionment engineered at the time of a redistricting 
persisted into the future and likely continued to grow with time.
Overall, both sets of results are consistent with the hypothesis that the 
apportionment of congressional districts correlated with party control of 
the districting process. When Democrats controlled the maps, they created 
smaller districts for themselves. When Republicans/Whigs drew the maps, 
Democratic districts grew. In the next section, I examine whether these 
discrepancies in size led to electoral biases favoring one party over another 
at the national level.
Malapportionment, Gerrymandering, and Partisan Bias
Did malapportionment affect the partisan composition of state congres-
sional delegations and possibly influence the national party balance in the 
House? To answer this question, in this section I analyze the impact of 
malapportionment on the translation of votes into seats. Malapportionment 
will produce partisan bias when one party dominates smaller constituencies 
while the other party’s voters are concentrated in larger constituencies. In 
this case, partisan bias would favor the party winning the smaller constitu-
encies. They would pay less for “their” districts than the opposition.
One way to examine this empirically is to look at the difference between 
the average vote proportion a party receives when all districts are treated 
equally and the vote proportion they receive when districts are weighted 
by population. To see how this works, table 8.3 presents a hypothetical state 
with three congressional districts. The rows display the raw numbers of 
votes for each party along with their district level percentages. So, Demo-
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crats win the first two districts with 57 percent of the vote and lose the final 
with 33 percent of the vote. The simple average of these district percentages 
is 49 percent. But this averaging treats each district equally. In other words, 
it assumes that each district contains 33.3 percent of the overall state popu-
lation. But as the table indicates, the number of persons differs considerably 
across districts. In districts won by Democrats there are 70,000 voters, and 
in the lone district won by Republicans there are 150,000 voters. Each pro- 
Democratic district accounts for 24 percent of state population, while the 
lone Republican district accounts for 52 percent.
To account for these differences in population size, one can weight each 
of the district vote percentages by its proportion of overall state popula-
tion. This calculation yields a malapportionment adjusted measure of vot-
ing strength. In the example just presented, this weighted vote share yields 
a Democratic value of 45 percent (i.e., (57 × .24) + (57 × .24) + (33 × .52) 
= 44.25). The difference between the unweighted and weighted averages 
tells us the size and direction of vote distortion attributable to malappor-
tionment. A positive value indicates that Democrats were overrepresented, 
while negative values mean that Democrats were underrepresented. Thus, 
in this example, malapportionment accounts for a vote distortion of 4 per-
cent in favor of Democrats.
To assess the partisan impact of malapportionment, I calculated the vote 
distortion state by state. I then regressed this measure on an independent 
variable indicating the partisanship of those responsible for drawing the 
new districts. This variable, Partisanship, takes a value of +1 for Democratic 
plans, 0 for Bipartisan plans, and −1 for Republican/Whig plans. If par-
ties were apportioning populations to stack their congressional delegation, 
then this variable should be positive. In addition, the number of congres-
sional seats in the state is included as a control variable. The regressions 
were run using weighted least squares, with the number of districts in the 
state serving as the weight.
The results, presented in table 8.4, indicate that party control of dis-
TABLE 8.3. An Example of Malapportionment Bias
 Democrats Republicans
District 1  40,000 (57%)  30,000 (43%)
District 2  40,000 (57%)  30,000 (43%)
District 3  50,000 (33%) 100,000 (67%)
Total Votes 130,000 160,000
Unweighted Average     49%      51%
Weighted Average     45%      55%
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tricting did indeed correlate with malapportionment bias. The first column 
presents the results for all years between 1842 and 1900. The coefficient 
for Partisanship is positive and significant. The value of the coefficient, 
.48, indicates that going from a Republican/Whig plan to a Democratic 
plan increased the intended pro- Democratic distortion by .96 percentage 
points. Column 2 presents results solely for elections immediately follow-
ing a redistricting. The Partisanship variable is again positive and significant 
with a value of .39. Thus, moving from a Republican/Whig to Democratic 
plan increased pro- Democratic distortion by .78 percentage points. Over-
all, these results provide further evidence that political parties used malap-
portionment to stack the electoral deck in their favor.
The next question is how much this affected overall levels of national 
bias. It would not matter much of these vote distortions had little effect on 
the number of seats a party wins. One approach might be to look at the 
number of seats a party could expect to win with various vote share met-
rics (i.e., weighted versus unweighted) and compare those with reality. In 
the earlier example, for instance, Democrats won 66 percent of the seats. 
With 49 percent of the vote, one would say that the state had a 17 percent 
pro- Democratic bias based on the distribution of partisan voting strength 
across districts. With 45 percent of the vote (i.e., the weighted average 
vote), bias was, therefore, 21 percent. The difference between these two 
values— here 4 percent— would tell us how much bias was the result of 
malapportionment. This approach would be straightforward. But as seen in 
previous chapters, the slope of the vote- seat relationship in most states was 
far from linear. Parties that received more than 50 percent of the vote often 
have their seat shares rise nonlinearly. This is a regular feature of single- 
member plurality systems, and was certainly true in the 19th century. Thus, 
TABLE 8.4. Vote Distortion from Malapportionment
 All Years Redistricting Years
Partisanship .48* .39*
 (.10) (.22)






Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .10.
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we also need to control for the nonlinear slopes of these vote- seat transla-
tions. In other words, we need to find an estimate of partisan bias from 
malapportionment that also takes into account the nonlinear swing ratios 
of 19th- century elections.
Recall that in earlier chapters, we estimated the relationship between 
votes and seats using the following equation:
ln(sit /(1 − sit)) = λ + ρ(ln(vit /(1 − vit)))
We can get a handle on the impact of malapportionment by estimating the 
this equation twice. First, for each state- year, we can insert the unweighted 
average of the vote received by Democrats for vit. Estimating a vote- seat 
equation with the unweighted Democratic proportion of the vote provides 
a measure of partisan bias after purging any bias due to malapportionment. 
In the second equation, we substitute in the population- weighted aver-
age of the Democratic vote for vit. Estimating a vote- seat equation with a 
population- weighted Democratic vote proportion provides a measure of 
partisan bias that includes malapportionment. Examining the different val-
ues of partisan bias across these two equations will provide an idea of how 
much malapportionment contributed to any overall bias in the electoral 
system.
The results are presented in table 8.5. Using the unweighted average 
produces an overall pro- Republican/Whig bias of 3.24 percent. Recall that 
this coefficient captures the size of partisan bias after purging malappor-
tionment considerations. Thus, at an even 50– 50 split of the vote, Repub-
licans (or Whigs) could expect to win 53.24 percent of the seats. The 
weighted average results, presented in column 2, show a pro- Republican/
TABLE 8.5. Vote- Seat Relationship Using the Two Different Vote Metrics, 
1842– 1900
 Unweighted Vote Average Weighted Vote Average
Partisan Bias −3.24* −4.12*
 (.51) (.89)





Log- Likelihood −3,574.88 −3,616.19
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .10.
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Whig bias of 4.12 percent. With 50 percent of the vote, Republicans could 
expect 54.12 percent of seats. Thus, taking malapportionment into account 
slightly increased the estimate of partisan bias. Malapportionment pro-
vided Republicans/Whigs, in the aggregate, with a small extra bump. The 
differences between these two values, however, are not overly pronounced. 
Although with two separate equations we cannot test the statistical signifi-
cance of the difference between the estimates, the substantive differences 
remain slight. Thus, it would appear that most of the bias in this era arose 
from the allocation of partisan- voting strength across districts. This is con-
sistent with findings for more recent eras in American politics which, for 
example, demonstrate that gerrymandering, and not malapportionment, 
was the main source of bias in the years leading up to the reapportionment 
revolution (Erikson 1972; Sickels 1966).
Conclusion
The Supreme Court decisions of the 1960s forbade the malapportion-
ment of legislative districts. Not only did these decisions prompt a radi-
cal redrawing of state and congressional districts throughout the country, 
they have shaped the line- drawing process ever since. In congressional 
districting, for instance, the current standard implemented by the courts 
is nearly zero- population deviation. Because the courts have, for the most 
part, eliminated variation in district sizes, it can be difficult to determine 
how much the one- person, one- vote rule hampers the ability of modern 
mapmakers to gerrymander.
One way to discern the impact of one- person, one- vote is to examine 
a period in which states were free to ignore population equality. In this 
chapter, I have examined the causes and consequences of malapportion-
ment during the 19th century. Did mapmakers use malapportionment for 
party advantage? If so, how much did malapportionment contribute to 
the partisan bias of the electoral system? In this chapter, I have explored 
the extent and impact of malapportioned districts on the 19th- century 
House of Representatives. Equal population between congressional dis-
tricts was never enforced, nor achieved. Whether one compares the largest 
and smallest districts in a state, or examines population deviations, 19th- 
and early 20th- century House districts varied considerably in size. Sec-
ond, these deviations directly correlated in a predictable, partisan fashion. 
Parties in control of the districting process created smaller constituencies 
for themselves, and larger districts for the opposition. Third, these varia-
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tions in district size led to partisan biases that, along with gerrymandering, 
aggregated across states, leading to biases in the House of Representatives.
These finding serve as an important lesson for contemporary political 
and legal attempts to remedy “unfair” districting schemes. When it comes 
to drawing district lines, the judiciary has directed its ire almost entirely 
at malapportionment. The current preoccupation of the courts with strict 
population equality ignores other— potentially just as harmful— forms of 
electoral manipulation. Looking back to the 19th century informs us that 
malapportionment was not the most important source of partisan bias— 
gerrymandering was. Malapportionment made partisan bias worse, but 
bias would have existed without it.

Part iii
Redistricting in the  





From Turbulence to Stasis,  
1900– 1964
As previous chapters have shown, the U.S. Congress of the 19th century 
was highly turbulent. Careers were short. Partisan majorities rarely lasted 
long. Small shifts in the national vote produced immense changes in party 
ratios. By the early 20th century, however, things had changed radically 
and permanently. Congressional careers extended into decades. Partisan 
majorities tended to remain steady. Indeed, the difference between the 
Congress of the 1880s and the Congress of the 1920s was arguably further 
than the gap between the 1920s and the present. Out of this transformation 
emerged the structure of modern American politics.
Central to this transformation was a drastic decline in both partisan 
swings and legislative turnover. Between 1900 and 1960, for example, 
majority control of the House turned over seven times. Of these, four 
episodes were concentrated between 1946 and 1952 when Republicans 
briefly gained control of the House only to lose it back two years later 
(the 80th and 83rd Congresses). Aside from these brief Republican inter-
regnums, Democratic control of the House after the 1930 election was 
incredibly stable. Notably, the 40- year period from 1954 to 1994 consti-
tuted an uninterrupted stretch of Democratic dominance in the House. By 
contrast, between 1840 and 1900, majority control of the House flipped 
11 times. And the longest any party held continuous control of the House 
was the 16- year period of Republican rule between the elections of 1858 
and 1874. The decline of partisan turnover was also matched by a decline 
in individual- level turnover. By the end of the 20th century, the percent-
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age of members seeking and winning reelection to the House had reached 
upwards of 90 percent.
Out of these changes in electoral politics emerged the foundations 
of modern congressional politics. To take one example, stable partisan 
regimes and stable legislative careers fostered the development of seniority 
norms in assigning the all- important committee chairmanships. Members 
pursuing constituent interests and crafting long- term relationships with 
their colleagues characterized a fundamentally different type of Congress 
than the frenzied, party- driven Congress of the 19th century. The profes-
sionalization of the House radiated throughout the rest of the political 
system. Presidents, judges, and federal bureaucrats each had to condition 
and adjust their behavior to the changing environment of this modernized 
House. The professionalized Congress became the “keystone” of the new 
Washington system (Fiorina 1989).
Indeed, one can view the enormous scholarly literature on modern con-
gressional politics as a search to explain the causes and consequences of this 
candidate- centered system. The vast literatures on incumbency advantage, 
campaign finance, the policy pork barrel, and electoral accountability can 
all be placed under this scholarly umbrella. Thus, while the basic pillars 
of the modern Congress were forged in the early to mid- 20th century, 
a number of essential questions remained unanswered. Why did partisan 
and individual turnover diminish in the early 20th century? And why did 
turnover remain so low thereafter?
Scholars have searched widely to explain the differences between 19th- 
and 20th- century politics. The most prominent narrative has followed 
in the footsteps of Burnham’s highly influential research. Burnham, and 
his many followers, argued the presidential election of 1896 fundamen-
tally altered voter behavior and partisan alignments. Citizens became less 
attached to the parties. The widespread victories of Republicans in the 
North and Democrats in the South turned these regions into the politi-
cal preserves of one party. The result was to create a favorable climate 
for incumbents to run and win reelection at rapidly increasing rates. Safe 
districts facilitate easy election. But as seen in previous chapters, there is 
ample reason to be skeptical of claims about the 1894 or 1896 election as 
representing a fundamental shift in voter sentiments.
A second narrative emphasizes a gradual modernization of Congress. 
This narrative follows in the influential footsteps of Nelson Polsby (1969). 
The growth of federal- government power and more potent policy instru-
ments enhanced the attractiveness of Washington to politicians. Where 
once political power resided in the state capitals, integration of the national 
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economy and the vastly greater role of the federal government in regulat-
ing the economy turned Washington from a relative backwater into the 
seat of power. The gravitational pull of Washington impelled members of 
Congress to desire election. The increasing scope of the federal govern-
ment also gave members of Congress access to policy instruments— such 
as the pork barrel and casework— that, strategically deployed, secured their 
continual reelection (e.g., Katz and Sala 1996).
We see in this chapter that gerrymandering played a foundational 
role in shaping the 20th- century professionalization of Congress. First, 
redistricting happened less often. Second, when redistricting happened it 
was less radical in its consequences. Just as the potent gerrymandering of 
the 19th century fomented a tumultuous House of Representatives, the 
decline of partisan gerrymandering in the early to mid- 20th century set 
down the building blocks for the stability and modernization that took 
over the 20th- century House. Applying the tools of the prior chapters we 
can explore how changes in redistricting strategies shaped political behav-
ior and ideological coalitions after 1900. These changes profoundly altered 
the structural basis of congressional elections and, in turn, the politics and 
policy of the House.
The transformation of gerrymandering also had enormous conse-
quences for federal policy making. To take one example, the bias stemming 
from malapportionment gave extra voting weight to rural interests at the 
expense of metropolitan interests. In terms of legislative policy making, 
this electoral bias fed a policy making bias toward rural and agricultural 
interests and away from policies favored by metropolitan areas (Ansolabe-
here and Snyder 2008; McCubbins and Schwarz 1988). For instance, fed-
eral dollars were steered toward farm supports and agricultural subsidies at 
the expense of school- lunch programs and urban transportation (McCub-
bins and Schwarz 1988). As more citizens moved into metropolitan areas, 
the failure of state legislatures to readjust congressional district boundaries 
meant that federal spending lagged behind where citizens actually lived. 
This is but one example of how the electoral system shaped political and 
economic life in the 20th century.
Internally, the absence of partisan turnover combined with the 
decline of legislative turnover— both a consequence of the slowdown in 
redistricting— transformed the distribution of power within the House. 
For example, one can see the powerful effect that non- redistricting had by 
looking at the chairmen of the three prestige committees during the 1950s 
and 1960s: Ways and Means, Appropriations, and Rules. Consider, for 
example, the House Committee on Ways and Means. During the 1950s, 
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1960s, and 1970s the chairmanship of this powerful committee was held 
by the Democrat Wilbur Mills. Mills was from Arkansas, which had redis-
tricted in 1902 and then only again in 1952. Having entered the House in 
1937, the stable district boundaries fostered Mills’ legislative ascent.
The chair of the House Committee on Appropriations during the mid- 
20th century was Clarence Cannon (D- MO). Cannon served either as the 
chair or ranking minority member of the Appropriations Committee from 
1941 to 1964. A Democrat from Missouri, the state redistricted only four 
times between 1900 and 1960; and every one of those remaps was a solid 
pro- Democratic plan. Cannon, therefore, was never in jeopardy of losing 
his district to a hostile remap. Or consider the powerful Democratic chair 
of the House Committee on Rules— Howard W. Smith from Virginia. 
Smith served as the Rules chair from 1955 to 1967, from which he famously 
worked to bottle up civil rights legislation. Smith was originally elected in 
1930 and accrued the necessary seniority to assume the chairmanship of 
this all- important committee. Critical to accumulating such seniority were 
the incredibly stable district boundaries of Virginia— the state redrew its 
district boundaries only three times between 1900 and 1960.
Thus, all of these powerbrokers had one thing in common— they came 
from states where they were rarely, if ever, in jeopardy of losing their dis-
trict to a hostile remap. To understand the differences between the House 
of the 19th and 20th centuries, therefore, one must understand the differ-
ences between redistricting past and present.
The Changing Nature of Gerrymandering
Our comparison begins with the frequency of redistricting. As seen in pre-
vious chapters, the timing of redistricting shaped electoral and policy out-
comes throughout the 19th century. States could redistrict whenever they 
wanted, and, in many cases, states redistricted often. In chapter 3, we found 
that gerrymandering throughout the 19th century was frequent in many 
states (e.g., Ohio, Indiana). Between 1840 and 1900, there were only two 
years in which at least one state did not redistrict. The strategic timing of 
redistricting altered party ratios in the House, changed ideological align-
ments, and shaped individual political- career decisions. Strategically timed 
mid- decade remaps, for example, altered majority control of the House 
during the Gilded Age, and, hence, the historical policy trajectory of the 
United States. The frequency and variability of redistricting also rendered 
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it very difficult for individual representatives to fashion a long career in the 
House. Redistricting could come at any time.
But if the issue in the 19th century was too much redistricting, in the 
20th century it became too little redistricting. As seen in chapter 4 (see 
fig. 4.1), the 20th century witnessed a precipitous decline in the frequency 
of redistricting. To get a sense of the 20th- century drop- off in redistrict-
ing, figure 9.1 reproduces part of the data previously presented in figure 
4.1, but here just focusing on the years between 1902 and 1962. The fig-
ure shows that in most reapportionment years, less than half of the states 
redrew congressional district boundaries. Moreover, the number of mid- 
decade redistricting events significantly declined.
But even this figure masks, to some degree, the calcification of district 
lines. There are numerous examples of states essentially opting out of the 
redistricting process. Wisconsin redistricted in 1932, and not again until 
1962. Illinois redrew in 1902, and then only again in 1948. Indiana went 
from 1942 to 1964 with the same district map. Connecticut redrew its 
boundaries in 1912, and not again until 1962.1 Perhaps no state was more 
striking in this regard than Ohio. As seen in earlier chapters, Ohio redrew 
fig. 9.1. the declining frequency of redistricting, 1900– 1962. (data compiled by 
the author from information contained in martis 1982.)
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district boundaries on an almost biannual basis in the 1870s and 1880s. 
These gerrymanders tilted the balance of political power in Ohio, and, as 
a consequence, tilted the balance of political power in Washington, DC. 
During the 20th century, by contrast, this former hotbed of gerrymander-
ing nearly dropped out of the redistricting game altogether. Notably, the 
state went 40 years between redistricting events (1914– 52).
The slowdown of redistricting had profound consequences for the 
development of Congress, and continues to cast a long shadow on con-
temporary politics. To take one example, congressional careerism became 
fully entrenched in the years between 1900 and 1960. By 1960, over 90 
percent of incumbents were running for reelection and winning. Gerry-
mandering— or, more accurately, the decline of gerrymandering— provides 
one of the keys to explaining this puzzling development. Because district 
lines remained static, incumbents found it much easier to plan and build 
a career in the House. They had some probability of actually controlling 
their district for long stretches. The uncertainty of when a redistricting 
might occur had largely been removed. The emergence of careerism has 
long been considered the primary factor behind the modernization of the 
House. Thus, to understand the evolution of modern American politics, 
one needs to answer a basic, but rarely asked, question: why did the fre-
quency of redistricting decline so sharply?
A number of reasons suggest themselves. But perhaps the most impor-
tant factor was the dramatic decline of party competition in the state leg-
islatures. Following the landslide elections of the mid- 1890s, many state 
legislatures became the political preserves of a single party (Schattschnei-
der 1960). Where one party dominated a state legislature the incentives 
to gerrymander dissipated. There is little reason to tinker with a district 
map that is already producing numerous party victories. This logic was 
most obvious in the South, where Republicans ceased to exist as a mean-
ingful party organization. In Louisiana, for example, Democrats occupied 
every single seat in the state legislature from 1900 to 1964. It should there-
fore come as no surprise that Louisiana went over 50 years with the same 
congressional- district boundaries (1912– 66).
The demise of vigorous party competition, however, was not confined to 
the South. Party ratios in many Northern state legislatures, for significant 
chunks of the early 20th century, were just as out of balance. In Michigan, 
Republicans controlled every single seat in the state senate between 1918 
and 1928. In Pennsylvania, Republicans controlled, on average, 83 percent 
of the seats in the Pennsylvania state assembly between 1910 and 1932.
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Without the prod of a federal reapportionment, the incentives to redistrict 
where one party dominated state government were essentially nonexistent. 
The sharp decline of competition within state legislatures can be seen in 
figure 9.2 which displays the average absolute difference in state legislative 
seat shares between Democrats and Republicans (or Whigs). The top and 
bottom panels present the data for lower and upper chambers, respectively. 
As one can see, there is a noticeable uptick in the seat differences over the 
course of late 19th and early 20th centuries.
As seen in chapter 3, absent a change in seat share from the decadal fed-
eral reapportionment, the key factor triggering a redistricting was a switch 
in party control of state government. When a new party came into control 
of state government, and the prior congressional- district map was drawn 
by the opposition party, the probability of redrawn congressional districts 
grew. Thus, the frequency with which partisan turnover of state govern-
ment happened in the 19th century goes a long way toward explaining 
the frequency and partisanship of congressional redistricting in that era. 
fig. 9.2. Competition in u.s. state legislatures, 1840– 2010. the figure displays the 
average absolute difference between democrats and republicans (or whigs) in 
state legislatures between 1840 and 2010. (data compiled by the author from 
burnham 1985 for 1840– 1940 and the Book of the States for 1942– 2010.)
174 Partisan Gerrymandering and the Construction of american democracy 
In the 20th century, these transitions of state party control substantially 
diminished.
The one outside prod, therefore, to redistricting, was a change in a 
states House delegation size resulting from a federal reapportionment. But 
even here the changing demographics of the country worked toward mini-
mizing the frequency of redistricting. The growing movement of people 
into urban areas, both through external and internal migration, fostered a 
burgeoning split between rural and urban districts. This cleavage became 
the focal point around which many redistricting battles turned. The influx 
of immigration, coupled with the Industrial Revolution, spurred tremen-
dous growth in America’s cities. In 1840, 10.8 percent of the population 
lived in urban areas. By 1910, this number had jumped to 46.3 percent. 
Entrenched rural interests within state legislatures were naturally reluctant 
to relinquish power. As a result, many states avoided redistricting.
The split between rural and urban interests came to a head in Congress 
following the 1920 census. This census confirmed the growth of cities rela-
tive to rural areas of the country. It was the first census in which urban pop-
ulations outstripped rural populations. This population shift also portended 
a profound shift of representation from states with large rural populations 
to states with urban centers. When it came time to reapportion, many mem-
bers of Congress objected. Members from states that were bound to lose 
seats— mostly from rural- dominated states— headed this opposition (Eagles 
1990). Holding sufficient votes in both the House and Senate, this coalition 
blocked the Apportionment Act’s passage. Thus, for the only time in Ameri-
can history, the country skipped a new apportionment.
While some may see the failure to reapportion in 1920 as a historical 
curiosity, it had enormous consequences for the development of Congress. 
Without the spur of a federal reapportionment, almost every state went 
20 years with the same district boundaries. Only two states— Pennsylvania 
and Colorado— redrew in 1922. Congress eventually reached an agree-
ment for a new apportionment in 1929, although the actual reapportion-
ment and redistricting would then take place following the 1930 census. In 
effect, the structural basis of the House stayed the same for two decades.
Even in those cases where a state gained new seats from federal reap-
portionment and might therefore be compelled into redistricting, the 
reluctance to redraw was abetted by the federal provision that allowed 
states to elect any newly gained seats in statewide at- large districts rather 
than reconfigure the entire state map. For example, from 1912 to 1946, 
rather than redraw their district boundaries, Illinois elected two members 
in at- large elections.
The upshot of these decisions, or nondecisions, can clearly be seen in 
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figure 9.3. This figure plots the average age of redistricting plans at the 
beginning of each decade. In 1850, the average age of redistricting maps 
was 6 years. By 1930, the average age of redistricting maps was 21 years. 
This pattern continued throughout the next decades. Indeed, in 1960, on 
the eve of the reapportionment revolution, the average age of state- district 
maps remained inched up to 22 years. In this slowdown lie the roots of 
modern congressional politics. The decline of vigorous redistricting had 
profound consequences on the partisan impact of gerrymandering, the 
evolution of candidate- centered politics, and the evolution of congressio-
nal policy making. The rest of this chapter highlights three major conse-
quences of the redistricting slow down: the decline of partisan turnover, 
the emergence of careerism, and the growth of malapportionment. These 
structural features of the electoral system would only be refashioned with 
the entry of the federal judiciary into the political thicket.
The Partisan Impact of Redistricting
A central consequence of the decline of state legislative turnover, hence, 
was a change not just in the frequency of redistricting but also in the mag-
nitude of its impact. Gerrymandering became much less virulent than it 
fig. 9.3. the increasing age of redistricting plans. the figure displays the average 
age, in years, of redistricting plans at the beginning of each decade. for example, 
in 1960 the average age of congressional district maps was 22 years.
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had in the 19th century. In particular, instances where one party replaced 
the map of another party happened much less often. One way to see the 
diminished virulence of redistricting is to look at the partisan transi-
tions between redistricting plans. How often was a pro- Democratic plan 
replaced by a pro- Republican plan, and vice versa?
These transitions are where maps have the most transformative par-
tisan impact. For example, in 1886, Republicans in Ohio turned a 10– 
11 congressional delegation deficit into a 16– 5 majority by replacing a 
Democratic- drawn map with one of their own. As the numbers in table 9.1 
indicate, these types of transformative gerrymanders sharply declined in 
the 20th century. Between 1840 and 1900 there were 45 wholesale partisan 
transitions— cases where one party had a map replaced by a map drawn 
by the opposite party. This type of transition accounted for 34 percent of 
the redistricting plans in the 19th century. By contrast, between 1900 and 
1962 there were only 16 such transitions, accounting for 13 percent of the 
redistricting plans between 1900 and 1962.
We can also see the decline of transformative gerrymanders in the num-
ber of redistricting maps that simply maintained the status quo. In other 
words, how many redistricting plans were cases where the party that drew 
the prior map also created the new map? The numbers to answer this ques-
tion are also presented in table 9.1. Before 1900, 52 percent of the plans 
either maintained or enhanced the status quo. After 1900, 65 percent of 
the plans maintained the partisan status quo. Further evidence of changes 
in the types of gerrymanders can be seen in the slight uptick of bipartisan 
maps (i.e., maps drawn under divided party control of state government). 
In the 19th century, bipartisan plans made up 9 percent of all redistricting, 
while in the 20th they made up 14 percent.
Thus, redistricting was less frequent and less transformative, in the 
short term, than it had been in the 19th century. The preservation of exist-
ing gains became more important than knocking off opponents. This is 
TABLE 9.1. Types of Redistricting Transitions
 D R Bip. Bip. R to D to D to R to Bip. to 
Years to R to D to R to D Bip. Bip. D R Bip. Total
1840– 1898 23 22  4 4  5 2 36 34 3 134
1900– 1962  8  8 10 1 12 2 48 32 3 124 
Note: This table lists the prior plan and the newly drawn redistricting plan. For example, “D 
to R” stands for a plan previously drawn by a Unified Democratic state government that was 
replaced by a plan drawn by a Unified Republican (or Whig) state government. Cell numbers 
are the number of plans that fall into each category.
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not to say that gerrymandering stopped having partisan consequences; far 
from it. The parties that drew district maps continued to profit from care-
fully crafted district lines. Instead, the stable district lines of the 20th cen-
tury became silent gerrymanders. District lines entrenched existing politi-
cal power within states and across the nation.
We can see this in figure 9.4, which plots estimates of the vote- seat 
relationship for different types of congressional maps during the early 
and mid- 20th century. In particular, the figure shows estimates of partisan 
bias and electoral responsiveness for partisan Democratic plans, partisan 
Republican plans, and bipartisan plans. As was done in earlier chapters, the 
unit of analysis is the state. Using data from Martis on the timing of redis-
tricting and data from Burnham on the partisanship of state legislatures, 
I identified the partisanship of the state government at the time in which 
each district map was drawn from 1900 to 1962. I stopped in 1962 because 
this year represented the last round of redistricting before the federal judi-
ciary entered the process and changed the rules of the game.
The results in figure 9.4 show that district lines clearly biased electoral 
outcomes in favor of the party that drew the maps. For Democratic- drawn 
maps, one finds a partisan bias of 9.6 percent. In other words, at 50 percent 
of the vote, Democrats could expect to win 59.6 percent of seats when they 
fig. 9.4. vote to seat translation by type of redistricting plan, 1900– 1962
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had drawn the maps. Republican plans, on the other hand, produced a pro- 
Republican bias of 5.8 percent. At 50 percent of the vote, Republicans won, 
on average, 55.8 percent of the statewide seats. Overall, then, we see that 
partisan maps continued to generate significant amounts of electoral bias.
Of course one might worry that the strong bias found in Democratic 
plans was a result of the near- zero levels of competition in Southern states. 
We can examine this possibility by examining the vote- seat estimates with 
the southern states excluded. The results of this model were largely the 
same. Although the electoral responsiveness increased for Democratic 
plans, as one would expect given the low levels of competition in the South, 
there was still a positive and significant amount of bias in favor of Demo-
crats in the non- southern states. The bias for Democratic plans in non- 
southern states was 10.1 percent, which is comparable to the results when 
all the states are included in the sample.
All told then, even though parties refrained from constantly tinkering 
with district boundaries, the maps of the 20th century still had substantial 
partisan consequences at the state level. Because state legislatures chose not 
to redraw boundaries nearly as often, this bias persisted for long stretches 
of time. The next question is to what extent these state level biases aggre-
gated into national political power. One way to assess this is to examine the 
partisan balance of districts maps across the century.
Figure 9.5 plots the percentage of House districts under the different 
types of districting plan. For example, in 1912, 47 percent of House dis-
tricts had been drawn by Democrats and 43 percent by Republicans, with 
the remaining districts either drawn by a divided government or a single- 
district state. This advantage at the state level then translated into pro- 
Democratic effects nationally. Even during the 1920s, when Democrats 
found themselves in the minority, their seat shares still tended to be larger 
than their vote shares warranted. The real payoff, however, from the Dem-
ocratic district- level advantage came in the 1930s. The results of figure 9.5 
along with the results on partisan bias, suggest that the New Deal majori-
ties in the 1930s owed much favorable district lines. Democrats very likely 
would have been in the majority regardless, given their sizable vote shares, 
but their seat shares were even larger than their vote share warranted.
Beginning in the 1940s and continuing up to the 1960s, one sees a shift 
toward Republicans (Figure 9.5). Republican gains in the North and Mid-
west put them in position to reverse the Democratic advantage in district 
maps. The result was a closer correspondence between actuality and an 
unbiased system nationally. Strong pro- Democratic bias in the South and 
border states was matched with pro- Republican bias in the North and 
Midwest. This result meshes with previous studies such as Cox and Katz 
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(2001) and Erikson (1972) which also uncovered a strong pro- Republican 
bias outside of the South from 1942 through 1962. Much of this bias can be 
attributed to the Republican advantage in district maps. Throughout the 
North, Republicans held a substantial edge in the number of districts that 
were drawn by Republican redistricting regimes after 1940.
Of course, one natural question is: if there was a pro- Republican bias, 
why did Democrats control the House for most of the 20th century? The 
answer is that where there were Democratic plans, they fully maximized 
the number of seats they won. Obviously, this was the case in the South. 
But even in the border states, and in various western states, Democrats 
dominated congressional election outcomes. Thus, as long as Democrats 
put up a decent showing in the Midwest and Northeast, they would control 
the House (Ware 2006).
The Age of Malapportionment
Coupled with the rise of silent gerrymanders in the early and mid- 20th 
century was a substantial rise in malapportionment. Rather than tinker with 
fig. 9.5. the percentage of house districts under different partisan maps, 1900– 
1962. the figure presents the percentage of house districts in states with 
democratic drawn maps, republican drawn maps, and maps drawn during 
periods of divided party control (bipartisan). states with only one district 
constitute the remainder but are not plotted in this figure.
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districts in the search for an electoral advantage, partisan state legislators 
could let demographics do the work for them. In other words, they could 
put districts on autopilot. In the 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court put an end 
to malapportionment as a political strategy when it ruled unequal districts 
unconstitutional. In Baker v. Carr (1962), which outlawed malapportion-
ment in state legislatures, the court ruled that malapportionment violated 
the voting rights of citizens by giving some citizens more weight in the 
electoral process than others. The legal doctrine of Baker was extended two 
years later to cover House districts in Wesberry v. Sanders (1964). By the end 
of the 1960s, with the oversight of the courts, newly drawn legislative maps 
essentially eradicated malapportionment.
In many ways, one can frame the electoral basis of congressional poli-
tics from 1900 to 1964 as the Age of Malapportionment. Although it is 
fairly well known that malapportionment existed, and the aftermath of the 
court- led reapportionment revolution is well documented, the magnitude 
and impact of malapportionment in shaping the history early to mid- 20th 
century American politics are still underestimated. We can begin to get 
some idea of the magnitude of malapportionment this by examining the 
size and deviations of redistricting plans. Table 9.2 presents information on 
district size at the beginning of each decade from 1902 to 1982. The infor-
mation on district size in the 20th century comes from the Congressional 
Directory, from the congresses following the decennial reapportionment. 
To start, we can first look at the average difference between the largest and 
smallest congressional districts within states. This metric provides initial 
insight into the raw magnitude of differences in district populations.
The data in the first column of the table clearly show that the discrep-
ancies between House districts rapidly grew throughout the mid- 20th 
century. In 1912, the average distance between the largest and smallest 
TABLE 9.2. The Rise and Decline of Malapportionment in the Twentieth Century
 Average Difference  
 between Largest and  
Year Smallest Districts Ratio of Inequality Population Deviation
1912 101,385 1.64 12.04
1922 132,875 1.78 17.53
1932 196,444 2.16 20.21
1942 200,532 2.23 20.27
1952 192,801 1.82 14.29
1962 270,748 2.06 16.67
1972 8,420 1.01 .51
1982 5,420 1.01 .37
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districts was 101,385 people. By the eve of the reapportionment revolution, 
this average difference had grown to 270,748. In Tennessee, the district 
map of which was eventually overturned in Wesberry v. Sanders, the largest 
House district contained 627,019 people, while the smallest contained only 
223,387— a difference of 403,632 people.
Of course, some of the growth in these differences can be chalked up to 
an overall growth in the nation’s population. To adjust for overall population 
growth in making comparisons across time, table 9.2, column 2, presents 
the average ratio between the largest and smallest districts— or the “ratio 
of inequality.” The numbers again show that malapportionment remained 
consistent throughout the 20th century. By 1962 the average ratio was 2.06 
(s.d. = .83). In other words, on the eve of the reapportionment revolution, 
within states, the largest district was, on average, twice as large as the small-
est district. In some states, the discrepancies were enormous. In Michigan, 
for example, the ratio of inequality had reached 4.5. The 16th District con-
tained 802,994 people; the 12th contained only 177,341.
The ratio of inequality only incorporates the largest and smallest dis-
tricts, and, therefore, provides one perspective on district inequalities. But 
because the ratio of inequality tracks outliers it provides only a partial pic-
ture of malapportionment. Recall from chapter 8 that another commonly 
used metric of malapportionment is to consider the average population 
deviation of districts from the average district population within a state. 
In 1912, the average district deviated from the mean population in a state 
by 12 percent. In 1922, following the failed reapportionment, the average 
deviation spiked to 17.5 percent. It stayed roughly at this level up until 
the 1960s. In 1962, districts deviated on average by 16.7 percent. Thus, by 
every metric, the malapportionment of congressional districts in the 20th 
century grew enormously compared to the 19th century.
The next question is who won and lost, in partisan terms, from malap-
portionment. Previous research has shown that on the eve of the reappor-
tionment revolution, Democrats were the primary beneficiaries of unequal 
districts. Outside the South, Democratic districts were, on average, smaller 
than Republican- held districts (Cox and Katz 2002, 14– 15). The advantage 
Democrats gained from malapportionment was also recognized by parti-
sans at the time of the 1960s Supreme Court decisions. In an internal memo 
commissioned by the Republican Party, the memo’s authors found that 
Republican candidates performed best in oversized districts, while Demo-
cratic strongholds tended to be smaller districts (Cox and Katz 2002, 13).
But Cox’s and Katz’s analysis, and the Republicans’ internal memo, 
only takes into account the electoral situation following the 1962 election. 
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One might reasonably wonder whether Democrats’ advantage held true 
for other parts of the mid- 20th century. Especially given the Republican 
advantage in district maps following the 1942 election, there might be rea-
son to suspect that Republicans benefited from malapportionment at times 
during the postwar years. Table 9.3 presents the results of a model in which 
the dependent variable is the population deviation of congressional dis-
tricts from their respective statewide averages. The independent variable 
denotes whether Democrats won the district or not.
The results reveal that before 1962, Democratic- controlled districts 
actually tended to be larger than Republican districts. This result becomes 
even stronger in column 2, which excludes southern states. Column 3 
shows that following the 1962 reapportionment, Democrats did turn the 
tables. The coefficient now flips signs, indicating that in the 1962 maps 
Democratic districts, on average, now became smaller. Thus, even though 
Republicans may have been right to call foul in 1962, they had gained from 
malapportionment over the previous 20 years. This also meshes with previ-
ous findings in the scholarly literature which has shown a pro- Republican 
bias in congressional elections outside of the South. Here we can see that 
malapportionment contributed to this bias (see Erikson 1972).
The profound impact of unequal districts extended beyond competi-
tion between the parties. Malapportionment also shaped the policy priori-
ties and ideological alignment of the House throughout the mid- 20th cen-
tury. Malapportionment fostered a House that was more conservative and 
biased toward rural interests than would have been the case had districts 
been equalized. Malapportionment biased policy toward rural interests, 
and in particular, farmers. One way that analysts have shown the powerful 
TABLE 9.3. Population Deviation and Partisanship of Districts
 All States,  Non- Southern  All States,  Non- Southern 
 1942– 60 States, 1942– 60 1962 States, 1962
Democratic District 2.94* 4.46* −8.36* −5.71*
 (1.04) (1.11) (2.89) (2.79)
Constant −1.02 −1.72 4.08 2.79
 (1.40) (1.47) (4.07) (3.72)
R2 .003 .006 .02 .01
Number of Observations 4,257 3,208 416 319
Note: The dependent variable is the population deviation of the congressional district from the statewide 
average. State fixed effects included but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05.
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policy effect of malapportionment is to compare the type and magnitude 
of government spending that occurred before and after the court- ordered 
reapportionment revolution of the 1960s. The reapportionment revolu-
tion created, for the first time, a metropolitan majority in the House. By 
implication, this research has established that metropolitan areas were 
underrepresented prior to the 1960s. Ansolabehere and Snyder (2008), for 
example, demonstrated that government spending went to rural districts at 
the expense of urban districts. Following the reapportionment revolution 
of the 1960s, funding was equalized.
Not only was the overall level of funding unequal between districts, 
malapportionment also compelled Congress to emphasize certain types of 
policy instruments at the expense of others. For example, McCubbins and 
Schwartz found that federal spending on agricultural policies was substan-
tially higher prior to the reapportionment revolution. A policy- making sys-
tem that had been biased toward agricultural spending was now redirected 
toward transportation and regulatory policies. After 1965, wheat subsidies 
were reduced by almost half. Cotton and corn subsidies were reduced by 
more than one- third (McCubbins and Schwartz 1988, 409). Funding for 
food stamps and school- lunch programs increased, while funding for sugar 
farmers dropped precipitously (McCubbins and Schwartz 1988, 396).
Malapportionment also affected ideological alignments within the 
House. This can be seen by regressing the DW- Nominate score of indi-
vidual representatives (which is a measure of ideological positioning based 
on roll- call voting) on the natural log of their district population. DW- 
Nominate scores range from −1 to 1, with the left side of the scale (−1) 
indicating a liberal roll- call voting record and the right side of the scale (+1) 
indicating a conservative roll- call voting record. Such a model shows that, 
for both Republicans and Democrats, larger districts correlated with more 
liberal representation. The negative coefficient one finds on the population 
variable indicates that smaller districts tended to have more conservative 
representatives, while larger districts tended to have more liberal members.
Therefore, a greater number of small districts created an overrepre-
sentation of conservatives within the Congress— for both parties. The 
reapportionment revolution shifted the alignment leftward. As district 
populations were equalized in the 1960s, the number of liberal- leaning 
districts increased and shifted the ideological and policy balance of the 
House leftward. The consequences reverberated within the House for the 
next decade. Notably, the eradication of malapportionment increased the 
legislative numbers, and, therefore, political power, of liberal members of 
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the Democratic caucus (see also Ansolabehere and Snyder 2008). These 
members eventually helped spearhead the transformational congressional 
reforms of the early 1970s (Rohde 1991).
Redistricting and Congressional Careerism
Differences in the timing and nature of districting also fundamentally con-
tributed to the rise of congressional careerism. Among the most profound 
consequences of changing gerrymandering strategies was the development 
of a professionalized House. The data figures shown in chapter 7 showed 
just how thoroughly ambition and turnover differed between the 19th and 
20th centuries. By 1920, nearly 85 percent of House incumbents were 
seeking reelection. Moreover, the decision to run for reelection had turned 
from a risky gamble to an almost sure bet. Of the incumbents who ran for 
reelection, the percentage who won was almost 90 percent. The increase 
in incumbents running for and winning reelection radically reduced the 
number of first- termers serving in the House. Between 1900 and 1962, the 
average percent of first- termers was 21 percent. Taking out the big wave of 
turnover caused by the Depression- era elections of 1930 and 1932 reduces 
this number even further. By contrast, between 1840 and 1900, the aver-
age percentage of first- termers had been 36 percent. The comparatively 
modest turnover pattern has remained consistent up to the present, and 
continues to define the House and national politics.
These trends furthered the transformation of the House from a body of 
amateurs to the professionalized legislature we have become accustomed 
to. One indicator of this transformation is presented in figure 9.6, which 
plots the average number of terms members had served by year. Through-
out the 19th century, the average held relatively at two terms. Beginning 
around the turn of the 20th century, we see a sharp increase in the number 
of terms served. By 1960, the number had climbed to over five terms.
The modernization of the House— and, consequently, the moderniza-
tion of national politics— has much of its roots in this transformation. The 
rise of “single- minded seekers of reelection” refashioned the institutional 
structure of the House, and the structure of the federal government, to 
facilitate their reelection chances (Fiorina 1989; Mayhew 1974a). Because 
of the central importance careerism holds in the modernization of Ameri-
can politics, finding its source has served as a major intellectual goal for 
students of the U.S. Congress. At least since Nelson Polsby’s influential 
article, which traced the modernization of the House of Representatives 
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to the late 19th and early 20th centuries, students of institutional devel-
opment have searched widely for an explanation. A number of potential 
answers have been given.
One prominent narrative focuses on the supposed realigning elections 
of 1894 and 1896. These elections, so the argument goes, eliminated two- 
party competition in many parts of the country. As a result, many fewer 
members went down to defeat via election. The supposed decline of two- 
party competition also influenced the voluntary decisions of incumbents to 
run for reelection. Knowing that their odds of winning reelection, assum-
ing they could secure renomination, jumped up following 1896, the rates 
of incumbents seeking reelection naturally jumped as well.
A second narrative emphasizes the changing balance between the state 
capitals and the federal government. Where once, say, the Missouri state 
legislature may have been as relevant to party politicians as the U.S. Con-
gress, by the turn of the 20th century the balance of power had clearly 
shifted to Washington. The scope and size of the national government had 
increased to the point that the Congress had become the keystone of the 
fig. 9.6. average number of terms served in the u.s. house, 1840– 1962. the 
figure shows the average number of terms served by members of Congress. the 
solid line is a locally weighted regression line.
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American political system. The policy instruments at the disposal of the 
federal government had rapidly increased. The importance of the national 
government, according to this view, fueled the rise of careerism. Politi-
cians gravitate to power. As the power of the national government rose, 
the gravitational pull of Washington for ambitious politicians rose as well.
Related to the growth of national government was a change in the inter-
nal politics of the House. The revolt of 1910 created a premium on senior-
ity. By taking the discretionary power out of the hands of party leaders and 
locating it in an automatic process— based on seniority— members could 
more fully map out their career plans. The uncertainty associated with the 
arbitrary decision of party leaders, so the argument goes, was removed. 
The primary importance of seniority in making committee assignments 
naturally followed.
While these narratives certainly contain a good deal of truth, they are 
not wholly satisfying. This section argues that gerrymandering— or more 
appropriately, the decline of partisan gerrymandering— created an envi-
ronment in which careerism could flourish. As seen in previous chapters, 
the frequency and fever- pitched partisanship of 19th- century gerryman-
dering fed the massive waves of turnover that hit the House during that 
era. Gerrymandering could come at any time, and it was often intensely 
partisan when it came. Even incumbents of the party drawing district lines 
often found themselves in more competitive districts as parties tried to 
maximize their seat share. But just as the frequency and magnitude of ger-
rymandering goes a long way toward explaining the rapid membership 
turnover of the 19th century, one might suspect that the altered gerryman-
dering patterns of the 20th century contributed to the decrease in turnover 
in the 20th century.
How did the changing nature of gerrymandering contribute to this 
shift? First, as we have seen, the frequency of redistricting in the 20th 
century declined precipitously. Many states went long stretches with 
stable, uninterrupted district boundaries. Hence, members of Congress 
had increasingly stable district boundaries. Between 1840 and 1900, the 
probability of a district being redrawn was 20 percent. In some states, the 
number was even higher. For example, during the 19th century, an Ohio 
congressman had a 40 percent chance of having their district redrawn in 
any single election. Thus, over the course of five elections, a congressman 
could expect to have his district redrawn more than once. It is not hard to 
imagine the difficulties of developing a career in the House, or a career in 
the constituency, with ever- shifting district boundaries.
By contrast, between 1900 and 1960, the probability of a district being 
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redrawn was cut in half to 10 percent. And as we have seen, at certain peri-
ods (i.e., between 1914 and 1930), and in certain places, the probability of 
a redistricting was effectively zero. Where redistricting is less frequent, 
the electoral uncertainty implanted in the minds of politicians drastically 
recedes. Certainty facilitates planning and investment. Moreover, when 
redistricting happened, it tended to be less partisan. This is not to say that 
redistricting became safe; many members still opted to retire following a 
redistricting. But compared to the virulent partisanship of 19th- century 
gerrymandering, the new politics of redistricting looked tame. One can see 
this manifest itself by comparing the margins of victory following a redis-
tricting between the two centuries.
Here then is a powerful, but completely overlooked, source for the 
20th- century ascent and entrenchment of congressional careerism. Mem-
bers were now in a position to solidify their hold on districts in a way 
that was not possible in the 19th century. In the Gilded Age, a congress-
man from, say, Ohio, could count on having his district redrawn within a 
term or two with almost near certainty. It is easy to imagine the difficul-
ties this would create in developing a political career both at home and 
within the House. Why try to build a home style when you know that the 
state legislature can, and likely will, carve up your district in two years? 
As Richard Fenno wrote following the reapportionment revolution, which 
broke the redistricting logjam, “It is this electoral uncertainty implanted 
in the minds of our politicians in the House of Representatives— more 
than policy change— that constitutes the real ‘reapportionment revolution’ 
nationally” (Fenno 1978, 12).
Why invest in a congressional career? Why invest in the institution 
itself— serving on committees, building the coalitions necessary for long- 
term legislative projects, etc.— when you face a certain redistricting in the 
near future? By the mid-20th century, however, congressmen could count 
on having the same district for long stretches of time. Building a personal 
vote now became a worthwhile, and achievable, investment. Coupled with 
other more well- known electoral reforms, such as direct primaries and 
secret- ballot laws, representatives could control their own fate to a much 
larger degree than they had in the 19th century.
Putting these two factors together suggests that the impact of changing 
gerrymandering strategies on career decisions can be rendered by the fol-
lowing probability calculus:
Seeking and Winning Reelection = f(Pr(Redistricting) × Pr(Partisan 
Gerrymander|Redistricting))
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Here, the decision to seek reelection, and the likelihood of winning, is 
expressed as a function of the probability of a redistricting event multiplied 
by the probability of a partisan gerrymander given a redistricting event. As 
the probability of a redistricting event decreases, the likelihood of running 
for reelection should increase. Moreover, as the partisanship of redistrict-
ing decreases, conditional on a new map, the likelihood of running for 
reelection increases.
To test for differences in the impact of redistricting across the two 
centuries, I estimated the differential likelihood of seeking reelection fol-
lowing a redistricting in the two centuries. Specifically, I estimated the 
probability of seeking reelection in years where the incumbent’s district 
had been redrawn. The key independent variable was a dummy variable 
denoting whether the election took place in the 19th or 20th century (i.e., 
1 = 20th century, 0 = 19th century). The analysis ran from 1840 to 1962. 
The model also included control variables measuring the margin of victory 
in the incumbent’s prior election, age (logged), and the number of terms 
served. The results, presented in table 9.4, column 1, strongly support the 
notion that redistricting had a smaller impact in the 20th century than in 
the 19th. The positive coefficient on the 1900 dummy variable indicates 
that 20th- century members were more likely to run for reelection after a 
redistricting than their counterparts in the 19th century.
To convert these results into substantive terms, using the estimates in 
table 9.4, one can calculate the probability of running for reelection in the 
TABLE 9.4. The Changing Impact of Redistricting on Seeking and Winning Reelection, 
1840– 1962
 Seeking Reelection Winning Reelection
After 1900 (1 = after, 0 = before) 1.25* .72*
 (.10) (.13)
Previous Electoral Margin .006* .03*
 (.002) (.004)
Age (logged) −.67* −.48
 (.25) (.36)
Number of Terms Served −.02 −.009
 (.02) (.03)
Log- Likelihood −1,562.85 −833.49
Number of Observations 2916 2,043
Note: Maximum likelihood logit estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. The 
first difference for seeking reelection is .24 (std. error = .02). The first difference for winning 
reelection is .10 (.02).
*p < .05.
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two time periods. Setting the other variables at their median values, the 
probability an incumbent would seek reelection in the 19th century, after 
a redistricting, was .6. During the 20th century, this probability jumped to 
.84. This result provides support to the idea that redistricting was viewed 
by 20th- century politicians as less devastating than in the 19th century.
That redistricting became less disruptive to a political career is further 
confirmed in table 9.4, column 2. This column presents the results of a 
model in which the dependent variable is whether or not the incumbent 
won reelection, conditional on the decision to seek reelection. Again, we 
see that redistricting in the 20th century was less disruptive to political 
careerism. The positive coefficient on the 1900 dummy variable is positive, 
indicating that 20th- century incumbents were more likely to win reelec-
tion following a redistricting than 19th- century incumbents. Converting 
these results into substantive probabilities shows that the likelihood of 
winning reelection, following a redistricting was .76 in the 19th century. In 
the 20th, this likelihood grew to .86.
Overall, these results show that redistricting in the 20th century became 
much less doom laden for incumbents than it had been before. Incumbents 
were more likely to seek, and win, reelection following a redistricting. This 
is not to say that modern redistricting was, and is, not disruptive. Incum-
bents are still less likely to run following a redistricting, even now, than 
during more normal election years. But the results here do show that com-
pared to the unruly gerrymandering practices of the 19th century, modern 
incumbents face much less disruptive districting.
Conclusion
For years, scholars have searched far and wide to explain the rise of 
candidate- centered politics in the 20th century without reaching a consen-
sus. An important, but woefully neglected, piece of this puzzle can be found 
in changing gerrymandering strategies. The pace of redistricting, which 
had been frenzied in the 19th century, diminished throughout the early 
to mid- 20th century. Because redistricting was less frequent, the average 
district remained undisturbed for 20 years. When redistricting did hap-
pen, the upheaval was much less drastic. The very foundation of modern 
congressional politics was forged out of these altered districting decisions. 
Members could plan for, and build, careers in the House. Both individual 
and aggregate turnover diminished.
Thus, by the 1960s, the essential features of the modern congressional 
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system were in place. The vast literature on the U.S. Congress has long 
held that the 1960s produced a break with the past. According to this lit-
erature, incumbent reelection rates soared in the mid- 1960s, ushering in 
an era of candidate- centered elections. Using the perks of office, accord-
ing to the dominant narrative, incumbents were increasingly able to insu-
late themselves against adverse national electoral tides. But as this chapter 
has shown the foundations for these changes had already been laid well 
before the mid- 1960s. While few would doubt that the electoral margins of 
incumbents spiked during the mid- 1960s (i.e., Mayhew 1974b), Congress 
was already full of careerists. The uptick in careerism and electoral margins 
in the mid- 1960s, so widely commented upon and analyzed, built on bed-
rock that had already been well established.
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Gerrymandering and the 
Future of American Politics
In this book, I have argued for a fundamental reevaluation of gerrymander-
ing and its impact on the evolution of American politics. The traditional 
narrative of political history has long centered on critical, realigning elec-
tions as the mainsprings of American politics. According to this narrative, 
some elections are more consequential than others. These critical elections 
sweep major tranches of legislators out of power and sweep in whole new 
classes of legislators. Critical elections produce abrupt breaks in traditional 
party ideological alignments and set the nation on a new policy trajectory. 
In short, according to this dominant narrative, critical elections are the 
main drivers of American electoral and policy history.
In explaining the periodic recurrence of critical elections, scholarship 
in this tradition has focused on mass behavior as the motor force behind 
realignments. Voter frustration with the status quo builds over time. These 
frustrations ultimately boil over, leading to a fundamental shift in party 
alignments and voter loyalties. Moreover, critical elections are followed 
by new governmental majorities who use their newfound power to fun-
damentally redirect the course of public policy. In short, the realignment 
narrative provides a sweeping explanation for the dynamics of American 
political history.
The realignment narrative, moreover, provides an explanation for 
the rise of candidate- centered politics in the 20th century. According 
to this view, the realignment of party ideologies following the 1896 
election transformed the party coalitions of both the South and North. 
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Working alongside these changes in party alignments were efforts by 
elites, in both the South and North, to solidify their hold on political 
power by cutting a portion of the mass public out of the electoral pro-
cess (Burnham 1965). The end result was the demise of the partisan- 
centered, mobilization- driven politics of the 19th century, and its 
replacement with the candidate- centered, advertising- driven politics of 
the 20th century.
The scope and power of the realignment narrative has guided a gen-
eration of scholars. The focus on rapid changes in mass behavior as the 
mainspring of American politics, however, has produced a radical under-
estimation of electoral institutions. Scholars of American political history 
instead have trained their attention on aspects like the ethnic basis of elec-
toral behavior, and debates over whether certain elections meet the ever- 
changing benchmark of being labeled a critical election.
The focus on individual- level behavior has led to a radical underestima-
tion of electoral institutions, in general, and gerrymandering, in particular. 
How citizen preferences— in the currency of votes— translate into politi-
cal representation is not straightforward. Rules about how these votes are 
cast and counted, how they aggregate into winners and losers, and how 
the victors of local elections translate into political power nationally, all 
mediate the connection between citizen preferences and governmental 
outcomes. Central to this translation are the construction of electoral dis-
tricts. Political decisions over whether to use geographic districts, where to 
place those districts, and when to redraw those districts has systematically 
shaped electoral politics and legislative power since the founding. Yet the 
importance of electoral districts in shaping political power has long been 
ignored by students of American political history; much to the detriment 
of our understanding of this history.
While political scientists are skeptical of gerrymandering, politicians 
throughout American history— from Elbridge Gerry to Tom DeLay— have 
acted as if gerrymandering presents a golden opportunity for partisan and 
personal gain. Politicians have deep- seated incentives to bias the transla-
tion of votes into seats. This book brings districting front and center to the 
narrative of American political history. For the remainder of this chapter, I 
first discuss the central claims made in this book. The second section turns 
to a discussion of how redistricting developed in the wake of the Supreme 
Court- led reapportionment revolution of the 1960s. I then place recent 
developments in redistricting politics, and scholarship, within the larger 
historical context uncovered in this book.
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Partisan Gerrymandering and American Political Development
The U.S. Constitution delegated responsibility for election administra-
tion primarily to the states. The freedom enjoyed by the states to design 
electoral rules provided ample fuel for ambitious state- level politicians to 
further their personal and partisan goals. Perhaps nowhere have battles 
over electoral rules been more evident than in the design of congressional 
districts. The Constitution makes no mention of how states were to be 
divided into congressional districts, or if districts were to be used at all. 
Indeed, for much of the early period of American history, the choice states 
faced was over when and how to redistrict. Modern redistricting takes 
place, for the most part, according to a fixed timetable. Because congres-
sional districts must meet the one- person, one- vote standard, states need 
to redraw after every census to adjust for any population changes across 
districts. The result has been a regularized 10- year redistricting cycle.
Nowadays, we take this cycle for granted. But within the context of the 
span of American history, this regularized redistricting cycle is a relatively 
new phenomenon. For most of American history, states could redistrict 
largely whenever they wanted. Some states went long stretches without 
drawing district boundaries. Even more dramatic was a pattern in which 
some states redrew more than once a decade. Ohio, for example, redis-
tricted seven times between 1878 and 1892. Between 1862 and 1892 there 
was only one election cycle in which at least one state did not redraw its 
congressional districts. Chapter 3 showed that partisan control of state 
institutions drove the timing of these redistricting events. When a new 
party captured control of state government, and the existing districts were 
designed by the out party, the probability of a redistricting event spiked. 
When these two conditions were not present, and a state did not gain or 
lose seats in the federal apportionment, the probability of redistricting was 
almost zero. Thus, both the decision to mandate single- member districts 
and subsequent state- level decisions to redistrict reminds us that even the 
political system’s most fundamental features might be molded from short- 
term, partisan calculations. The modern structure of the House of Repre-
sentatives emerged out of these short- term calculations.
The modern redistricting process is shot through with many of the 
technological accoutrements of 21st century. Detailed census data, geo-
graphic information systems (GIS), and sophisticated redistricting software 
provide today’s mapmakers with the tools to construct gerrymanders with 
the simple push of a button (Monmonier 2001). But as this book has dem-
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onstrated, 19th- century politicians had little trouble engineering effective 
partisan gerrymanders despite their technological limitations.
Much of this success can be attributed to the minimal legal and political 
constraints that 19th- century line drawers faced. Without a meddlesome 
judiciary peering over their shoulders, state legislatures were free to draw 
districts almost however they wanted. The pressure to protect congres-
sional incumbents were also largely absent. The result was that mapmak-
ers were much more willing to pursue aggressive partisan gerrymanders. 
Parties typically tried to maximize their seat shares by carving states into 
districts with minimal vote margins, even if that meant making the districts 
they already held less safe. The results influenced party ratios, electoral 
competition, and the career decisions of incumbents.
Chapter 4 showed that these maps biased political outcomes within the 
states and had profound consequences for party ratios in the House. Parti-
san plans produced an average bias of 6 percent in favor of the controlling 
party. Moreover, cumulating these state- level gerrymanders, I found that 
redistricting did, on occasion, affect party control of the House. Notably 
in 1878 and 1888, redistricting helped determine majority control of the 
House of Representatives.
These redistricting decisions also directly shaped the nature of elec-
toral competition. With few exceptions, the national vote for Congress was 
very close, yet the partisan composition of the House often changed dra-
matically. For instance, in 1874, Republicans’ percentage of House seats 
dropped from 69 percent to 36 percent (a loss of 94 seats) despite their 
national vote dropping only 6.8 percent. In 1894, Democrats lost 114 seats, 
while their national vote share dropped 7.4 percent. The explanation for 
the outsized seat swings of the 19th century have remained an unresolved 
puzzle for historians and political scientists.
Chapter 5 showed that partisan gerrymandering provides an impor-
tant missing piece of the puzzle. State politicians fashioned congressio-
nal districts with slender, yet winnable, margins— in other words, increas-
ing competition. Added together, these competitive districts produced a 
hyper- responsive electoral system where small swings in the vote produced 
immense swings in seats. Notably there was an overabundance of marginal 
Democratic seats following the 1852 and 1892 elections, and an overabun-
dance of marginal Republican districts following the 1872 elections. In all 
three cases, one party dominated the drawing of districts nationwide. As 
a consequence, unanticipated political and economic events— the Kansas- 
Nebraska Act of 1854, the Panic of 1873, and the Panic of 1893— created 
seat swings well out of proportion to the vote swing. Although important 
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past work has identified the presence of sharp vote- seat distortions in these 
eras (Brady 1985; 1988), no one has identified the essential role that parti-
san gerrymandering played in first constructing this hyperresponsive elec-
toral system.
Because states often engaged in drawing highly competitive districts, 
this also made the career of an individual member of Congress more tur-
bulent. Members of Congress faced a greater probability of redistricting. 
When it happened, it was often intensely partisan. Chapter 6 explored the 
impact of redistricting on congressional turnover. Members of Congress 
were less likely to run for reelection when their district was redrawn. More-
over, those who ran were less likely to win. The result was that in periods of 
intense redistricting, turnover in the House spiked. The largest periods of 
turnover in the 19th century, and all of American history, occurred in years 
when redistricting was widespread.
Overall, the politics of gerrymandering during this era clearly illustrates 
the desire, and ability, of partisan politicians to stack the electoral deck in 
their favor. From the initial decision in 1842 by Congress to mandate single- 
member districts to the politics of gerrymandering during the Gilded Age, 
19th- century politicians took full advantage of institutional manipulation. 
Gerrymandering shaped the competitiveness of congressional elections, 
the partisan composition of state congressional delegations, and at times, 
helped determine party control of the House of Representatives.
Throughout the book, I have also pointed to cases where the alteration 
of party balances in the House also influenced the outcomes of legislative 
battles. From the Louisiana Purchase to the Kansas- Nebraska Act to tariff 
policy in the late 19th century, the strategic construction of district lines 
played a central role in providing the necessary majorities to pass these 
transformational pieces of legislation. It is important to note, however, that 
the majority of lawmaking cases examined in this book involved legisla-
tion that actually passed. Here majorities, partially manufactured by ger-
rymandering, pushed through legislation that may not have passed without 
the aid of strategic redistricting. But one might also wonder about cases 
where legislation was delayed, or blocked outright, because of manufac-
tured majorities. In other words, were there “dogs that didn’t bark”? Of 
course, systematically identifying instances of legislation that did not pass 
because of districting is difficult. How does one know the set of legislation 
that would have passed if partisan majorities had been different? Because 
we do not get to observe this counterfactual, it becomes incredibly difficult 
to empirically identify the dogs that did not bark. Such empirical difficul-
ties are not unique to this study, and have remained a longstanding chal-
196 Partisan Gerrymandering and the Construction of american democracy 
lenge for students of lawmaking. Nevertheless, one can point to illustrative 
examples to show that the impact of gerrymandering may not have been 
limited to just those pieces of legislation that were enacted.
For example, one area where gerrymandering influenced legislative 
outcomes without the necessity of enacting legislation was civil rights. The 
close partisan balance in the national government following the Civil War 
put the House of Representatives front and center in the battle over civil 
rights and enforcement of Reconstruction. Because Republicans had a near 
lock on both the Senate and the presidency, the fate of civil rights legis-
lation often hinged on partisan control of the House. When Democrats 
controlled the House, their general strategy was to zero out funding for 
enforcement of civil rights in Southern elections. Enacting new legislation 
was not necessary. As long as Democrats could “veto” the ideal level of 
appropriations sought by Republicans, they could dramatically influence 
the nature and amount of civil rights enforcement in the South.
Similarly, in the 20th century, changes in districting strategies produced 
a distinct bias in favor of rural districts. During the 20th century, state leg-
islatures opted to redistrict less. The result was rapid growth in malappor-
tionment. As the population of the country grew, legislative districts failed 
to keep pace. By the early 1960s, congressional districts varied greatly in 
size. The result was a massive structural inequality that favored rural areas 
at the expense of metropolitan interests.
The Past and Present of Gerrymandering
The Supreme Court radically upended the system described above in a 
sweeping series of decisions handed down in the 1960s. Breaking from 
their standing doctrine of judicial noninterference in the political process, 
the Supreme Court ruled in 1962 that state legislative districting in Ten-
nessee violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, and was, 
therefore, justiciable. The case, Baker v. Carr, represented the first salvo in 
a decade long judicial attack on malapportionment. In a series of follow- up 
cases, the Supreme Court implemented the new doctrine of one- person, 
one- vote by overturning districting plans in states and localities. Two years 
later, the Supreme Court extended the one- person, one- vote doctrine to 
U.S. House districts. The case, Wesberry v. Sanders (1964), involved con-
gressional districts in Georgia which had not been redrawn since 1931. By 
1961, the 5th District (which included all of Atlanta) had a population of 
823,680, while the rural 9th District had a population of 272,154. Districts 
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in Georgia had last been drawn in 1934. It was no coincidence that on the 
eve of the reapportionment revolution the longest serving member of the 
House— Carl Vinson— was from Georgia. Vinson was serving in his 26th 
term, having first been elected to the House in 1914.
The consequences of the reapportionment decisions were rapid and 
immense. By the end of the 1960s, malapportionment had essentially been 
eradicated in both congressional and state legislative districts. The result 
was a radical redrawing of legislative districts, and a reshuffling of political 
power, across the country (cf. Ansolabehere and Snyder 2008; Cox and Katz 
2002). Beyond the immediate short- term consequences of the reappor-
tionment revolution, the transformation of court doctrine fundamentally 
changed the redistricting game as played in the state legislatures. Notably, 
the reapportionment decisions injected the courts directly into the political 
thicket. Overseeing the redistricting process is a role the judiciary plays to 
this day. Notably, the courts ensure adherence to the requirement of equal 
apportionment of districts. The creation of congressional districts with 
equal population has now become required. More controversial, however, 
has been the courts role in using districts to enhance the representation of 
racial minorities in Congress and state legislatures.
Racial Gerrymandering
The reapportionment cases of the 1960s were not the only major transfor-
mation in the American electoral structure to take place during this period. 
Notably, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965 with the goal of 
reversing the systematic disenfranchisement of African Americans, primar-
ily in the South. Certainly one of the most consequential pieces of legisla-
tion ever passed by Congress,  the Voting Rights Act  helped pave the way 
for a radical transformation of southern society and national politics. Cen-
tral to federal intervention in the electoral process was federal oversight 
of electoral districts. Over the course of the next 30 years the issue of vot-
ing rights and redistricting would become intimately intertwined (Canon 
1999).
The legal connection between districting and minority rights gained 
further steam in the 1980s and early 1990s in the wake of a series of path-
breaking Supreme Court decisions. In 1986, the Supreme Court ruled in 
Thornburg v. Gingles that the Voting Rights Act implied legislative districts 
should not discriminate against racial minorities. In the wake of legisla-
tive districting in North Carolina, following the 1982 reapportionment, 
African- American voters sued arguing that the districts diluted their vot-
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ing power and ran afoul of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The court 
agreed with the plaintiffs and ruled the districting plan invalid. This deci-
sion was construed as a prod for state legislatures to draw legislative dis-
tricts that made it feasible for minorities to get elected. In practice, state 
legislatures, with further prodding from the U.S. Department of Justice, 
took this to mean creating districts where an ethnic minority comprised a 
majority of the district. The driving idea was that majority- minority dis-
tricts will be able to elect minorities into the legislature and thereby boost 
minority representation.
As state legislatures began carrying out this goal in the early 1990s, it 
produced considerable legal and political backlash. Creative geography in 
North Carolina, for example, produced the famous 12th District, which 
knitted together parts of Durham and Charlotte into a single district, 
although those two cities are more than 150 miles apart. Much of the dis-
trict was comprised of little more than stretches of Interstate 85. In 1993, 
the Supreme Court ruled, in Shaw v. Reno, that race cannot be the only 
justification for creating a district; especially if it leads to bizarrely shaped 
districts like North Carolina’s 12th. As a result, the court ruled that the 
North Carolina district needed to be redrawn. It is worth noting that the 
12th District elected the first African American to Congress from North 
Carolina since the end of Reconstruction.
Two years later, the Supreme Court further reined in racial gerryman-
dering in Miller v. Johnson. Here the court argued that race can be a factor 
in creating a district, but it cannot be the predominant factor. Neither the 
Shaw or Miller decisions, however, completely reversed Thornburg. Race 
can still be a factor in drawing districts as long as the primary motive is par-
tisanship rather than race, per se. Given that African Americans and Lati-
nos are predominantly Democratic voters, the court has in effect allowed 
for the continued use of implicit racial gerrymandering. Nevertheless, the 
decisions of the more conservative Supreme Court of the 1990s have fur-
ther reduced the scope for race to be a dominant factor in designing dis-
tricts. But again, this is still unsettled legal doctrine and continues to be the 
basis for widespread litigation.
Also unsettled is the extent to which racial gerrymandering actually 
benefitted one party or another. Because minority voters overwhelmingly 
tend to vote Democratic, concentrating these voters into minority- majority 
districts may actually benefit Republicans. To put this in the language of 
efficient gerrymandering, majority- minority districts may reduce the effi-
ciency with which Democratic votes translate into seats nationally. Gary 
Jacobson, for example, notes that “racial gerrymandering was responsible 
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for as many as ten of the seats Republicans gained in the South in 1992 
and 1994” (Jacobson 2009, 14). Other scholars have been more skeptical, 
arguing that any benefit to Republicans from majority- minority districts 
were overwhelmed by the immense pro- Republican national tide of 1994.
Thus, whether or not majority- minority districts benefit one party at 
the expense of the other party remains an open question. But read against 
the larger backdrop of gerrymandering history presented in this book, the 
push to use district design to boost the representation of ethnic minorities 
must be seen as nothing short of ironic. As we have seen, gerrymandering 
in the 19th century was a weapon. In particular, a weapon aimed at disen-
franchising African Americans in the South. Democratic gerrymanders, in 
the North and South, in the 1870s, notably, brought to power a Demo-
cratic majority bent on reversing reconstruction. The sweeping Demo-
cratic victory in the House elections of 1874 put Democrats in a position to 
undermine federal Reconstruction. The strategic use of the appropriations 
process allowed Democrats to starve the enforcement of Reconstruction.
Party Bias
While the Supreme Court has been willing to rule on gerrymandering 
in the areas of malapportionment and minority rights, the justices have 
remained reluctant to rule directly on the partisan impact of redistrict-
ing. Over the subsequent decades, the judiciary has elaborated and refined 
legal doctrine surrounding the districting process. But it is worth noting 
that this court supervision only extends to certain areas of the districting 
process. While malapportioned districts violate current legal doctrine, the 
Supreme Court has yet to rule a plan unconstitutional on the grounds of 
being an unfair partisan gerrymandering. Indeed, in a dissenting opinion 
in Wesberry v. Sanders, Justice Harlan argued that focusing on the size of 
districts ignored the bigger picture. The great oversight of the majority 
opinion in Wesberry, according to Harlan, was that parties could still use 
districting to engineer unfair political outcomes.
The Supreme Court, however, has, over time, stepped close to the line 
of ruling a redistricting plan unconstitutional on the basis of partisan ger-
rymandering. Notably, in Davis v. Bandamer (1986), the court ruled that 
partisan gerrymandering was justiciable. Yet, the majority opinion also 
ruled that the plaintiffs would need to show discriminatory vote dilution to 
reach the level of an Equal Protection Clause violation. The court argued, 
in Davis, that this threshold had not been met. More recently, in Vieth v. 
Jubelirer (2004), the court again dealt with the constitutionality of partisan 
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gerrymandering. In a plurality decision, this time the court ruled that par-
tisan gerrymandering was not justiciable. The plurality opinion concluded 
that while partisan gerrymandering may, in principle, violate the Equal 
Protection Clause, it would be impossible for courts to empirically validate 
whether a map had met the threshold of a partisan gerrymander— or even 
to establish what that threshold should be. This decision, however, failed to 
completely turnover the precedent set in Davis v. Bandamer. Justice Ken-
nedy, writing in a concurring opinion, argued that gerrymandering might 
still be justiciable. However, the Supreme Court has yet to define a stan-
dard that would rule a gerrymander unconstitutional.
The upshot of these decisions is that there still is still plenty of legal 
room for partisan mapmakers to exploit districting for partisan advantage. 
One result of this legal opening is a firestorm of commentary every 10 
years about the supposed evils of redistricting. Reflecting on the incendi-
ary redistricting battles of the early 2000s, the New York Times published an 
editorial, “Democracy Takes a Hit.” The editorial summarized the view of 
redistricting held by most political observers, stating that “Partisan gerry-
mandering . . . has reached a crisis point. Because of increased partisanship 
and improvements in technology used to determine district lines, legisla-
tors now regularly create districts that all but ensure victory for the party 
that controls the districting process” (New York Times, April 29, 2004). This 
perspective, however, was not unique to the editorial pages of the New York 
Times. The traditionally more conservative editorial page of the Wall Street 
Journal proffered similar comments, writing that modern gerrymandering 
demonstrates “the lengths, widths and depths to which the politicians have 
gone to create invincible incumbents and disenfranchise millions of voters” 
(Wall Street Journal, March 11, 2005).
Thus, for commentators along the political spectrum, allowing politi-
cians to write the rules that determine their future success represents one 
of the fundamental drawbacks of the Constitution. Draw the boundaries 
one way, and Democrats are in power. Draw the lines another way, and 
suddenly Republicans are in power. The result of modern redistricting 
efforts, according to these commentators, has been to produce “elections 
with no meaning” (New York Times, February 21, 2004).
These fears, however, are not new. Hand- wringing over the potential 
evils of redistricting can be found throughout American history. The very 
phrase “gerrymander” was coined in 1812 by those who felt aggrieved by 
what they saw as the unfair abuse of the districting process. And angst over 
the use and abuse of redistricting has not stopped. In 1892, to take one 
example, the Atlantic Monthly equated redistricting with nothing less than 
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“Legal Disenfranchisment” (Atlantic Monthly, April 1892). Democratic vot-
ers in Kansas, the article went on to say, “have no more hope of being repre-
sented in Congress at Washington than if they had no vote at all; they have 
but the shadow of liberty, - the substance being denied them as much as it 
is the Russian peasant or the Indian ryot” (quoted in Argersinger 1989, 63).
Jump forward to the 21st century and one continues to hear many of 
the same concerns. Political observers across the spectrum— including 
legal scholars, journalists, reform groups, and even the general public— 
trace many of the perceived ills of American democracy to gerrymander-
ing. For example, some legal scholars have argued that letting politicians 
draw district lines fundamentally undermines the health of American 
democracy. Some have likened modern mapmaking to letting the “foxes 
guard the henhouse” (e.g., Gerken 2010). Others draw their analogies from 
economics, likening bipartisan gerrymandering to duopolistic cartels (e.g., 
Issacharoff 2002).
These concerns have also found expression in more popular outlets. In 
a provocative 2003 New Yorker article, Jeffrey Toobin excoriated redistrict-
ing as it is currently practiced in the states. The title itself— “The Great 
Election Grab”— signaled the widespread fear of politician- led redistrict-
ing. The image conveyed is one of politicians, in effect, stealing elections 
through mapmaking. Similarly, a recent book written by a professional 
geographer, and written for a popular audience, carried the subtitle “How 
Politicians Manipulate Electronic Maps and Census Data to Win Elec-
tions” (Monmonier 2001).
This anxiety surrounding politician- drawn district maps has also led 
to efforts to change the rules surrounding redistricting. Reform groups in 
a number of states, fed up with partisan polarization and legislative grid-
lock, have trained their sights on redistricting. This has led some states to 
remove redistricting from state legislators and hand it over to independent 
citizen- based commissions. For example, California voters recently chose 
to create a citizen- based redistricting commission responsible for draw-
ing both state legislative and U.S. House district maps. The hope among 
reformers is that nonpartisan maps will produce more competitive elec-
tions and less polarized legislators.
Against this avalanche of worry, it is therefore very interesting to read 
the political science literature on redistricting. With few, if important, 
exceptions, research in political science offers a much more benign per-
spective. In fact, the dominant theme of the political- science literature is 
that the supposed dangers of redistricting are vastly overblown. Gerry-
manders may bias political outcomes here and there, but the overall impact 
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of gerrymandering on the national balance of power is modest (e.g., Cain 
and Butler 1991; Campagna and Grofman 1990; Niemi and Abramowitz 
1994; Seabrook 2010; Swain, Reed, and Borelli 1998). Similarly, the mod-
ern growth of incumbent reelection rates and victory margins, it is argued, 
has little to do with bipartisan redistricting (e.g., Abramowitz, Alexander 
and Gunning 2006; Ansolabehere and Snyder 2008; Friedman and Holden 
2009). Nor have scholars found much evidence linking gerrymandering 
to the rise of party polarization in Congress (e.g., McCarty, Poole, and 
Rosenthal 2009; Oppenheimer 2005; Theriault 2008).
There is no consensus, however, as to why redistricting appears to 
have minimal impact. One possibility is that the legal rules surrounding 
redistricting prevent politicians from pulling off full- blown gerrymanders. 
States must conform to the one- person, one- vote doctrine and adhere to 
the Voting Rights Act, which protects minority interests in the electoral 
process (e.g., Shotts 2001). Even the most notorious gerrymander of recent 
memory— the Texas remap of 2004, for example— had two of its districts 
thrown out for violating the Voting Right Act. These limits, enforced by 
an ever- watchful judiciary, narrow the range of options that parties can 
choose from when drawing new boundaries and thereby blunt the impact 
of gerrymandering.
A second possibility is that the gains to be had from gerrymandering are 
simply limited to begin with. According to this view, too many factors pre-
vent mapmakers from meaningfully biasing electoral outcomes. The value 
of incumbents and seniority in Congress mute the motivations of state leg-
islators to pursue out- and- out partisan gerrymanders. Even when states try 
to gerrymander, pro- Democratic gerrymanders in some states often cancel 
out pro- Republican gerrymanders in other states. Moreover, shifting vot-
ing patterns can quickly undermine even the most carefully crafted map 
(Rush 1993).
This book has shown that gerrymandering can, and has, dramatically 
shifted the political balance of power in national politics at critical junc-
tures in American history. Throughout the 19th century, gerrymandering 
biased partisan seat distributions, and, on occasion, even decided majority 
control of the chamber. At this point, one might wonder to what extent the 
scales of power can be tipped by gerrymandering. How far can the national 
balance of power be tipped by the strategic design of districts? The narra-
tive provided in this book suggests that the extent to which gerrymander-
ing can tip the scales is highly conditional on the political context in which 
redistricting takes place. For much of the 19th century, with some notable 
exceptions, the political universe was highly polarized. At both the state 
and national level, the balance between the two major parties was often 
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quite close. This was especially true in the years after the Civil War and the 
reentry of the South into the Union. Because party control of the House 
was often razor thin, both the incentives to gerrymander and its impact 
increased sizably. When party control of the House was almost a foregone 
conclusion, as it was for much of the post– World War II era, the incen-
tives to aggressively pursue gerrymanders receded. Thus, one lesson of this 
book is the importance of taking into account the larger political context 
in which gerrymandering strategies are pursued.
Moreover, although this book has emphasized those instances in which 
gerrymandering demonstrably influenced outcomes, it should not be con-
cluded that political outcomes were solely fashioned by politicians manipu-
lating district design for personal gain. The American democratic system 
contains mechanisms that provide for a degree of self- correction and has 
prevented partisan politicians from converting elections into winner- take- 
all affairs. First, gains made in one state can be cancelled by countervailing 
gains in another state. Second, even when states were able to manufac-
ture winner- take- all systems— such as those found in Indiana, Ohio, and 
Maine— these highly efficient gerrymanders carried with them substantial 
risks. A small electoral breeze in the wrong direction could spell disaster 
for a majority party. And as we saw with in the elections of 1854, 1874, 
and 1894, big gambles turned into massive losses. Finally, the larger con-
stitutional system designed by the framers explicitly built mechanisms to 
work against winner- take- all politics. The separation of powers and stag-
gered elections provides both the president and the Senate with a separate 
electoral base. The separation of purpose that can arise when either the 
Senate or the president is controlled by a party different than the House 
of Representatives provides a further bulwark against full- blown winner- 
take- all politics.
Electoral Competition
Alongside their reluctance to rule on party bias, Supreme Court justices 
have also been unwilling to declare a redistricting plan invalid on the 
grounds that it violates a constitutional standard of political competition. 
Indeed, some have argued that the periodic redistricting required by the 
reapportionment doctrines has only further dampened electoral compe-
tition. Because politicians are naturally interested in self- preservation, 
the regular redistricting cycle affords politicians a regular opportunity to 
readjust district boundaries in a way that preserves their electoral security. 
These supposedly incumbent- protection acts have then been blamed for 
the rising rates of incumbent reelection rates and rising victory margins.
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Political  science research, however, is far from reaching a consensus 
on whether redistricting can serve as a plausible explanation for declining 
rates of competition in House elections. Indeed, identifying the connec-
tion, if any, between gerrymandering and electoral competition has been 
one of the front- burner questions occupying students of congressional 
elections for the past 30 years. Some have argued, echoing Tufte (1973), 
that modern redistricting has been captured by House incumbents who 
demand, and receive, safe congressional districts.
This stream of research lays much of the blame for declining competi-
tiveness at the feet of redistricting (e.g., Cox and Katz 2002; Hirsch 2003; 
Carson and Crespin 2004). Another strand of the literature, argues that redis-
tricting as a causal explanation for reducing competition has more bark than 
bite (e.g., Ferejohn 1977; Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2000; Oppen-
heimer 2005). According to this line of thought, factors such as incumbency, 
modern residential patterns (e.g., the increasing partisan homogeneity of 
cities and suburbs), and fluctuating party loyalty strongly outweigh any inde-
pendent effect that incumbent- friendly gerrymandering may have.
Here we can see the power of paying attention to a much longer time 
frame. One of the major differences between modern redistricting and this 
earlier era is the nature of redistricting plans drawn by state legislators. This 
book has shown that in the 19th century, when a single party was in charge of 
creating congressional districts, they were much more likely than their mod-
ern counterparts to draw competitive congressional districts in an attempt to 
maximize the number of seats their party could win on Election Day.
In evaluating the impact of contemporary redistricting on competition, 
it is essential to consider the full range of counterfactuals. One might ask: 
what if gerrymandering was conducted by 19th- century standards? While 
the naysayers may very well be right that redistricting has little marginal 
impact on electoral competition, it is crucial to also consider the “base.” 
What would competition look like if gerrymandering returned to 19th- 
century standards?
As one illustration of the differences between redistricting then and 
now, consider the case of Ohio. Specifically, I want to consider the congres-
sional district plans drawn by the Ohio state legislature for the election of 
1882 to those for the 2002 election. This is a valuable comparison because 
the two rounds of redistricting share many common features. First, in both 
cases, Republicans had unified control of the redistricting process.1 Sec-
ond, the division of the statewide vote was roughly the same in both cases. 
In 1880, Democrats’ share of the two- party presidential vote was 47.6 per-
cent, and in 2000 it was 48.2 percent. So, in both eras, heading into the 
redistricting cycle the state as a whole was very competitive.
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Yet when we turn our attention to the actual congressional districts 
that were drawn, stark differences appear. To compare the two redistricting 
plans, I used the presidential vote from 1880 and 2000 respectively, and 
aggregate this vote into the new congressional districts. In 1880, for exam-
ple, I used the Democratic percentage of the two- party vote by county. 
Because Ohio’s congressional districts in this era were comprised of one or 
more whole counties, I aggregated the presidential vote into the newly cre-
ated congressional districts by consulting historical district maps (Martis 
1982). For the 2000 cycle, the task was much easier. The Almanac of Ameri-
can Politics (2004) reports the 2000 presidential vote aggregated into the 
new districts that were created for the 2002 election. Thus, for both eras, 
we have a general exogenous measure of the underlying competitiveness of 
congressional districts.
TABLE 10.1 Comparing Redistricting Plans in Ohio, 1882 and 2002
 Vote in New Congressional  Vote in New Congressional 
District Districts, 1882 Districts, 2002
 1 47.5% 47.4%
 2 48.9% 35.1%
 3 48.3% 46.4%
 4 60.7% 36.1%
 5 57.8% 38.5%
 6 49.8% 48.9%
 7 47.5% 42.7%
 8 44.2% 37.1%










19 30.7% — 
20 44.7% — 
21 42.6% — 
Average Democratic % 47.9% 48.4%
Average Margin  4.8% 16.5%
% of Districts between 45% and 55% 52% (11/21) 39% (7/18)
Note: The numbers in columns 1 and 2 are the two- party percentage of the district- level presidential 
vote with the exception of Districts 1 and 2 in 1882. Both of these districts were in Hamilton County, 
which prevented identifying the presidential vote since I do not have precinct- level data for this particular 
election. Since these two districts were essentially unchanged from 1880, I report the congressional vote 
in 1880 for these districts.
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The results of this exercise are presented in table 10.1. The columns list 
the two- party presidential vote by district for the two plans. At the bottom 
of the table are summary statistics. One can clearly see the rather dramatic 
differences between the two districting plans. In the 1882 redistricting 
plan, the average district margin was 4.8 percent, while in 2002 the average 
district margin was a much larger 16.5 percent. Similarly, simply counting 
the number of districts that had a two- party vote between 45 percent and 
55 percent, we again find major differences. In 1882, nearly half of Ohio’s 
21 districts (11 out of 21) would be considered marginal.2 By contrast, in 
2002 only 38.8 percent fall into the marginal range (7 out of 18). So, here 
we have a comparison where many of the surface features are the same: a 
single party controlling the districting process and healthy competition at 
the statewide level. Yet, the congressional districts drawn by state legisla-
tors in the two eras produced two starkly different results. These results, 
albeit for one state, suggest that the debate over redistricting and electoral 
competition needs to be reframed. In considering this debate, one needs to 
ask not just what marginal changes redistricting produces, but what would 
redistricting look like if we returned to 19th- century standards. Looking 
at redistricting from the latter perspective strongly suggests that district 
design does indeed influence modern electoral competition. But it is only 
by turning to the past and expanding our knowledge of redistricting that 
this insight emerges.
This book has examined the causes and consequences of gerrymander-
ing throughout U.S. history. But the incentives that motivated the party 
politicians of the 19th and early 20th century have not stopped. Politicians 
continue to fervently seek election and seek the capture of national govern-
ment. The incentives and constraints that politicians face have only grown 
more complex with the entry of the judiciary into the redistricting process. 
But political science and history have underestimated the importance of 
gerrymandering in shaping the dynamics of American party history. Gerry-
mandering has profoundly shaped party alignments and individual career 
trajectories throughout history. Districting determined who held political 
power in the Congress and fundamentally altered the course of public pol-
icy. The reverberations of these battles continue to stir American politics. 
In evaluating the consequences of legal doctrine and potential reforms to 
the contemporary redistricting process, therefore, it is essential to have a 
firm understanding of the history of gerrymandering in America.
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Notes
C h a P t e r  1
 1. The practice of judicial noninterference would later become codified in Felix 
Frankfurter’s opinion in Colegrove v. Green (1946) which enunciated the “political 
thicket doctrine.” But this opinion merely formalized what had already been the 
long- standing practice of judicial restraint toward redistricting (Ansolabehere and 
Snyder 2008).
 2. Cited in Cooter 2000, 182.
 3. In addition, two states— New York and Pennsylvania— had multimember dis-
tricts. The 1842 law also outlawed this practice.
C h a P t e r  2
 1. Some recent historical scholarship on this episode argues that Madison’s dis-
trict was not quite the gerrymander that its contemporary critics claimed (Hunter 
2011).
 2. Cumulating or “plumping” votes (i.e., giving more than one vote to a single 
candidate) was not allowed.
 3. I started in 1800 because, prior to this election, party labels were still in flux 
in certain parts of the country, and not all members of Congress clearly identified 
with one party (or faction) (see Hoadley 1986). Moreover, data on party ratios in 
the state legislatures before 1800 is spotty at best (see Dubin 2007).
 4. Pennsylvania did, however, opt to use a few multi- member districts.
 5. Beginning with the Apportionment Act of 1872, Congress allowed states to 
elect any newly gained seats in at- large elections if, for some reason, they failed to 
redistrict. In calculating the proportion of Democratic seats, I excluded at- large 
seats. Including them does not change the results.
 6. Bias is calibrated to what would have happened if the vote were split 50- 50. 
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Thus, the bias estimates reported in table 2.2 are the result of passing λ through the 
following equation: exp[λ]/(exp[λ] + 1) − 0.5.
 7. States with only one seat, or states that elect their entire delegation at- large, 
are excluded.
 8. For more on the electoral rationale for Republican and Federalist flip- flops 
on the issue of expansion, see Theriault 2006.
C h a P t e r  3
 1. A month after his inauguration, Harrison died of pneumonia and was suc-
ceeded by Vice President John Tyler. Nominally a Whig, Tyler was a former Jackso-
nian, strong supporter of states’ rights, and a strict constructionist. He subsequently 
became a thorn in the side of congressional Whigs and vetoed their cherished 
banking legislation. Tyler was subsequently read out of the party (Holt 1999).
 2. See Shields 1985.
 3. Tyler attached a message upon signing the bill voicing his displeasure with 
the content. Whigs in the House were furious, and, led by John Quincy Adams, 
initiated a resolution calling for an official rebuke of the president’s actions (Shields 
1985, 367).
 4. This provision also meant that multimember congressional districts, which 
were used on a limited basis in New York, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, were no 
longer allowed.
 5. Three of the Georgia Whig delegation resigned mid- session, and were 
replaced by Democrats. Thus, at the time of the vote on the Apportionment Act, 
Georgia had a mixed delegation of six Whigs and three Democrats.
 6. The Democrats won the gubernatorial election 55 percent to 43 percent, and 
control of both legislative chambers.
 7. Since then Congress has occasionally granted exceptions, sometimes allow-
ing states to elect one member at- large, or exempting the districting requirement 
for states who fail to agree on a districting plan after a new apportionment. For 
example, in 1932, Congress allowed states losing seats in the federal apportionment 
to elect their members via general ticket, but only for that one election.
C h a P t e r  4
 1. Washington Post, October 14, 2004.
 2. While upholding the bulk of the plan, the Supreme Court struck down two 
of the newly drawn districts on grounds that they violated sections of the Voting 
Rights Act.
 3. Cox and Katz 2002 provide evidence that the initial wave of redistricting 
following the Supreme Court decisions of the mid- 1960s had substantial partisan 
consequences (largely in favor of the Democratic Party).
 4. These provisions are based on various federal statutes. See Martis 1982, 7.
 5. The Supreme Court in Smiley v. Holm (1932) declared that the legal rever-
sions of the 1911 Apportionment were still in force even though Congress did not 
explicitly include them in the 1929 Act.
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 6. The 1862 Apportionment Act explicitly exempted California and Illinois 
from the single- member district requirement and allowed them to elect their del-
egations by general ticket.
 7. Negotiating a new district plan, appeasing congressional incumbents, satisfy-
ing local party organizations, and agreeing on how best to allocate partisans into 
new districts were among the many transaction and opportunity costs that had to 
enter into any party’s utility calculation.
 8. This case eventually ended up in the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court decided 
in Smiley v. Holm (1932) that the legislature had to abide by the statute- making pre-
scriptions specified in Minnesota’s state constitution, and therefore declared the 
governor’s veto valid.
C h a P t e r  5
 1. Beginning with the Apportionment Act of 1872, Congress allowed states to 
elect any newly gained seats in at- large elections if for some reason they failed to 
redistrict. In calculating the proportion of Democratic seats, I excluded at- large 
seats. Including them does not change the results.
 2. In this analysis, I use the statewide total Democratic vote. Using the total vote, 
as opposed to the average across districts, captures biases arising from both the dis-
tribution of voters and from malapportionment (Grofman, Koetzle, Brunell 1997). I 
explore the magnitude of malapportionment, and its impact on elections, in chapter 
8. To foreshadow, malapportionment accounts for only a small percentage of the bias.
 3. States with only one seat or states that elect their entire delegation at- large 
are excluded.
 4. The estimates in Brady and Grofman 1991 show an average swing ratio of 
3.98 in the 19th century (1850 to 1900) and 2.13 in the 20th century (1900 to 
1980). Engstrom and Kernell (2005, 542) estimate an average swing ratio of 4.64 
between 1840 and the 1890s (in non- Southern states). This dropped to 3.48 after 
widespread adoption of the Australian ballot (the analysis stops at 1940).
 5. In almost all of these cases, I used either state- legislative election returns or 
the presidential votes reported at the ward and town level. These sources are avail-
able upon request. In some instances, I was also able to use contemporary reports 
from the New York Times for corroboration. The only case I was forced to exclude 
was the Massachusetts redistricting of 1892 because the district lines cut across too 
many county boundaries.
 6. As a comparison, Born (1985, 312– 13) estimates a coefficient of .771 for the 
period 1952 to 1982, and .668 when he restricts the sample to the period after the 
reapportionment revolution (1966– 82).
 7. Models including state and year fixed effects produced largely similar results. 
Using the presidential vote, instead of the congressional vote, predicted the 
intended change slightly worse and the actual outcomes slightly better than the 
congressional vote, but also contained an occasional large miss (i.e., when the most 
recent presidential election was four years prior to the redistricting). I preferred to 
use the most recent electoral results possible since the politicians drawing the maps 
likely used them.
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C h a P t e r  6
 1. More recently, Cox and Katz 2002 have provided a partial rehabilitation 
of the Tufte thesis as applied to the reapportionment revolution of the 1960s. 
They showed that victory margins increased in Republican- held districts, but not 
Democratic- held districts. The notion of a conditional partisan impact of redis-
tricting, as applied to the 19th century, is one I examine in more depth later (see 
also Cain 1985).
 2. I have run the results with bipartisan plans included. The estimates for these 
plans are always considerably lower than for partisan plans, as one would expect, 
but because of the small number of observations the standard errors are substantial.
 3. To control for third- party movements, I also estimated the model including 
the statewide minor party vote as an independent variable. The estimates for the 
swing ratio were largely unchanged.
 4. I also considered estimating separate state- by- state swing ratios using the 
method proposed by Gelman and King 1994. The Gelman and King method relies 
on a two- step method. First, estimate a model of district- level vote shares. Sec-
ond, simulate vote outcomes under different scenarios (e.g., different national vote 
swings). Finally, estimate seat swings under these different scenarios. Because the 
regressions for states with small House delegations produced very noisy forecasts 
of district- level vote shares, I opted instead to estimate the average swing ratio.
 5. This election actually took place over the calendar years of 1854 and 1855. 
Congressional elections in this period were not all held in November of even- 
numbered years; some states held elections prior to November, while others held 
elections the following year. For ease of presentation, I will simply refer to this 
election period as the “Election of 1854.”
 6. The 31 Democratic districts above 70 percent were all located in the South.
C h a P t e r  7
 1. I have also run the model with year- fixed effects instead. The results for the 
redistricting coefficient remain largely the same. Moreover, running the model 
with state- fixed effects had minimal effect on the results.
 2. The expectations for this variable are not necessarily straightforward. The 
reason is that not all congressional elections occurred at the same time as the presi-
dential election. Throughout this period, some states held congressional elections 
in non- November months. The potential impact, if any, of nonconcurrent elections 
on surge and decline effects in this era remains understudied.
C h a P t e r  8
 1. The court allowed the original map to be used for the 2002 election because 
the primary elections had already been held. A redrawn map was then put into 
place for the 2004 elections and remained in place through the 2010 elections. 
The redistricting map eventually ended up in front of the Supreme Court (Vieth v. 
Jubelirer 2004). In a plurality opinion, the court upheld the plan arguing that they 
could not come up with a justiciable standard for determining whether a partisan 
gerrymander violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.
 2. The partisan and policy consequence of malapportionment in the Senate has 
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been the subject of a handful of studies (Lee and Oppenheimer 1999; Riker 1955; 
Stewart and Weingast 1992). There is also research on the apportionment of House 
seats across states and the particular methods for calculating how many seats each 
state receives in the decennial apportionment (Balinski and Young 1982; Eagles 
1990; Kromkowski 2002). Here I am focusing on the intrastate apportionment of 
House seats.
 3. This example draws heavily from Grofman, Koetzle, and Brunell 1997.
 4. Data on district- level population comes from Parsons, Beach, and Dubin 
1986; and Parsons, Dubin, and Parsons 1990.
 5. As a comparison, on the eve of the reapportionment revolution in 1962, the 
average difference between smallest and largest districts had surged to 270,000 
people.
 6. These differences, however, pale in comparison to the Senate. The current 
ratio of inequality in the Senate is a whopping 69 (California versus Wyoming).
 7. Here I use the absolute value. In the later analysis, I use the actual value to 
measure deviations above and below the state average.
 8. Although substantial, these inequalities pale in comparison to many state leg-
islatures. For example, Argersinger (1992, 78) reports that the Rhode Island senate 
in 1900 had an average deviation of 111.
 9. Another obvious cleavage was rural versus urban districts, which, in some 
cases, correlated with party divisions, but at other times cut across the parties (e.g., 
Eagles 1990). Here I am mainly concerned with partisan cleavages.
 10. The town- based apportionment scheme of the lower house gave Republicans 
a virtual lock on that chamber. From here they had an institutional veto to prevent 
any redistribution of either the state or congressional districts that might benefit 
Democrats.
 11. I also ran an analysis with the entire sample and included a term for those 
years right after a redistricting that was also interacted with the other terms in 
the equation. The years immediately following a redistricting did not differ sig-
nificantly from other years in predicting deviations, so it was left out of the final 
equations.
C h a P t e r  9
 1. For those keeping track, this means that between 1842 and 1962 Connecticut 
had only two congressional district maps.
C h a P t e r  1 0
 1. In 2001– 2002, Republicans in Ohio held both the state legislature and the 
governor’s office. Because the legislature failed to act before January 2002, under 
the state constitution, they needed a 2/3 majority in both houses for a new law to 
take effect in 2002. Thus, Republicans had to gain the votes of a handful of Demo-
crats. Nevertheless, the plan was considered a Republican gerrymander (see Barone 
and Cohen 2003, 1246).
 2. This is a conservative estimate. If one were to round off, then the 16th, 17th, 
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